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ABSTRACT
The army of the Habsburg Monarchy was the central
institution of the Habsburg state, and it embodied the
ideal of non-national, dynastic rule.

The army leadership

was aware of the dangers of nationalism, but in the period
between the end of the Napoleonic Wars and the revolutions
of 1848, no attempt was made to overcome the danger of
national disaffection.

The revolutions of 1848 caused the

army to remove Hungarian and Italian units from their
homelands, but, despite the suspicion in which they were
held, these troops fought well in the wars of 1859 and
1866.
The financial weakness of the Monarchy and the coming
of home rule to Hungary caused this policy of garrisoning
Hungarian units outside of Hungary to be gradually
abandoned after 1867.

The worsening of relations with

Russia after the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78 led the
Monarchy's army to undertake a series of reforms designed
to reduce the time needed for mobilization.

Central to

rapid mobilization was a "territorial" system wherein most
of the Monarchy's soldiers were garrisoned in their
recruiting districts.

Despite the growth of nationalist

agitation, the army leadership expressed no fears for the
loyalty of the troops.

Nonetheless, the army became

deeply involved in suppressing nationalist unrest,
especially in Bohemia and Hungary.
vi

This process

culminated in 1905 with proposals for full-scale military
intervention in Hungary.
In the last decade before the outbreak of the First
World War the army leadership, aware of the growing of
nationalist feeling and the growing social isolation of
the officer corps, sought to develop its own plans for a
renewal of the Monarchy.

These various plans, which

became increasingly pessimistic, involved proposed wars
with Italy or Serbia or support for the plans of Archduke
Franz Ferdinand, the Monarchy's heir-apparent, who
intended to begin his reign with a military coup in
Hungary that would enable him to reconstruct the Monarchy
as a centralized state.

By 1914 the army leadership,

though not the soldiers in the ranks, had come to despair
of the Monarchy's future.

INTRODUCTION

Between 1848 and 1914 the Habsburg state changed its
boundaries, its name, and the designation of its armed
forces.

In 1848 the state was known as the Austrian

Empire, and its armed forces were the kaiBerlich-koniglich
(imperial-royal) Armee.

In 1914 the subjects of a state

known variously as Austria-Hungary, the Habsburg Monarchy,
or the Dual Monarchy, marched off to war in three
different formations— the imperial-and-royal (kaiaerlichund-koniglich) joint army, the imperial-royal Landwehr of
Austria, and the royal Honvdd of Hungary.

The changes in

designation, both for the state itself and for its army,
reflected the attempts of the Monarchy's rulers to deal
with the effects of nationalism— particularly of Hungarian
separatism— on a multinational state.
Both the supporters and opponents of the Habsburg
state regarded the army as the special servant of the
dynasty.

It was the army that held the Monarchy together

during the revolutions of 1848/49, putting down revolts in
Italy, Prague, and Vienna and fighting a bitter civil war
to keep Hungary from asserting its independence.

The

events of 1848 made both the friends and opponents of the
dynasty acutely aware of the multinational composition of
the army— and of the role of the army in supporting a
political order which was explicitly opposed to the idea

of nationalism.

Throughout the half-century between the

coming of Hungarian home rule in 1867 and the outbreak of
the First World War, political debates on the size and
structure of the Habsburg army were defined by the army's
presumed role in creating and maintaining a unified, non
national, dynastic state.
This study deals with the effects of the nationality
problem on the Habsburg army between 1848 and 1914.

It

treats the Habsburg army both as an object in the
political debates within the Monarchy and as an
institution trying to preserve its own particular ethos in
the face of political and social changes it only dimly
understood.
The Habsburg armies held the Habsburg state together
in 1848/49 and, despite the growth of nationalist
sentiment within the Monarchy, fought throughout the First
World War with both loyalty and tenacity.

In an era which

has seen the dissolution of both state and army in
Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, the army of the Habsburg
Monarchy provides yet another example of an institution
attempting to reconcile its own belief in state service
with the conflicting demands of nationalism and a
supranational ideology.

CHAPTER 1
ARMY AND DYNASTY:

VORMARZ AND REVOLUTION

The army of the Habsburgs survived the Napoleonic
wars with its prestige intact and its role in European
policy enhanced.

The soldiers of the dynasty had fought

the French danger for a generation, and though repeatedly
savaged, had avoided the sudden catastrophe that had
overtaken their Prussian rivals.

The officers of the

Austrian army held fast to the memory of Aspern and were
quick to point out that in 264 engagements in the French
wars, Austrian arms had carried the day in 168.1

The

Habsburgs had fielded the largest of the allied armies in
the campaigns of 1813-14, and an Austrian field marshal
had been supreme commander at Leipzig.

The army of the

dynasty had outlasted the ambitions of General Bonaparte,
and Prince Metternich and his emperor expected it to be
the main support of legitimacy and stability in the
postwar age.

Twenty years after the end of the French

wars, Austrian generals could still note with pride that,
in the fight against liberalism and subversion,

"even

today the legitimate part of Europe can look with full
confidence only towards the Austrian army."2
The army with which Prince Metternich proposed to
defend legitimate interests in central Europe consisted
3

4
in 1847 of 294 battalions of infantry, 268 squadrons of
cavalry, 56 dispersed batteries and 121 companies of
artillery, and some units of technical troops and
frontier guards.

The army was organized by branch as3

Infantry
58 line infantry regiments
20 grenadier battalions
18 Military Border regiments
1 Tirol J£ger regiments
12 Jager battalions
6 garrison battalions
Cavalry
8 cuirassier regiments
6 dragoon regiments
7 chevaux-leger regiments
12 hussar regiments
4 uhlan regiments
Artillery
5 field artillery regiments
various garrison units

Metternich boasted that the peacetime strength of the
army was 400,000 men— 315,000 infantry, 49,000 cavalry,
24,000 artillery, and 9400 technical troops.

In theory,

another 400,000 could be raised by summoning the
Hungarian Insurrectio and mobilizing the seventy
battalions of the Austrian Landwehr.

The Insurrectio,

however, had last been called out in 1809, when the
Magyar lords had ridden out to do their feudal duty in
their ermine cloaks and egret plumes and were slaughtered

by the French at Raab.

The affair had been a set-piece

on the theme of chivalry against metallurgy, and the
Insurrecto— as demands in the Hungarian Diets of 1832,
1836, and 1840 for its revival seem to indicate4— had
been allowed to fall dormant.

The Landwehr— which had

done fairly well in 1809— led a shadowy existence
throughout the Vormarz.

Gunther Rothenberg declared that

the emperor had decided to abolish the militia in 1827
and that the Landwehr was "completely shelved" in 1631.5
However, Wrede's Geschichte der k.-u.-k. Wehrmacht as
well as reports from contemporary British observers grant
the Landwehr a continued existence.6
In any case, the wartime strength of the Habsburg
army in Metternich's day was far below the 800,000 men of
the chancellor's calculations.

The peacetime estimate of

400,000 was itself more than wishful thinking.

Army

expenditures were fixed at 40-44 million florins a year,
and military expenditures fell as a percent of the budget
from 50% to 20% between 1815 and 1848.7

The military

coped with an inflationary era by keeping essential
cadres on active duty and sending the rest of the men on
leave.

Perhaps a third of the army was permanently on

leave, and in the latter half of the 1820s the figure may
have climbed to one-half.8 Alan Sked calculated that in
the Vormarz years the chancellor "could count on only

6
270,000-300,000 troops, and he preferred not to rely on
them at all."9
Sked's remark bears further consideration.
Metternich's policies abroad were predicated on diplomacy
rather than force, and the defense of the Rhenish
frontier was by and large simply handed to the Prussians.
Yet the Austrian army was regularly employed throughout
the Vormarz.

Austrian units did garrison duty in the

federal fortresses of southern and western Germany, and
in 1832 Metternich assembled a brigade for a proposed
intervention against radical elements in the princedoms
of the southwest.

The army intervened in Naples and

Piedmont in 1820/21, in central Italy in 1831, and in
Parma and Modena in 1847.

The Grenzer units on the

Military Border fought regimental-sized campaigns against
brigands, Bosnian rebels, and Turkish irregulars in 1819,
1831, 1834, and 1845/46.10 Metternich's diplomacy, the
saying went, was all done with mirrors.
true of his military policy.

The same was

Neither Metternich, the

Archduke Charles, still the Monarchy's most prestigious
soldier, nor Count Kolowrat, Metternich's rival and
architect of the Monarchy's financial policies,
considered the army ready for foreign war.

It was the

state of the army that kept the Austrian government from
going to war over the Eastern crisis of 1829 or against

France in 1840, despite favourable diplomatic conditions.
The Monarchy was prepared to intervene in Italy in
defense of "order" throughout the Vormarz, since Austrian
policy held that the road from Paris to Vienna ran
through Milan,11 but the role of the army there, as in
the Monarchy as a whole, was largely one of security.
Critics of Feldmarschall Count Radetzky, the commander of
Austrian forces in Lombardy-Venetia, were unimpressed
with the training given the Austrian armies in Italy, and
Radetzky's famed field maneuvers may have been more
shadow than substance, exercises in propaganda designed
to convince the population of Lombardy that, whatever the
temptations of nationalism and French doctrines, the
double-headed eagle still flew in Milan.12
The armies of the dynasty were intended to support
stability and legitimacy in Europe and within the
Monarchy itself.

The image of an army of 800,000 led by

the heirs of Schwarzenberg and Archduke Charles served
that role abroad, while at home the army fulfilled its
mission by suppressing brigandage on the Turkish
frontiers, protecting Austrian rule in Lombardy and
Venetia, and putting down political disturbances.

In

1845 Illyrian rioters were put down by force in Agram,
and the next year the army and a loyal peasantry crushed
a rising of Galician nobles and occupied the free city-

8
state of Cracow.

Strikes that took on a political color

could be dealt with by the military, and Prince Alfred
Windisch-Graetz first made his name in Prague by putting
down a strike of textile and handicraft workers in 1844.
No provincial gendarmerie existed outside LombardyVenetia until 1849, and the army provided police service
in the Austrian countryside.

The urban criminal police

forces of the Monarchy were pitifully small, and in major
cities grenadier and pioneer troops from local garrisons
did duty as supplemental police.13 An army designed to
fight abroad or on the frontiers generates much of its
own cohesion; the urge to defend one's home, the glories
of empire and conquest, and the sense of being with one's
own kind in an alien land are all powerful bonds.

An

army whose role is largely internal must possess far
stronger inner strength, and that point was not missed in
Vienna.

After 1848 the dynasty was well aware that only

its generals had saved the Monarchy, and in the
continuing Hungarian crises at the end of the century
Archduke Albrecht was quick to point out that only the
army linked the lands of the Monarchy together; if the
army's spirit failed, then the dynasty was lost and
Austria would exist no more.14
The Austrian army of the Vormarz, Rudolf Kiszling
maintained, was ”an absolutely reliable instrument of
i

power in the hand of the monarch."15 Yet in 1848/49 the
army experienced a mutiny unequalled in its history.
Thousands of Italian regulars deserted the colors, nearly
the whole of the Austrian fleet offered its services to
Daniele Manin's reborn Venetian Republic, and thousands
of Hungarian regulars took up arms against their
sovereign.

The events of 1848/49 within the army are

made even more difficult to understand by the lack of any
official inquiry into their causes.16

The question

remained: how reliable was the army of the dynasty, and
what measures were taken to ensure its loyalty?
Francis I is supposed to have observed of his empire
that
My peoples are strange to one another and that
is all right. They do not get the same sickness at
the same time. In France if the fever comes you are
caught by it at the same time. I send the
Hungarians into Italy, the Italians into Hungary.
Every people watches its neighbor. The one does not
understand the other, and one hates the other...From
their antipathy will be born order and from the
mutual hatred general peace...17

The peoples of the Monarchy were strange to one another,
and the soldiers of its army hardly less so.

Perhaps

two-thirds of the officers were German, a figure which
one contemporary observer put at eleven in twelve for
some Slav regiments, and the old Habsburg tradition of
accepting the swords of foreign officers lingered on:
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Englishmen, Danes, French, Russians, and Swiss were to be
found serving the dynasty.18

Englishmen (Including

Richard Guyon, who became one of Kossuth's generals In
1848) fought as hussar officers on both sides in the
Hungarian war, exiled Legitimist Frenchmen commanded
Austrian troops in Italy, a Cavanagh of Ballyane fell
leading Hungarian infantry at Vincenza, and in a
celebrated remark Heinrich Hentzi, the imperial commander
at Budapest in May 1849, explained to his besiegers that,
though born in Debrecen, he was no Hungarian but a Swiss
loyal only to the emperor.

Officers in 1848 were in any

case under no obligation to learn their soldiers'
languages and, as in Wellington's army, they could not
really be expected to talk to the men.

Ethnic and

linguistic purity were rare in any province and
especially so in Bohemia and Hungary.

There were, Istvan

Deak points out, Hungarian regiments where hardly anyone
spoke Hungarian, and while a regiment from Transylvanian
Siebenburgen might be German enough to understand a
Salzburg unit, it would remain wholly alien to a Szekler
unit raised a few days' ride away.19
The dynasty's armies had always been multinational,
and as early as 1715 Prince Eugene had wished to exclude
Poles, French, Italians, Hungarians, and Croats from line
regiments.

A Hofkriegarat ordinance of 1722 warned

11
against those nationalities who were "great slackers and
braggarts" and who would "debauch and lead astray" their
German comrades.70

Yet the army had never been a merely

German institution, and in the VormHrz the provinces of
the Monarchy provided regiments as follows (exclusive of
the Military Border)i
Infantry

Cavalry

Artillery

Austria

9

7

2

Bohemia

8

8

2

Galicia

13

8

-

Hungary

12

12

-

Lombardy-Venetia

8

1

-

Moravia-Silesia

5

2

1

Transylvania

3

-

_

In the last year before the revolution the strength of
the peacetime army (including Jtiger and Grenzer units but
excluding technical branches) was rated at 339,574
officers and other ranks.

This number could be broken

down by province of origin as*1

Austria (Upper, Lower, Inner)

55,546

16.1%

Bohemia

47,544

14.1%

Galicia

55,540

16.5%

Hungary

76,179

22.64

Lombardy-Venetia

30,100

8.74

12
Moravia-Silesia

24,930

7.4%

South Slav Areas

31,228

9.2%

Transylvania

18,507

5.4%

These numbers must be treated with some caution, since
the Hungarian figures would include large numbers of nonMagyars, and large numbers of Germans would be included
in the figures for Bohemia and Moravia.

Yet the army can

be seen with fair accuracy as being very likely half Slav
and only about a sixth German.

Hungary, where regular

line regiments had been raised only since Theresian
times, provided the single largest "national" contingent.
The loyalty of multinational armies and imperial
populations has been a problem since antiquity.

Athens

used citizen-soldiers and sailors to police its Aegean
empire but kept order in Athens itself with Thracian
slave-soldiers; Rome kept its native auxiliaries away
from their recruiting areas.

The heterogeneity of the

Habsburg army was obvious, and the problem of nationalism
did not escape the dynasty and the Hofkriegsrat, the
Monarchy's central military administrative council.
imperial authorities, the American consul in Hungary
reported, devoted "millions of money and the highest
orders of intellect" so that the "enormous mass of
machinery which pervaded the empire, and held in

The
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subjection the hetereogeneous and discordant nations of
which it was composed” would be an effective internal
force.22
and-rule.

Key to this was a military system of divideThe standard English-language work on the

Habsburg army, Rothenberg's The Army of Francis Joseph,
points out that at the end of 1847, six of fifteen
Hungarian infantry regiments were stationed in Italy,
four more were in the Austrian crownlands, and only five
remained inside Hungary.

Four of the eight Italian

infantry regiments were stationed outside Italy, while
six regiments from the Austrian crownlands had been sent
to Lombardy-Venetia and four more to Hungary.

Thirteen

of twenty-five non-Hungarian cavalry regiments were
garrisoned in Hungary, and six of the twelve regiments of
Hungarian hussars had been sent outside Hungary.
Rothenberg insists that these figures show that

To counteract nationalist influences, Vienna
adopted a policy of distributing troops outside
their ethnic areas, and in addition troops were
transferred frequently to avoid their becoming too
friendly with the local inhabitants.23

Some current scholarship agrees with this view.

Alan

Sked has translated from the Magyar parts of an article
on "The Austrian Military Organization in Hungary and the
Troops Stationed in Our Country in April 1848” by Aladar
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Urban of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences.

Urban

explains that

The Hungarian cavalry and infantry
regiments...were dislocated, naturally mainly in
foreign provinces, far from their homeland. Thus at
the beginning of 1848 out of 45 battalions of the 15
Hungarian and Transylvanian infantry regiments, only
24 were garrisoned inside the country; of the five
Grenadier battalions...only two were stationed at
home. The position of the Hussar regiments was
similar; of the 12 regiments, only 4 were in Hungary
and the annexed lands or were in Transylvanian
territory. On the other hand, 16 battalions of
seven foreign infantry regiments, besides 12 cavalry
regiments, were stationed in Hungary and Croatia and
Transylvania.
That is, nearly half of the foreign
cavalry regiments were stationed in our homeland and
the number of foreign infantry was comparatively
large.24

The image of a deliberate policy of divide-and-rule
is firmly established in Habsburg historiography.

The

classic view is exemplified by the American diplomat W.
H. Stiles, who in explaining the events of 1848/49 to
Americans, wrote that

A body of troops, in ordinary times, is
quartered in every capital and every town in the
empire, the number in each being regulated by the
size and character of the population.
Infinite
care, too, is taken in the disposition of these
troops, which is always made with reference to the
different nationalities. Agreeably to the "divide
and conquer" principles of Metternich, no troops
were permitted to remain at home, or in those
provinces where they were enlisted and belonged, but
invariably transferred to another and more distant
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nation, where they could not speak the language, had
no sympathy with the people, and where they were
ready, at any moment, to shoot them down with as
little compunction as they would a foreign enemy
whom they had never before seen. Bohemians, for
instance, were quartered upon the Hungarians;
Hungarians upon the Austrians; Austrians upon the
Poles; Poles upon the Italians; and Italians upon
the Croatians, &c.3!

Sixty years after the events of 1848 it was firmly
believed by Franz Ferdinand and his circle that prior to
the 1880s an extra-territorial garrison system had been
applied to deunpen national enthusiasms in the army and
such a system should be immediately re-established.36
Yet official references to any such system are remarkably
absent.

Certainly there was concern about nationalism.

Count Frimont, commander of Austrian forces in Italy in
the 1820s, had argued against using Lombard or Venetian
units to suppress revolutions in the Italian states and
refused to allow Italian officers to serve in the
Austrian military mission sent to rebuild the army of the
duchy of Parma in 1834.37

Radetzky himself wrote in

1834 that Italy and Poland would never be properly loyal
"military countries,"36 and there had been arrests of a
handful of disaffected junior officers in Galician
regiments in 1840.39

Yet there was no official policy

of relocating regiments away from their homelands.
Istvan Deak claimed that army policy was to send the two

16
line battalions of each regiment to distant areas
inhabited by different nationalities while leaving the
third battalion and the recruiting and training machinery
of the regiment in its home district.

But he went on to

admit that such a system was "never consistently
pursued."30 Any presumed policy of divide-et-impera
must be examined in light of the histories of the
individual regiments, Sked's, Survival, analysis of
Radetzky's order of battle, and the state of imperial
finances.
The army was the property of the emperor, the
supreme warlord.

Its soldiers were bound by their oath

to fight "wherever the imperial will of His Majesty may
command, on land and water, by day and by night, in
fights, battles, skirmishes and enterprises of any
kind"31 and from the time of Montecuccoli and Eugene the
Hofkriegsrat had attempted to run the army as an imperial
institution and not as a collection of provincial
militias.

There was no standard method of training

officers or levying recruits in the VormSrz and no
standard term of service.

Until the 1640s Cisleithanian

recruits served for fourteen years, Italians for eight.
In Hungary, where the county authorities used the army as
a dumping ground for undesirables, service was for life.
Only in 1845 was a standard eight-year term introduced.

There was concern that Cisleithanian provinces were
bearing a disproportionately heavy burden— Radetzky
pointed out that between a fourteen-year active term and
a thirteen-year Landwehr committment, a Cisleithanian
recruit had a military liability up to age 453Z— and a
continuing unhappiness with the quality and number of
recruits provided by the Hungarian counties.
Nonetheless, the regiments were, within the limits
imposed by linguistic diversity, regarded as all of a
kind.

Regiments could not be built up from a common

draft of recruits— Galicians brigaded with Lombards and
Voralbergers— but all were soldiers of the emperor, and
the Habsburg army appears to have taken seriously Article
1 of Archduke Charles's service regulations:

nationality

and religion were of no significance next to a soldier's
oath of loyalty.33
The army was a long-service institution, and a
recruit whose life revolved around his regiment for eight
or fourteen years would presumably be insulated from many
of the political fevers of the civilian population.

Yet

the Habsburg army was hardly unique in setting long terms
of service.

Contemporary military thought still held

that only long-service troops could be properly and
economically trained.

In any case, even long-service

troops would be exposed to local agitation if left in one
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garrison long enough, and the accepted image of Habsburg
policy is that regiments were deliberately and frequently
shuffled about:

Vienna adopted a policy of distributing troops
outside their ethnic areas, and in addition troops
were transferred frequently to avoid their becoming
too friendly with the local inhabitants. One
regiment...Infantry Regiment "Hoch-undDeutschmeister" Nr. 4, was stationed in Milan in
1815, posted to St.-Polten the next year, switched
to Bergamo in 1820, to Naples in 1822, to Capua in
1830, to Gorz in 1831, to Verona in 1833, to
Kaisers-Ebersdorf in 1836, to Vienna in 1840, and
finally to Tarnow and Lemberg in 184 6.34

Rothenberg's example is somewhat flawed.

The Hoch-

und-Deutschmeister was a Viennese regiment, and the
memorial raised by the Viennese to "our Deutachmeister"
on the regiment's second centenary still stands in the
little Deutschmeisterplatz before the Rossauer Kaserne.
The list of regimental movements is impressive, yet in
the thirty years Rotheberg considers, one might note that
M

f

Deutachmeister spent four years at St.-Polten, only a
day's march to the west of the capital, four years at
suburban Kaisers-Ebersdorf, and six years in Vienna
itself.

It was presumably at Naples and Capua on active

service, and was part of the forces sent to police
Galicia in 1846.

In other words, between 1815 and 1846

the regiment was in or near its home for fourteen years.

A look at Wrede's listings of regimental stations
suggests that regiments, on the whole, moved every four
to six years.

Yet exceptions abound:

the Hungarian 2.

Infantry was at Pressburg from 1830 to 1848; the Bohemian
1. Cuirassiers at Brandeis from 1819 to 1848; the 37.
Infantry (Grosswardein) at Lemberg throughout the
Vormarz; the 4. Cuirassiers (Lower Austria) at Pressburg
from 1817 to 1847 and the 8. Cuirassiers (Bohemia) at
Podiebrad from 1836 to 1848.

Two of the Italian

regiments which remained loyal to Radetzky in 1848— the
38. (Brescia) and 45. (Verona) Infantry— spent 1830-48 in
narrow orbits around their recruiting areas in northern
Italy, rarely more than a few days' march from home.35
When the Richter Grenadiers were ordered to Hungary in
October 1848, they had been in Vienna for more than
fourteen years.36
A purely tactical view favored exposing regiments to
more than one locale and not allowing a unit to go to
seed in one garrison, since as imperial property all
regiments existed to defend the Monarchy as a whole.

A

garrison post requiring one battalion of infantry could
be manned equally well by Galicians or Veronese.

In

March 1830 directives were issued for large-scale
transfers designed to stir the army from its "peacetime
slumber."37

Yet by the mid-1830s there were budgetary
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pressures against moving regiments across the Monarchy.
More regiments were garrisoned in their home districts/
large numbers of men were simply sent home on unpaid
leave, and, when regiments were moved, it was to posts in
nearby areas.

Italian units on the move were more likely

to march to Croatia or the Dalmatian coast than Hungary
or Bohemia.

Between 1835 and 1837 the percentage of

Italian infantry in Radetzky's forces rose from thirty to
forty-five percent.38 Count Franz Hartig, the former
governor of Lombardy protested to Vienna that prudence
dictated that Italian soldiers be kept out of LombardyVenetia,39 but as the army's budget stagnated in the
decade before 1848 the Hofkriegsrat could not afford to
pay for constant relocations.
Regimental histories also suggest that the picture
of a deliberate policy of divide-and-rule is suspect,
the Berkeleys give Radetzky's order of battle in January
1848 as containing 70-75,000 men deployed in sixty-one
battalions, thirty-six squadrons, and 108 batteries.
They go on to note that "the greatest mistake made by
Radetzky was to have left so many Italian regiments... in
Italy."80

The Verona general command had no Italian

gunners or troopers, but twenty-four battalions— about
forty percent of the infantry and a third of the total
force— were made up of Italians, a figure twice the size

of the twelve battalions of Austrians who made up the
next largest ethnic unit.

The remaining twenty-five

battalions can be broken down as ten Croat, nine
Hungarian, and six Bohemian-Moravian.

Even if the

Hungarian and Bohemian units contained large numbers of
Germans, the infantry at Radetzky's disposal had a solid
Italian core.

These troops were exposed to considerable

propaganda bombardment in Lombardy, but Alan Sked's
search of Metternich's files turned up only a single case
of Italian soldiers being successfully suborned by
nationalist sects before 1848.41

In 1833 the governor

of Lombardy reported to Metternich that, while his
Italian troops were subject to constant attempts by
nationalists to subvert their loyalty "as far as the
military is concerned, the conduct of the Lombard troops
up till now can in no way be reproached.

With regard to

both discipline and loyalty to their oaths, no blame
whatsoever can be attached to them."42

Radetzky was

more than satisfied with the morale of his Italians into
March 1848, and it is worth noting that three Italian
regiments remained loyal throughout 1848/49, and the 38.
Infantry (Brescia) distinguished itself against the
Piedmontese and against rebels in Milan and the Veneto.
Rothenberg maintains that at the end of 1847 ten of
the fifteen Hungarian infantry regiments were stationed
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outside Hungary.

His figures, which apparently derive

from Rudolf Kiszling's work,43 are not as reliable as
Aladar Urban's, which are drawn from the Hungarian
archives.

However, Urban's contention that at the

beginning of 1848 twenty-four of forty-five Hungarian
battalions were at home does not bear out his point that
the Hungarian regiments were largely relegated to
garrisons "far from their homeland."

If indeed sixteen

non-Hungarian battalions were stationed in Hungary,
Transylvania, and Croatia, Urban does not indicate how
many were in Croatia, where in view of the large-scale
fighting that broke out on the Military Border in
1845/46, one might see them as reinforcements for the
Grenzer and not (as Urban does) as foreign occupation
troops.

Sked also notes that in Urban's view a non-

Hungarian unit at, say, Agram would count as a "foreign"
unit in Hungary; a Hungarian regiment sent to Croatia
would count as being away from "our homeland."44
In April 1848 Count Latour, the new Austrian war
minister, reported that imperial troop strength in
Hungary was twenty-four battalions, sixty-two squadrons,
and eleven companies of artillery.45 The figure cannot
be taken as definitive.

Troop levels in Hungary were

extremely fluid throughout the spring of 1848.

Hungarian

units returned from other parts of the Monarchy, some
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Cisleithanian units were, at the behest of the Hungarian
war ministry, sent out of Hungary, and still other
Hungarian units were sent from Hungary to reinforce
garrisons in Italy or the Border.

Nonetheless, Latour's

report indicates that while surprisingly little of the
cavalry (eight of sixty-two squadrons) was Hungarian,
sixteen battalions were from Hungarian regiments.

While

much of the artillery was Bohemian (Bohemia and Moravia
supplied three of the army's five artillery regiments),
two-thirds of the infantry garrisoned in Hungary was, if
not solidly Magyar, at least from regiments raised in the
Lands of the Crown of St. Stephen.

The imperial garrison

in Hungary was officially rated at 32,000 men; some
14,000 of them (forty-three percent) were Hungarian.
Latour's report makes only an eighth of the cavalry
Hungarian— as compared to a third (six of nineteen
regiments) for Rothenberg and Kiszling and a quarter
(four of sixteen regiments) for Urban.

Nonetheless, the

number of Hungarian soldiers in Hungary in early 1848—
two-thirds of the infantry, forty-three percent of the
total, including the garrisons of the major fortresses of
Komorn and Peterwardein— is too large to fit easily into
a policy of divide-and-rule.
Even if no deliberate policy of moving regiments
outside their national areas can be demonstrated, other
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policies could be used to guard against any potential
disloyalty.

The post-Mutiny Indian Army restricted

access to combat branches to those northern "martial
races" who had been loyal in 1857.

The Soviet army tried

to confine its Central Asian conscripts to labor and
service units.

Unsupported infantry are a manageable

threat, and one might cripple any chance of a rising by
denying suspect nationalities access to heavy weapons.
Stiles certainly felt that the Austrian army employed
such devices:

Another most admirable arrangement for...
strengthening the empire at the expense of the
provinces, consisted in the arrangement of the army,
and by which each nation of the empire was
instructed in only a single arm. The Bohemians, for
example, were mostly infantry; the Hungarians,
cavalry; the Austrians, artillery; the Tyrolese,
riflement; the Poles, lancers. The whole,
therefore, when united under imperial command,
constituted a powerful and efficient force; but
divided, no province, in case of revolt, was
possessed of a complete and formidable army.46

And in point of fact neither Hungary nor Galicia provided
any artillery.

The reason, though, seems less one of

deliberation than tradition.

Artillery was by tradition

a bourgeois branch of service, and the skills required of
an artillery officer were not really compatible with
being a gentleman— a situation not unknown in the English

and Prussian armies.

Artillery was largely a Bohemian—

Bohemian German but more often Czech— -arm.

Was there

ever, Archduke Albrecht would ask, a better or more cold
blooded gunner than a Czech?47 Artillery was a field for
the urban bourgeoisie and skilled workers, and those
classes were notably absent in East Galicia or transDanubian Hungary.

There was no attempt to deny cannon to

the Italians; Venetians with a taste for military
trigonometry could become naval gunners.

Other Italian

officers dominated the army's technical branches—
fortification, engineering, cartography.46 The same
sort of logic applied to the cavalry as well.

Lombardy

provided only a single regiment of chevaux-leger (one
which would remain conspicuously loyal in 1848/49), but
northern Italy, like Transylvania and the Tirol, was not
horse country.

Steppe lands— Galicia and Hungary— were

cavalry country by tradition, and those two provinces
provided twenty regiments of cavalry between them.
The simplest means of controlling suspect
populations is to station overwhelming force at the
source of disaffection.

English liberals like the

Berkeleys or Priscilla Robertson certainly believed that
the Austrian army was deployed to overawe the population;
Cecil Woodham-Smith once cast a glance at 1820s Austria,
"ruled by an army, where even to speak of liberty was a

crime."4* Urban suggests that, since in February X848
the imperial garrison in Hungary— twelve grenadier
companies, 130 companies of line infantry, seventy-two
squadrons of cavalry, eleven companies of artillery, plus
technical and fortress units— amounted to about one-tenth
of total imperial strength, Hungary was under military
occupation.*0 The same image— which perhaps owes more
to Browning's poetry than to political observers— is
applied to Lombardy and Venetia.

The Hofkriegarat, well

aware of Napoleon's maxim that the road from Paris to
Vienna ran through Milan— and of revolutionary currents
inside Italy— kept the Verona general command on a
wartime footing.

Yet the garrison levels in such a

sensitive area remained low.

In 1833 Radetzky 'a army was

made up of 75,000 men, but by early 1846 the marshal
disposed of only 49,000— 15,000 of whom were fortress
garrisons in the Quadrilateral.

In point of fact, as

Sked noted, there seemed to be no relation in the Vormarz
between garrison strengths and the presumed political
reliability of the various provinces.

Sked's chart of

1846 garrison levels shows little evidence of quartering
troops on the disaffected!*l
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Table 1.1. Civil and Populations, Habsburg Monarchy 1846
Province

Civil
Population

Lower Austria
1,375,400
Upper Austria
844,914
Steiermark
966,863
K&rnten-Krain
757,355
KUatenland
477,702
Tirol
830,948
Bohemia
4,112,085
Moravia-Silesia
2,162,086
Galicia
4,718,991
Dalmatia
384,572
Lombardy
2,516,420
Venetia
2,137,608
Hungary
12,039,400
Transylvania
2,069,600
Border
1,147,283

Military
34,226
12,652
18,466
2,146
3,487
8,807
62,083
4,552
78,252
9,456
31,556
30,945
56,802
9,400
56,322

Ratio Civil/
Military
Rank
40.19
66.78
54.72
352.93
137.00
94.36
66.24
474.97
60.31
40.67
79.74
69.08
211.96
220.17
20.37

2
7
4
14
13
10
6
15
5
3
9
8
11
12
1

Some 34,000 soldiers were stationed in Lower
Austria, but the capital itself was lightly garrisoned.
When revolution broke out in March 1848, the young
Archduke Albrecht, commanding the city garrison, had only
14,000 men of all branches to control a city of more than
400,000.

Albrecht *as able to restore order in the Inner

City after a day of street fighting, but his men were
unable to control the suburbs.

The authorities in

Vienna, like their counterparts throughout Europe,' were
paralyzed by the sudden onset of the revolution that
Metternich had long predicted, and their lack of
resolution contributed much to the springtime triumph of
the revolutionaries.

As R. J. Rath's account of the
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colors, more thousands of Hungarian regulars joined
Kossuth's rebel armies, and imperial regulars under the
command of the new Hungarian war ministry fought against
Croat troops who claimed to be defending the imperial
regime which had proclaimed them outlaws.

The irony is

of course that the initial rebel successes in Italy and
the ability of the Hungarians to secede depended on the
presence of large numbers of native troops. There had
been no system of assuring national reliability employed
before March 1848; the defections of the spring and fall
would not be forgotten after the restoration of order.
About a third of Radetzky's men were Italian-born,
and while the marshal had consistently regarded political
suspicion of his men as malicious and ignorant civilian
attacks on military honor, he had admitted in a report of
December 1847 to the Hofkriagarat that one could not
expect of the Italian troopB "more than is . . .
reasonable . . .

There can be no doubt that these troops

will be subject to all kinds of influences and will be
enticed to desert; if the luck of war goes against us in
the first battle, then I shall not answer for their
loyalty; such an experience would not even be surprising;
it is as old as history itself. "5S
The Austrian army in Lombardy-Venetia had been
highly regarded by the populace in the first half of the

Vormarz; they had lived in the glow of being the
conquerors of the French.

But the Italian regiments had

been subject to popular abuse and enticements to
disloyalty throughout the 1830s and 1840s; their loyalty
was keyed to their membership in a solid and successful
organization.

The sudden onset of revolt and the

collapse of Austrian authority left the Italian troops
scrambling out of the wreckage.

By the last week of

March 1848 reports of large-scale desertions were being
sent to Vienna from the Verona command.

Venetia was

struck first— a battalion of the 13. Infantry and the
Angelmayer battalion of grenadiers had deserted in Venice
itself, joined by a battalion of the 16. at Udine and
four companies of the 8. FeldjUger at Padua.9* The
losses in Venice— where 2460 of a city garrison of 8370
were Italian97— included much of the imperial fleet as
well.

Three corvettes, two steamers, and three frigates

escaped to Trieste with depleted crews, but the bulk of
the fleet— including six brigantines, three corvettes,
and perhaps 100 patrol and supply ships— and the whole of
the naval infantry went over to the rebels.9' The fleet
had been inherited wholesale from the moribund Venetian
Republic at the end of the French wars, and its
traditions and outlook were wholly Venetian.

But the

desertions ashore were consequent upon a total failure of

will on the part of the army commanders in the city, who
had given in to the demands of Manin and his supporters
before any major violence had broken out.59 The pattern
was much the same in Lombardy; the inital successes of
the revolutionaries in mid-March gave rise to an air of
panic and despair on the part of the authorities.

On 5

April Radetzky reported that he had lost seventeen
battalions, two squadrons, and one battery— units that
had deserted, been evacuated from Venice to Trieste, or
been cut off in the countryside.

Two weeks later he

reported that his losses were little more than a thousand
dead and wounded, but that 10,860 had deserted and 13,000
had been cut off.50
The Berkeleys claimed that a quarter of all Austrian
casualties were "willful missing"— Italians who had
deserted rather than fight the rebels of Piedmontese— and
that four-fifths of Radetzky's Italian troops deserted or
went over to the enemy.61 The latter figure would mean
that more than 16,000 Italian soldiers deserted.
Lawrence Sondhaus put the number of deserters at about
15,000 but argued that, despite the Berkeleys' claims,
between one-half and two-thirds of all troops raised in
Lombardy and Venetia remained loyal and that very few
Lombard troops ever took up arms against their old
service.62 The dispersal of small units across the

countryside prior to the outbreak of the revolts
guaranteed a high number of men who would be quite simply
missing.

The experience of being one of a dozen or two

soldiers stationed in the midst of an armed and hostile
countryside, abused by the population and clergy, out of
touch with any higher authority would be more than a
little unnerving.

And communications in Lombardy-Venetia

still moved at the same speed--a man on horseback— as in
Roman times.

The report of 5 April indicates the

fragmented state of the army:

a battalion of Warasdiner

Kreuzer Grenzers was "supposed to be fighting its way to
the Tirol from Como;" the whereabouts of three companies
of the 43. Infantry, the garrisons of Lecco, Marbegno,
and Sondrio were completely unknown; the 2. battalion of
the Banat Grenzers was presumably somewhere behind the
Isonzo.63

How many of those listed as "missing," "cut

off," or "deserted" were ultimately moved from one
category to the other remains unclear, although large
numbers of deserters returned to the colors after the
initial shocks of March.

Once his forces had

consolidated their position in the fortresses of the
Quadrilateral, Radetzky issued a series of amnesty
decrees that attracted men back into service "by the
thousands."64
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Disaffection in the imperial ranks came suddenly,
and events seem to have borne out Radetzky's belief that
any initial reverse would shake the loyalty of troops who
had resisted nationalist blandishments in peacetime.
Troops faced with revolt in March 1848 found themselves—
as in Milan, where events paralleled those in Vienna—
facing in inadequate numbers a large and well-armed
population, or— as in Venice— commanded by officers who
had given themselves over to panic.

Small local

detachments were abandoned in a hostile countryside,
subject to the counsel of nationalists and their own
fears.

The nature of recruiting took its own toll.

Sked's account of the 26. Archduke Ferdinand d'Este
(Udine) Infantry makes it clear that the Este, securing
communications between Lombardy and the Tirol, had long
been used as a dumping ground for undesireables and petty
criminals.

The imperial commander in the Tirol

complained on the eve of the revolts that the 26. had
twenty to twenty-five convicts dumped in each of its
twelve companies, and that the Este had already
established a reputation for rioting and brawling in
Innsbruck.

By April the Este had become unmanageable.

The 400 Hungarian troops in the area had no supplies,
and, with only two rounds available per man, could not be
relied upon to quell any serious unrest in the Este.

The
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26. was subject to overt bribery in both cash and wine by
local revolutionaries, and it was isolated by the
collapse of political authority.

Nearly 400 men of a

suspect and ill-regarded regiment had been sent with only
two officers into a zone filled with unrest and stripped
of local officials.6* There are no exact figures for
the return of deserters after Radetzky had begun to
reassert imperial authority, but desertion itself seems
to have ceased by the early summer of 1848.

The Italian

troops that remained loyal during the retreat to the
Quadrilateral stayed loyal afterwards.

Radetzky himself

appears to have understood the nature of much of what had
happened to his Italians.

His own policies toward

deserters— at least for private soldiers— were quite
mild, and in February 1849 the marshal reported that "the
greater part" of the deserters had returned to their
regiments.66
The ultimate cohesion of Radetzky's army is borne
out by events that did not happen.

In early 1848

Radetzky's armies contained ten battalions of Grenzers
along with eight line battalions from Hungarian
regiments, a Hungarian grenadier battalion, and sixteen
squadrons of hussars— 10,000 South Slavs and 10-12,000
Hungarians.

By mid-June Magyars and Serbs were

slaughtering one another in the Voivodina; in early

September a Croat army invaded Hungary proper.

As early

as May the Vienna authorities had reported that Grenzer
units on their way to Italy were deeply worried about
leaving their homes and families to the mercies of the
Magyars.67

The Hungarian press was solidly in favor of

Italian independence, and its editorials called for the
withdrawal of all Hungarian units serving in Italy.

The

imperial authorities were able to exercise some control
over communications with Lombardy-Venetia, but the
outbreak of war in Hungary was no secret, and the
treatment dealt Magyars and South Slavs by one another
was no secret either.

Yet while the numbers of

Hungarians and Grenzers on service in Italy rose to about
30,000 each, there were no internecine outbreaks.
Neither were there any significant desertions.

The

Italian press assumed that all Hungarians in Italy were
fighting only under the knout and were straining at the
leash to desert in support of Italian ambitions, but even
after revolutionary Hungary proclaimed its intent to seek
a Piedmontese alliance, "hardly a Hungarian soldier from
the 30,000 stationed [in Italy] defected."68

Radetzky

strictly enforced a policy of even-handed treatment of
his troops, and the circumstances of war against a
foreign enemy worked to promote cohesion in the ranks, as
did reports of Italian atrocities at Brescia.

Despite
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the early desertion of half the Italians, the imperial
armies in Italy, made up in large part of men whose
families were killing one another along the Drave, held
together on a core of corporate loyalty.
The cohesion of the army was unshaken throughout
most of the empire. Only in a single instance— the mutiny
of the Richter Grenadiers on the Taborbriicke in October
1848— did the rank-and-file of imperial units fire on one
another without orders from their officers.

Even in the

case of the Richters, it might be noted that the
Bezlrkschef urging the grenadiers to refuse to leave
Vienna was a former captain in the unit.69

In Prague,

where the military under Windisch-Graetz applied a policy
of calculated provocation, troops from the Bohemian 42.
Infantry (Theresienstadt) and the 8. Curassiers (Prague)
fought with some relish against Czech students and
workers.

Prague has often been taken as the first great

victory of the counterrevolutions imperial troops
commanded by resolute officers stayed true to their oaths
and fought energetically against the designs of civilian
rebels.

A quiescent Bohemia then supplied the imperial

armies with a steady stream of loyal recruits throughout
the Italian and Hungarian wars.

In March-April 1848 more

than 100,000 reservists and soldiers on extended leave
were recalled to their regiments without incident.
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Recruiting continued— even across the Leitha— without
serious disruption, and the Hungarian regiments continued
both recruiting (which served both Vienna and Budapest)
and, more to the point, providing reinforcements for
Italy into the summer.70
The proclamation of constitutional government in
Hungary had been made with imperial assent, and imperial
troops in Hungary came under the administration of the
Hungarian Ministry for War, a situation confirmed in May
by royal decree.

While Kossuth and Batthyany temporized

on the question of recalling Hungarian troops from Italy,
some Hungarian units were returned from Cisleithania.

As

of May 1848 the Hungarian ministry controlled twenty-five
battalions of line infantry from Hungarian regiments, two
battalions of grenadiers, and four complete hussar
regiments; four more line battalions and four more hussar
regiments were returned in the early days of summer.71
Kossuth appealed in the summer for all other Hungarian
units to return from Cisleithania, and some units of
hussars responded.

Units of the 8. and 12. Hussars under

junior officers attempted to fight their way home from
Galicia and Bohemia.

Most of the deserters from the 12.

were cut up or driven into Prussian internment by
Bohemian cuirassiers, but a few hundred men from the two
regiments did arrive in Hungary, where they faced the
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wrath of Kossuth's War Minister, the hussar colonel Lazar
Meszaros, who threatened to have them tried and hanged
for desertion and insubordination.72
The troops available to the Hungarian ministry in
early summer formed no negligible force.

However, some

units of the twenty-nine available battalions were sent
out to Italy, and the state of the regular army in the
Vormarz Monarchy told against the Hungarians.

Gyorgy

Klapka, the deputy war minister, claimed that all units,
and especially the cavalry, were understrength.
Hungarian forces in mid-summer were carried as twenty-one
battalions of infantry, seventy squadrons of hussars, and
two regiments of Szekler Grenzers— a regular force
supplemented by ten fairly inchoate battalions of
national guard (Honvdd) volunteers.

At 15,000 foot and

7000 horse, the regular units were seriously
undermanned.73 Regulars, on Meszaros's instance, were
kept separate from the Honvdd.

In later and more

desperate times, regulars might be put in the same
tactical formation as the militia, but even so radical a
general as Arthur Gorgey was still enough of an imperialroyal officer to disdain the Honvdd.

Gorgey acidly

described his northern corps of 20,000 men as being "twothirds useless volunteers"74 and, like Meszaros, put his
faith in regulars.

Troop returns for May 1849— the high
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tide of Hungarian defiance— still carry nineteen regular
battalions and ten regular hussar regiments as the core
of the Hungarian armies, separate from and prized above
106 Honvdd battalions, four rifle battalions, and six
regiments of Honvdd hussars.75
Throughout the Austrian half of the Monarchy there
were units that remained loyal to their oaths in the face
of revolutionary appeals. Czech troops fought loyally in
Prague, and Czech recruits and reservists continued to
report to their depots.

In Italy there were Italian

units that fought against Piedmont and against rebels in
Lombardy and Venice.

Two battalions of the 45. (Verona)

Infantry and two of the 38. (Brescia) Infantry
distinguished themselves against the Piedmontese. Units
of the 38. held the fortress of Mantua for Radetzsky
throughout the early weeks of revolt and war, and a
battalion of the 45. took part in the siege of Venice.
The first two battalions of the 44. (Milan) Infantry
deserted in the spring of 1848, but the third battalion
remained loyal and was singled out for special praise at
the battles of Santa Lucia and Custozza.76

After 1849

some Hungarian exiles made great play of the fact that
soldiers of two Italian regiments in Hungary, the 16.
Zanini (Treviso) and the 23. Ceccopieri (Lodi) took
service with Kossuth.77

Some units of the 16. at Essegg

attempted to remain neutral in the ethnic warfare that
flared across Slavonia in the autumn of 1848, but
Hungarian units secured the fortress until loyalist
officers surrendered it to Baron Jellacic in February
1849.78 Yet four companies of the 16. took part in the
defense of Temesvar.

One battalion of the 23. was at

both Temesvar and the siege of Komorn.

Another battalion

fought under Hentzi at Budapest and was taken prisoner in
May 1849; the battalion commander and a party of officers
and senior enlisted men were killed in a failed attempt
to blow up the Chain Bridge over the Danube at Buda.79
The 7. Chevaux-leger, the only cavalry unit raised in
Lombardy-Venetia, had been in Hungary almost continuously
since 1815; it went over to Jellacic in the autumn of
1848 and fought with great ferocity throughout the
campaigns of 1848-49.80

Hungarian units in Italy fought

loyally, despite the efforts of the revolutionary
government in Hungary to seek an Italian alliance.

The

33. (Altsohl), 52. (FUnfkirchen) and 61. (Temesvar)
Infantry and the 5. and 7. Hussars distinguished
themselves in the field; much of the credit for the
victories at Mortara and Novara went to two battalions of
the 33. Gyulai (Arad) Infantry.
Many of Radetzky's Italian soldiers melted away in
confusion in the spring of 1848.

Men leaving Lombard
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regiments sought to desert, not to defect.

Only in

Venice itself, where the third battalion of the 13.
(Padua) Infantry and a grenadier battalion stationed in
Venice since 1837 and made up of men from the 16.
(Treviso) and 26. (Udine) Infantry81 joined sailors and
naval infantry in manning the walls, did they fight
against the imperial standards.
remained loyal.

Hungarian units in Italy

The Hungarian units in Hungary joined

Kossuth's forces en masse.
There were a few conspicuous foreign names among the
Hungarian commanders— the Pole Jozef Bern, the Hessian
Count Karl Leiningen, the English hussar officer Richard
Guyon— and into the autumn of 1848 some non-Hungarian
units stationed in Hungary continued to take orders from
the Hungarian government.

The first encounter between

Jellacic and the Hungarians at Pakozd was decided by
batteries of the 5. (Prague) Artillery, firing against
units of the same regiment serving in the Croat ranks.
In the course of the autumn, though, the Czech gunners
returned to imperial service, and their places were
filled by miners hastily recruited in Upper Hungary.

The

armies of.Kossuth were almost wholly Magyar and Szekler.
The military forces of the Hungarian revolution— a core
of regular infantry and hussars and a HonvSd force that

42
eventually reached 140 battalions and eighteen regiments
of hussars82— were a "national" army.
The 15,000 regular infantry that made up the spine
of the Hungarian armies in the late summer of 1848 and
which bore the brunt of the fighting against Jellacic83
stayed loyal to Kossuth and Gorgey throughout the war,
and the local authorities in the counties of Hungary
continued to forward conscripts to the training depots of
the regular Hungarian regiments.

Imperial courts-martial

did not attempt to delve into the causes of their
defection, and the motives of many officers and enlisted
men alike can only be guessed at.

A sense of Magyar

nationalism certainly existed, although for the rank-andfile the meaning of nationalism is likely to have reduced
itself to a reaction against attacks on Magyardom and
Magyar dominance in Hungary by Serbs, Croats, and
Romanians in the summer's fighting in the south and east.
More important, in all likelihood, was the habit of
discipline.

Conscripts continued to arrive at the drill

square or the riding school, orders continued to be
passed on from officers and non-commissioned officers to
ordinary soldiers, and orders continued to be obeyed.
Certainly this was the view of the imperial authorities:
a decree of 20 August 1849 granted amnesty to all private
soldiers and non-commissioned officers of regular
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battalions or cavalry squadrons in the rebel armies,
provided that they had been born in the lands of the
Crown of St. Stephen.

At Peterwardein and in the Szekler

Grenzer battalions the enlisted men had thrown out their
loyalist officers to fight for Kossuth's commissioners,
but in general the command structure remained intact.
The officers, especially the junior officers of a
regiment provided leadership for loyalty or rebellion.
Perhaps 200,000 Hungarians— 50,000 regulars of all
branches, including about 1500 officers— saw service in
the rebel armies in 1848/49.

Many of the 50,000 were

"blissfully ignorant of their new status as rebels: in
the first months of the war, and many officers continued
to believe that in taking orders from the Hungarian
government— from Batthyany and Meszaros as royal
ministers— they were bring true to their oaths.84

To

march out as a regular against the Serbs or Jellacic in
the summer of 1848 was to obey the orders of regular
officers responsible to a legally-constituted war
ministry sanctioned in turn by the king-emperor.

The

commander of the 2. Schwarzenberg Uhlans at Alt-Arad
found himself fighting on royal orders against Serbian
volunteers raised on "imperial" authority by the Austrian
consul in Belgrade, who was busy earning his general's
rank by persuading Serb Grenzers to fight Hungarian

44
regulars.

Baron Blomberg of the Schwarzenberg Uhlans

pleaded desperately with Vienna for either clarification
or recall.es

Latour's war ministry in Vienna alternated

between ordering imperial generals in Hungary to obey
Meszaros's War Ministry in Budapest and telling them to
follow their own consciences— "an inhuman task," Deak
commented, "for men who had been taught never to think
independently. "8*
The Swabian and Romanian burghers of Weisskirchen in
southern Hungary petitioned the court to explain the new
state of affairs: "What in one place is good and legal,
in another place appears as a betrayal of the good cause,
and no matter what one does, one is bound to violate Your
Majesty's laws in the very act of obeying them."87

The

officers of imperial regiments were no less caught among
interpretations of their oaths.

Meszaros at the

Hungarian war ministry continued to style himself a royal
minister and annotate promotions and transfers with
"pending the gracious approval of His Majesty."88
Imperial officers fighting in the Voivodina knew
themselves to be acting under legal and proper orders; it
was only in the autumn of 1848 that the lines of
rebellion and loyalty began to harden.

An imperial

rescript of 3 October 1848 defined disloyalty as
obedience to the Hungarian authorities after that date.
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That date was too late for many officers who wished to
return to imperial service.

Faldmarschalleutnant Janos

Moga, who had fought Jellacic's army at Pakozd, resigned
from Hungarian service on 1 November 1848 and departed
for the imperial camp; a court-martial sentenced him to
five years' fortress detention.

Feldmarschalleutnant

Baron Janos Hrabovszky, one of the Monarchy's most
decorated and distinguished officers, spent too long
fighting the Serbs.

He left Hungary only at the end of

1848; his sentence was ten years in a fortress
dungeon.89 The change of rulers in December 1848
blurred lines of loyalty for others.

Many Hungarian

officers consoled themselves with the thought that they
were fighting for the good Ferdinand and his constitution
against the "usurper" Franz Josef, creature of the court
camarilla.

Many officers sought service on the Italian

front, where no questions of honor applied; not a few
rebel officers told their judges they would have been
utterly loyal if only they could have gone to Lombardy to
serve their monarch.

Others followed Gorgey out of

desperation: at least the chill punctilio of the
subaltern-turned-field marshal gave off the impression of
military rectitude divorced from the grey fog of
politics.
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The uniforms of regulars on both sides remained the
same, and trumpet-signals and German commands were not
changed until late in the affair.90

Only when Windisch-

Graetz's men put white ribbons on their shakos— the
standard sign for "enemy" troops on maneuvers— did the
number of tragic and comic mistakes fall off.

Meszaros

fought long and hard against Kossuth's plans to magyarize
the Hungarian armies, and Hungarian forces were commanded
in German throughout the early days of the war.91

The

commanders on both sides treasured the common bond of
their uniforms and hesitated to shatter the unity of the
army.

"I shudder," wrote Jellacic in September 1848, "at

the thought of training my cannon on hussars.

If this

happens, a chasm will open, perhaps forever, in the ranks
of the army."92

Count Adam Teleki, commanding the

Hungarian regulars blocking Jellacic's path to Budapest,
ordered his men to stand neutral and attempt
negotiations; Teleki's predecessor Ottinger had decided
to treat the whole affair as a sort of maneuver and
ordered a quiet withdrawal while forbidding his men to
use their weapons.93

On 28 December 1848, Ottinger, now

a major general commanding cavalry for Windisch-Graetz,
encountered the 2. battalion of the 34. (Kaschau)
Infantry at Babolna near Raab. Ottinger, with the
Wallmoden Curassiers and the Civilart Uhlans, stood off
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from the 2/34, hesitant to engage old comrades of the
observation corps deployed against the Croats in August.
Only when the infantry fired upon his horsemen did
Ottinger sound the charge, and 300-400 of the 2/34 fell
to the lances and swords of the cavalry.94
The Hungarian rebel armies enlisted 200,000 men in
the course of the war; perhaps 10,000 of that number were
officers, 1500 of those professionals.

Under the terms

of the amnesty decree of 20 August 1849 junior Honvdd
officers were subject to service in the ranks as private
soldiers, but few ex-lieutenants and captains had to
endure more than brief periods of service in the ranks.
The imperial armies had grown to 648,000 men by October
1849, and the strains on budget and staff were heavy.
The military did not wish to accomodate an influx of
disaffected ex-officers, and most were shortly
discharged.

The full weight of military displeasure fell

on outsiders: members of the Viennese Academic Legion who
had left Vienna to serve in the Hungarian armies found
themselves marched off in chains to penal detachments.
Military courts tried 498 officers above the rank of
captain: 231 were sentenced to death and forty were
actually executed; most of the dead were junior officers
in the regular army who had attained high rank in the
Honvdd.95

A special MilitSr-Zentralunterauchunga-
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Koimission, which sat from 1 November 1849 to 31 December
1850 heard 4628 cases— twenty-four generals, seventy-one
staff officers, 376 line officers, thirty-nine military
bureaucrats, twenty-nine military doctors and technical
personnel, 354 other ranks, 1448 civilians, and thirtynine civil servants.

The commission was less sanguinary

than Haynau's courts-martial: of the seventy-one staff
officers, two were cashiered and imprisoned, four lost
rank and pension rights, fifty-three were "purified" and
rehabilitated, two cases were simply dismissed, and nine
were still awaiting a hearing when the commission was
adjourned.96 Generations of Hungarians were raised to
revere the thirteen Hungarian generals executed at Arad,
and the 120 soldiers, civilians, and peasant partisans
executed immediately during and after the war.

By the

standards of the twentieth century the number of
executions was almost trivial; to Hungarians of the post
revolt generation the number was proof of Austrian
ruthlessness and cruelty.
The treatment of regulars who had fought on the
rebel side was, at least by twentieth-century standards,
quite lenient.

The Austrian Verzeichniss der wegen

Hochverrathes durch Teilnahme an der ungarischen
Revolution gefall ten kriegsgerichtlichen Urtheile lists
759 condemned rebels, two-thirds of them soldiers.

One
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need only count, up the number of dead and look at the
dates of amnesty for those Imprisoned to understand the
changes in the treatment of armed rebellion since
1850.97

The composite regular officer on Kossuth's

side, Deak noted, was a subaltern who "grabbed the
opportunity for promotion, adventure, the chance to
command army corps instead of platoons [and] when in
doubt consoled [himself] with patriotic sentiments and
progressive slogans."

(Klapka, one might note in

passing, had been so bored as a junior officer that he
had thought seriously of going off to Bengal to buy a
place in the East India Company's army).9*

Those

officers who were "purified" by imperial tribunals
returned to their old service, apparently without
official prejudice, although suspicion persisted in
officers' messes for years.99
luckier.

The rank-and-file were

They had after all only done what they were

told by their superiors and betters.

They were subject

to discrimination neither from their commanders nor their
comrades.100
The regiments that had fought on the rebel side
could not be simply dissolved and their names stricken
from the army list, as the East India Company had done
with Madras regiments after the mutinies of 1806 or the
Bengal regiments after the mutiny of 1857.

They were

however "reorganized"— sent out of Hungarian territory
and provided with new officers; NCOs and enlisted men who
had been conspicuously pro-Kossuth were quietly
discharged.

The 62. (Maros-Vasarhely) Infantry, from

which only the officers and fifty men had remained loyal,
was sent off to Leoben and Trentino to be rebuilt.

The

60. (Eperjes), which had distinguished itself in street
fighting in Vienna before its return to Hungary and
subsequent disloyalty, was shipped back to Lower Austria
and totally rebuilt, since all three battalions and their
officers had gone into revolt.101

There had been three

Italian regiments in Hungary in 1848, the 16. and 23.
Infantry and the 7. Chevaux-leger.

The light horse had

stayed with Jellacic and had been notably loyal; the
infantry presented a problem.

Four companies of the 2/16

had fought at Temesvar, but the rest of the two
battalions in Hungary had tried to stay neutral.

The

3/16 at Treviso and the regiment's grenadiers in Venice
had been disloyal.

The line infantry of the 16. were

sent off to OlmUtz to be re-trained; after the fall of
Venice the grenadiers were shipped to the imperial siege
lines around Komorn to redeem themselves.
Ceccopieri was treated with more leniency.

The 23.
The 1/23 and

2/23 had won acclaim at Komorn, and only the 3/23 in the
regiment's home district at Lodi was purged.10*

The army had held the Monarchy together, and if the
Hungarian and Italian regiments were suspect, the civil
population was subject to the full weight of military and
imperial displeasure.

Martial law lasted in Vienna and

Prague until mid-1853 and in Hungary and Lombardy-Venetia
until mid-1854.

Vienna itself, where the population had

defied regulars and murdered an imperial war minister,
was treated to special consideration.

The Vormarz

garrison of 14,000— made up largely of pioneer and
grenadier units— had been inadequate to subdue an armed
populace of 400,000, and after the restoration of order
the army returned in force, trebling its garrison
strength.

In 1850-56 the new Arsenal was built on the

high ground near the Siidbahnhof as a home for three
regiments of infantry and supporting artillery units.

An

American military observer pronounced the new Arsenal to
be "doubtless perfect in all respects" and within its
walls were sufficient ammunition and materiel to give the
army's gunners fire superiority over the whole of the
city for an extended siege.103 A new Franz-JosefsKaserne was built near the Dominikanerbastei at the
eastern edge of the Innere Stadt, providing control over
the Danube bridges and the city's other railway station.
Temporary strongpoints were set up and linked by
heliograph, and continuous patrols— which clashed with
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angry civilians on more than a few occasions— were run
between the Arsenal and scattered firebases.

On any

night in the early 1850s, as many as 100 patrols might
leave the Arsenal gates for the streets of the Innere
Stadt.106
In October 1848 loyal regulars had taken five days
to blast and batter their way inside the city walls.

The

army and the court were convinced that new outbreaks were
imminent— in 1850 the young emperor wrote his mother that
"here...the spirit grows worse day by day, but the people
are too cunning to let it come to an armed showdown.. .On
Sunday, a great church parade on the Glacis, to show our
dear Viennese that troops and guns still exist."105

The

army's engineers drew up plans for. a chain of forti
fications all around the walls, for adding a 30-ft. scarp
onto the exiting walls, and for demolishing all houses
along the curtain.

The system was laid out so that the

"Inner City as well as the Glacis might be effectively
controlled, the swarming out of the suburbs by the rabble
into the Inner City, where the most valuable citizens are
gouped, be hindered, plundering might be prevented, and
effective bombardment allowed."106 Vienna's commercial
and industrial leaders protested that any extension of
trade and industry required the demolition of the old
walls so that the suburbs might be annexed and the city's

chronic housing shortage alleviated, but the Archduke
Maximilian d'Este, something of an expert for the court
on social unrest, noted that the proletariat had already
tasted the blood of its betters, that it was daily
swelled by an influx of foreign outcasts and transients,
and that only the walls stood between the Hofburg and the
rabble.107

Special instructions were drawn up for the

garrison in 1853 and renewed in 1857: the army had no
intention of being left surprised and helpless before a
new rising.108

On the eve of the Italian war of 1859

the city garrison was given notice that large-scale
reinforcements were available;

Archduke Wilhelm had

arranged for an additional fifteen thousand men to be on
hand within 72 hours.109
The heightened requirements in both Vienna and the
Monarchy as a whole were also met by the creation of a
new force of gendarmerie, established throughout the
various crownlands in the autumn of 1849.

Thirteen

battalions of gendarmes, trained and outfitted on
military lines, were set up under Feldmarachalleutenant
Johann Baron Hempen von Fichtenstamm, then governorgeneral of Budapest.
elite force.

Hempen saw his new command as an

His men received better pay and quarters

than line soldiers (as well as cash bonuses for each
arrested criminal actually convicted, with a sliding
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scale for severity of the crime), and their authority
extended to both civilians and soldiers, including
officers.
By early 1850 the new gendarmerie was co-opting the
best of the army's NCOs directly from their
regiments.110

The thirteen battalions expanded to

sixteen within a year, and finally to nineteen.

Three

were employed in Hungary proper, and one each in
Siebenburgen, Croatia, and the Voivodina.111

Their

authority replaced that of the old patrimonial courts and
the Pandura employed by the Hungarian counties, and their
presence had long been wished for in parts of Hungary
where the usual procedure had been to wait until highway
robbery became epidemic before sending for the army to
hunt down highwaymen.

The gendarmerie provided quiet and

effective police functions throughout the crownlands—
reformers had been advocating the creation of a rural
police force throughout the 1840s— and it served
increasingly to take over the task of dispersing strikers
and demonstrators.
If such a role made the gendarmes less than popular
with the civilians, neither were they admired by the
army.

The gendarmerie was generally recognized as honest

and highly disciplined, but in 1852 it was placed under
the ministry of interior, and feelings in the army turned

against what it saw as a rival institution.

It was an

open question, one military observer noted, whether the
army or the civilians hated the gendarmerie more.112
Kempen had envisioned the gendarmerie as a force whose
mission was one of providing public security, but he had
not seen himself as head of a political police.

Yet

after mid-1852 Kempen found his new command assigned the
functions of the secret police formerly run directly by
the minister of the interior.113

By the middle of the

1850s both Kempen and the emperor were uneasy about the
use of the gendarmerie for covert political sur
veillance.114

The military function of the gendarmes,

though, should not be overlooked.

The battalions serving

in the Hungarian east were faced with bands of nation
alist partisans who had gradually taken up the more
traditional trade of simple banditry, and who could rely
on at least the passive support of much of the peasantry.
Campaigns against brigandage by both gendarmes and
regulars became routine.

The line between partisan and

bandit was hard to draw, and the imperial authorities
remained on edge and continued to reinforce their
garrisons.115
The enemies of the empire were by no means all
defeated. Radetzky's armies had smashed the Piedmontese,
and the marshal and his advisors had attempted to win the
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Lombard peasants for the empire by ruining the local
nobles, but the 130,000 imperial soldiers now stationed
in Lombardy-Venetia were more than ever garrisoned in a
hostile land.

The Piedmontese had not been made to feel

the full consequences of defeat, and Count Cavour, the
Piedmontese chief minister, was harboring exiles and
partisans from both Hungary and Lombardy-Venetia.

On 6

February 1853 a series of attacks on Austrian guardposts
in Milan began, and on 26 February there was an attempt
to seize the head quarters of the city garrison.

Ten

imperial officers and other ranks were killed; fifty-five
more were wounded.

Seventy-nine Italians captured in the

raids were hanged on Radetzky's order.

The British

ambassador in Turin primly noted that "the difficulties
of administering the Lombardo-Veneto would appear . . .
to be rather increased.1,116 Radetzky immediately set
about confiscating the estates of those Lombards who had
gone into emigration, imprisoning all those suspected of
radical views, and demanding authority to pursue
terrorists into Switzerland and Piedmont.
The army had learned what observers had said that it
knew all along from the war in Hungary.

No system of

non-national garrisoning had been operated in the
Vormarz, but there was now an overriding need to keep
watch on the Hungarian regiments.

They had proven
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themselves unreliable at home, and the authorities were
aware of the presence of ex-HonvSds, both officers and
private soldiers, in the ranks.

Special attention was

paid to reintegrating regular officers, and various
orders of the day reminded officers of their duty toward
amnestied comrades.117

In some cases recruiting

districts were shifted to break continuity with the army
'of 1848.

The 2. Infantry, a Pressburg regiment since

1781, had its recruiting area shifted to Brasso in the
Siebenburgen area of Transylvania.

The 60. was moved

from Eperjes to Erlau; the 19. had its recruiting
district shifted from Szolnok to Raab.

The district of

the 33. (Altsohl) was given to the Bohemian 25. Infantry;
the Galician 12. was recruited in Zips from 1853 to
1857.118

The Hungarian regiments were moved out of St.

Stephen's Lands and the Italian regiments were moved out
of Lombardy-Venetia.

Each of the Hungarian regiments had

left one battalion in its recruiting district before
1848; the third battalions were now moved about as well.
Supply, mobilization, and training were made vastly more
difficult, but the army was now afraid of the Hungarians.
In other crownlands, regiments like the 15.(Tarnopol),
the 4.(Vienna), the 57.(Tarnow), or the 18.(Koniggratz)
might remain at home, but not the Hungarians.

As of

1858, only a single Hungarian regiment, the 62.(Maros-
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Vasarhely) was anywhere in territory (in Agram, in this
case) belonging to the Crown of St. Stephen.

119

The treatment of the Hungarian regiments affected
their morale.

There was increasingly little chance that

Hungarian soldiers would receive any real sympathy or
understanding from their officers.

There had been, not

surprisingly, a shortage of Hungarian officers joining
the colors after 1849.

Given both the unwillingness of

Hungarians to seek commissions on political grounds and
the declining status of a junior officer (pay scales were
fixed at 1818 levels of a florin a day for a lieutenant,
despite the inflation of the 1850s), the number of
Hungarian (and Cisleithanian) officers declined.

By 1859

fifty-two percent of the imperial-royal officer corps was
made up of men born outside the Monarchy.120

Fewer

officers in the non-German regiments had any grasp of
their men's language or problems than before 1848, when
even if a subaltern of the Hungarian nobility might speak
French far better than he spoke Magyar, he had at least
some traditional sympathy with his men and some place in
their accepted scheme of things.

Resentments grew inside

Hungarian regiments throughout the 1850s.

Friedrich

Engels looked at the Austrian army in 1855 and judged
that its survival was problematical; any shock might
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dissolve it, and many regiments were only waiting for a
chance to desert.121
The soldiers and line officers of the imperial-royal
forces, as distinct from the high command, fought well in
Lombardy in 1859, living up to the old description of the
Austrian army as "lions led by asses."

Yet two complete

army corps could not be sent to the Italian front at all;
they were required in Hungary to guard against any
possible rising.122

One author noted tartly about the

Italian debacle that conquered peoples rarely make
enthusiastic soldiers,121 but the point is less that the
Hungarians were a conquered nation than that the soldiers
of Hungarian regiments had been made to feel that they
were potential rebels and not trusted soldiers of the
dynasty.

Those who had fought with great bravery under

Radetzky were treated no better than those who had fought
as rebels under Gttrgey and Klapka,

The creation of a

deliberate system of non-national garrisoning told
Hungarian soldiers that they were now seen as traitors
merely awaiting their chance to desert or revolt.

An

extra-territorial system had not existed before 1848, and
its implementation afterward did not insulate suspect
nationalities from politics.

It introduced instead

national disaffection as a source of military
demoralization and only made soldiers of the Hungarian
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regiments aware of their own identity as members of a
suspect nation.
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CHAPTER 2
ARMY AND DYNASTY:

DECAY AND DUALISM

Late in the evening of 3 July 1866 the remnants of
the Austrian Northern Army streamed away from the field
at Koniggratz.

A handful of units, most notably those of

Austria's Saxon allies, made the retreat in good order.
The bulk of the Austrian forces, perhaps 100,000 men,
pressed toward the fortress of Koniggratz in deepening
panic.

The city commandant feared that the mob swarming

through the dusk toward his walls was Prussian, and the
city gates remained barred.

The sluices of the Elbe had

been opened, and as night fell some 60,000 men were
trapped on a handful of narrow causeways.

Theodor

Fontane could find only one image to rival the chaos
outside the town of Koniggratz: the shattered Grande
Armde pouring back across the Berezina.1

In the

aftermath of the battle perhaps 180,000 men were moved
back across the Elbe to regroup north of Vienna— an
impressive, if belated, show of competence by the
defeated Austrian commanders.2
Yet the army itself was near to collapse, far closer
than it had been after any of the defeats of the French
wars.

Major Geza Fejervary, sent up from the emperor's

military chancellery to view the damage, found entire
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battalions coining apart; in many units officers could
enforce discipline only at swordpoint.

Count Karl

Coudenhove wrote home in despair that his men were, in
point of fact, no longer willing or able to fight.3
Only the cavalry, where the spoiling charges of the
Alexander Uhlans and the Wrangel Cuirassiers had broken
the ability of the Prussian horse to mount a pursuit to
the Elbe, and the artillery, which kept up a successful
covering fire late into the night, emerged from the wreck
of Benedek's Northern Army with any martial reputation
left intact.4

On the morning of 4 July drowned soldiers

floated on the Elbe in sodden clumps, and the hills north
of Koniggratz were strewn with white-coated dead, the
victims of superior staffwork and the firepower of the
needle gun.

The survivors of the Northern Army staggered

on toward Vienna, the political influence of the army
lost along with all the other wreckage abandoned on the
field.
The ruin of the Austrian army had been seventeen
years in coming.

Contemporary observers, Friedrich

Engels among them, had expected the imperial forces to
make short work of a Prussian army which had seen no real
action since 1815.

The Austrians were, after all, the

heirs of Radetzky, and Feldzeugmeister Ludwig Benedek,
commanding the Northern Army, was the hero of San Martino

and the darling of the Liberal press.

In defeat the

court and the army scrambled to find a scapegoat, and the
anguished Franz Josef spoke bitterly of betrayal.5

Yet

little had happened in Bohemia that had not gone wrong in
Lombardy in 1859.

The lethargy and indecisiveness of the

generals, the blithe reliance on the bayonet, the
restiveness of Hungarian troops, all had been present at
Magenta and Solferino.

The army's effectiveness in the

field had deteriorated steadily since 1849, and
Rothenberg's list of its technical deficiencies in 1859
is exhaustive:
[The high command] repeatedly warned that the
army was not prepared to undertake a campaign,
although it is doubtful that they realized the
extent of the damage done to the army since
1849...Logistic and supply services were
insufficient and corrupt and the troops lacked
engineering stores, rations, and clothing.
Infantry
weapons were adequate, but the artillery was much
inferior to that of the French. Above all, command
was in the hands of [generals] who failed to see the
need for seizing the initiative.6
The brilliant performance of the imperial light cavalry
against the French and the stubborn resistance put up by
Benedek's wing at Solferino7 masked the cold facts of
1859: the imperial forces had been poorly trained,
indifferently led, and had contained large numbers of men
whose loyalty was questionable.

The decay of the army

was a function of the victory of 1849, and it paralleled
the overall failure of Austrian policy in the 1850s.

Later in the century Count Taaffe would explain that
the secret of governing the Monarchy was to find a way to
keep everyone only mildly unhappy.

The regime of the

1850s pleased no one, and it left everyone dissatisfied
without creating the spirit of resignation that was
Taafe's goal.

The governments headed by Prince Felix

Schwarzenberg (1849-1852) and interior minister Alexander
Bach (1852 - 59) offered something to offend all the
political factions of the Monarchy, and while it
introduced a number of liberal reforms— municipal
autonomy, trial by jury, uniform tariff and taxation, an
independent judiciary, a reformed civil service— the
emigres of 1849 still regarded Austria as "a ship loaded
with slaves...who could be freed only after a
shipwreck."8
The imperial authorities tried within the limits of
a non-national state to recognize national and linguistic
equality.

Schwarzenberg and Bach did not aim at

Germanizing the Monarchy, and laws were gazetted and
trials held in ten languages.9 The expansion of the
bureaucracy, where German was the internal language,
meant that more German was heard, but of course not all
the bureaucrats were German, and the schools of Bohemia
turned out sufficient numbers of Czech officials to
infuriate Bohemian Germans who found "German civilization

72
served up to them by Czech officials on a platter of
state of siege."10

The administrators of the 1850s

were, however much they might be mocked in Hungary as
"Bach's hussars" in their cloaked and gold-frogged
pseudo-Magyar uniforms, by and large efficient and
honest.

Yet imperial policy neither conciliated the

Hungarians nor won the support of the nationalities who
had fought against the Magyars in 1848/49:
The [Hungarian] peasants appreciated their
liberation but persisted in attributing it not to
Vienna but to Kossuth, and there is little evidence
that they preferred the relatively efficient but
alien Bach Hussars to their own traditional
masters....
The Slovak nationalists found that they had
got, after all, very little more out of Vienna than
they had out of Pest...The Serbs fretted against the
ill-faith which had given them, instead of their own
self-governing province, an absolutely-ruled
Department full of Germans and Roumainians....
In
Transylvania both the Saxons and the Roumanians were
solid in opposing reunion with Hungary, but both
were bitterly disappointed with the new
absolutism... The Croats brooded over Dalmatia, and
found the yoke of imported foreign officials as
heavy as the Hungarians did; all the books quote a
remark made by a Croat to a Hungarian friend: "We
have got as a reward what you got as a
punishment."n
The failure of the imperial government to build a
centralized non-national state was mirrored in the decay
of the army.

The 1850s had begun with great promise.

As

Novara, at Temesvar, and on the Jaegerzeile the army had
held the Monarchy together.

The dull Biedermeier court

of the Emperor Ferdinand had been replaced by one that
glittered with uniforms.

The young emperor, so lately a

junior staff officer, surrounded himself with soldiers
and habitually appeared in uniform.

There was military

rule in Verona, Budapest and Vienna itself.

Baron

Ktibeck, late president of the Hofkaimer and now the
Monarchy's financial expert, attended a dinner at
Schdnbrunn in the autumn of 1849 and found himself adrift
in a sea of generals.

He confided to his diary that

Austria was now a military state and that at Schonbrunri
he had seen the "apotheosis of the army."12
Victory had given the army a pre-eminent voice in
the councils of state, and when the war ministry, a
legacy of the failed liberalizing of 1848, was dismantled
in 1853, the army was freed from the last traces of
civilian control.

In the autumn of 1850 the massed

battalions of imperial— royal whitecoats— a quarter of a
million men, commanded by the now-legendary Radetzky—
helped ensure Austria's diplomatic triumph over Prussia
at Olmiitz.13

The triumph at Olmiitz, followed in 1853 by

a successful show of force against the Turks over Ottoman
threats to Montenegro and then by the occupation of the
Danubian Principalities during the Crimean War, gave the
imperial army a series of empty victories.

The

Prussians, humilitated at Olmiitz, undertook to reform
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their armies in order to oppose Austrian "arrogance" in
the Germanies.

The mobilization against Russia had been

fearfully expensive— sixty million florins overall, the
whole of the 1854 military budget swallowed up by March
1854— and the consequences crippled the Monarchy's
finances for years afterward.14 The Russians were
outraged at Austria's actions in the Danubian
Principalities.

The newly-crowned Tsar Alexander blamed

his humiliation at the hands of Britain and France on the
lack of support— the "armed neutrality"— shown by Franz
Joseph, and the Monarchy lost any hope of support from
the Russia that had sent 150,000 men into Hungary to aid
the Habsburgs in 1849.
The 1850s gave the army its paper triumphs.

The

mobilization of the autumn of 1850 had even made the
imperial armies seem both powerful and modern.

The

imperial quartermasters had moved 75,000 men, 8000
horses, and 1800 wagons and artillery pieces to the
Bohemian front by rail15— a dazzling display of skill.
The Prussian army, which had seen no serious fighting
since 1815, allowed itself to be cowed by an Austrian
army so recently victorious on two fronts.

In point of

fact, though, the imperial forces had learned little in
1848/49.

The transport system decayed all through the

1850s, victim of unbalanced budgets, the sale of rail

lines to private concessions, and the rampant corruption
which culminated in 1859 with the suicide of the army's
chief of procurement.16 The tactics that had won the
day at Novara and Komorn had been wholly orthodox, and
there was no incentive to change.

Victory can ruin an

army just as surely as defeat, and the imperial
commanders locked themselves into obsolescent doctrines.
Perhaps the major change in the structure of the army was
the dissolution of the light cavalry.

Uhlans had been of

use in Hungary, and the cavalry's seven regiments of
chevaux-legers were converted to uhlans and given lances,
creating shock troops at the expense of reconaissance, a
move exactly opposite to the evolution of military theory
elsewhere.
The reasoning behind the expansion of the uhlans
affected the infantry as well.

Maria Theresa's Austria

had been famed for its use of light infantry and
skirmishing tactics,17 but nineteenth-century doctrine
stressed close formations and the bayonet.

The victories

of 1848/49 were won with methods commonplace in Archduke
Charles's day, and Austrian military doctrine centered on
close columns charging home with cold steel.

The

military leadership of the Monarchy was not given to
intellectual pursuits, and legend held that the Austrian
staff could not be interested in the Prussian Kriegspiel
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because one could not properly place bets18— and the
young emperor insisted that "loyal and chivalrous"
officers rather than learned ones were the guarantors of
the army's success.19 Nothing is quite so conducive to
lethargy as success, and there was no love of military
learning in the upper reaches of the army.

Count Karl

Grtinne, the emperor's adjutant and the most influential
military voice in the Monarchy, was scathing in his
contempt for "military pedants," a reflection of both his
conservatism and his own lack of military talent.
Benedek, lionized for his exploits in 1848 and 1859,
insisted that he could conduct a campaign according to
simple principles; he was, he said, not impressed by
complex maneuvers.20 Archduke Albrecht, who did keep up
with the theory of his profession, distrusted innovation
on political grounds* any major innovation in the army
ultimately implied social change, and the spirit of the
army had to remain true to the Dynasty alone.21
The army approached 1866 with a tactical doctrine
that took no account of the introduction of the
breechloading rifle or the open-order tactics developed
by the French in Algeria,

in part this was sheer

conservatism, a refusal to meddle with past success.
was also a misreading of the lessons of 1859.

At

Solferino the French, whose infantry had been largely

It
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armed with smoothbores, had used the superior accuracy
and firepower of their artillery to allow fast-moving
French columns to press home bayonet charges into the
close-packed Austrian formations.

The Austrian high

command had viewed the French success as proof of the
ability of the bayonet to overcome firepower and had
neglected the role of the French artillery in enabling
the infantry to overcome the superior range of the rifled
Lorenz musket used by the Austrians.

The imperial-royal

service regulations of 1862 designated the bayonet as the
supreme weapon on the battlefield and abandoned maneuver
and aimed fire for the cold steel and 61an of pure
Stosstaktik.22

The results, even in the Danish campaign

of 1864, were bloody enough.

In 1866 the whitecoated

Austrian battalions charged the Prussian needle-guns and
died in waves.

The Austrian victory at Trautenau (27

June 1866) cost the Habsburg forces 17.8% casualties
against 4.2% for the Prussians.

The 23.Infantry (a

former Lombard regiment, recruited at Zombor in Hungary
since 1860) suffered losses of thirty-one percent.23
For every Prussian soldier killed in 1866, 2.3 Austrian
soldiers died, and total casualties amounted to 4.5
Austrians killed, wounded, and missing for every
Prussian.24

Conservatism and a misreading of the events at
Solferino explained part of the reliance on Stosstaktik,
but some historians, Hans Delbriick chief among them, saw
the preference for close formations as being grounded in
the fear of desertion by various national groups—
Italians, Hungarians and Croats.25

Delbriick's assertion

was sharply attacked by Heinrich von Srbik, who denied
outright that the imperial-royal army was devoted to
close formations out of fear of national disaffection and
pointed out that the Habsburg armies had a long tradition
of favoring cold steel and mass.26 The VormSrz army,
like so many continental forces, lacked the financial
resources to sustain an interest in Feuertaktik.

With

line infantry limited to twenty training rounds per man
annually, a reliance on the bayonet was unavoidable.27
Furthermore, only about ten percent of the infantry
conscripts of the 1850s were literate, and the quality of
imperial-royal NCOs was generally regarded as low.

It

was easier to supervise men in close formations where
attacks could simply be made en masse with the drums
beating out the pas de charge.
There had of course been concern among the Austrian
high command in 1859 that disaffection among Italian and
Hungarian units would lead to large-scale desertions or
outright mutiny.

Count Griinne, the emperor's adjutant-

general, argued that the reserve battalions of all the
Lombard and Venetian regiments should be sent out of
Italy immediately upon mobilization.26

Archduke

Albrecht, commanding general in Hungary, wanted all
mobilised Hungarian reservists sent out of Hungary,
though not to Italy, where they were likely to desert or
defect.

Nor did he wish to see any suspect Italian

troops posted to Hungary.29

And the initial battles of

the war seemed to bear out fears of desertion.

The 45.

(Verona) Infantry distinguished itself at Magenta,
winning 32 silver medals and losing 45 killed and 287
wounded, but also listing 742 men as missing.

The 13.

(Padua) Infantry, being shipped from Hungary to reinforce
the Italian front, lost 110 men to desertion en route and
was abruptly shifted to Innsbruck.

News of the defeat at

Magenta and the evacuation of Milan precipitated largescale desertions in the 23.(Lodi) and 43.(Bergamo)
Infantry.30

Croatian Grenzer units sent to Lombardy had

displayed a distinct lack of discipline and a tendency to
go off in search of loot, leading Gunther Rothenberg to
agree with Delbriick.31

It was long believed that there

had been large numbers of deserters in 1859 from
Hungarian units.

C.A. Macartney believed that 15,000

Hungarian troops, six percent of the Austrian forces in
Italy, deserted during the war of 1859.

The 19.(Raab)
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and the 34.(Kaschau) Infantry are supposed to have had
1200 missing at Solferino— a level of desertion
tantamount to outright dissolution.32
Yet, as Istvan Deak demonstrated, the actual
statistics for the campaign of 1859 tell a much different
story.

Casualty returns from Solferino for the 19.

listed 32 killed, 183 wounded, and €4 missing.

The 34.,

all three of whose battalions fought for Kossuth in
1848/49, fought with enthusiasm at Solferino; the
regiment suffered 703 casualties, of which 271 were
missing— "a low figure, considering that the battle was
lost and that the Austrians listed as missing everyone
who could not be positively identified as dead."33

In

other Hungarian units, such as the 48.(Nagykanizsa) and
the 60.(Eger), there were high figures for all types of
losses.

The 48. lost 62 killed, 347 wounded, 235

captured, and 161 missing at Solferino, where it held its
position in the center of the fighting.

With two gold

and seventy-nine silver medals awarded to its soldiers,
it was one of the most highly decorated units of the war.
The 60., badly mauled at Magenta, was driven from the
field by the French at Solferino, losing fifty-six
killed, 249 wounded, and 548 missing.

Many -of the losses

occurred when elements of the regiment fired on one
another in darkness and confusion during the general
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rout.34

The imperial-royal army's Hungarian units, Deak

noted, did not desert en masse in northern Italy; they
were killed en masse.35
Desertions in large numbers had certainly taken
place from the Monarchy's Italian regiments, though few
of these occured at or near the front.

The 13.(Padua)

lost its deserters on the march west out of Hungary; the
23. (Lodi) and 43.(Bergamo) were stationed on the
Dalmation coast when problems began.

The 55.(Monza) lost

forty-two men when its reserve battalion was sent from
Lower Austria to Hungary in midsummer, after fighting had
ended in Lombardy.36 The Hungarian regiments had shown
no special tendency to desert despite the assertions of
some historians.37 Yet it was the perception of
desertion rather than the reality that seems to have
affected Austrian decisions about the need for close
supervision of the troops, and by 1866 there was a deep
concern for using close formations to monitor suspect
nationalities.38 The three Italian regiments that
fought in Bohemia in 1866— the 13.(Padua), 38.(Brescia),
and 26.(Udine)— distinguished themselves despite heavy
casualties,39 but when Magyar battalions of the
67.(Eperjes) and 68.(Szolnok) Infantry were unable to
advance against Prussian fire at Nachod, it was taken as
self-evident that Hungarian troops were attempting to
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abandon the field.40 The imperial-royal command was
more than willing to treat its Hungarian soldiers as
potential traitors.
Imperial policy demanded an army loyal only to the
dynasty, but the regiments could not be separated from
their national groups.

Both Friedjung and Prince

Schwarzenberg's biographer claimed that in the years
between 1848 and 1866 "an Austrian regiment was a melting
pot of various nationalities" and that "after 1849 a
system was introduced whereby each regiment consisted of
soldiers of different nationalities."41

Both writers

seem to have confused the regiment, drawn from a local
recruiting district, with the brigade— the basic imperial
tactical grouping during the 1850s— made up of six
battalions of infantry.

The battalions of a brigade

might be of various nationalities, but each battalion
came from its own regiment, its own recruiting ground.
The brigade allowed the military authorities to keep
large tactical units together while still allowing them
to monitor suspect units.
impartially as rain.

And imperial suspicion fell

Of the nine regiments recruited in

Italy in the 1850s only two saw any service in LombardyVenetia during those years: the 13. (Padua) was at Udine
for the first few months of 1854 and the 44. (Milan)
arrived in Padua at the beginning of I86042— although
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the 45. (Verona) saw services at Magenta in 1859 and won
thirty two silver medals for bravery, a performance it
would repeat at Koniggr&tz.
not exempt.

The German regiments were

The 4. Hoch-und-Deutschmeister had

distinguished itself in Hungary, but a detachment of
grenadiers of the 4. had deserted to the mob attacking
the war ministry buildings in October 1848, and the
regiment was considered prone to sympathize with the
Viennese and shipped out to the Tisza in the early 1850s
to hunt bandits.43
The Hungarians were of course kept out of Hungary.
Of twenty-one Hungarian regiments in 1858, only one was
serving inside the lands of the Crown of St. Stephen; in
1862 the number was three of forty-one regiments.44
Suspicion fell on the Grenzers, the units of the
Monarchy's Military Border, as well.

The Transylvanian

Grenzer regiments had fought for Kossuth and had been
"re-organized" in 1849, but in early 1851 they were
dissolved altogether and their soldiers parcelled out to
other regiments.45

Szekler cadres of the old 1. Szekler

Grenzers were moved to Czernowitz and, along with two
companies of the 31. (Hermannstadt) and three companies
of the 51. (Klausenberg), converted to a new 5. (Munkacs)
Infantry.

The new regiment received an auxiliary

recruiting area at Maros-Vasarhely and was further
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diluted in 1852 with 2800 recruits from the zones of the
32. (Budapest) and the 34. (Kaschau).46
The Croatian Grenzers had been conspicuously loyal
in 1848, but the Habsburgs had never been disposed to
shows of gratitude.

Loyalty to the dynasty was simply

assumed; rewards were rarely handed out for mere
performance of duty.

An autonomous Croatian kingdom of

Illyria was no more desirable than an autonomous Hungary.
Fiume and bits of eastern Slavonia were added to Croatian
territory, and the Grenzers were given actual title to
the land they farmed in their regimental areas,47 but
Dalmatia was kept separate from Croatia and the major
demand of the Croats, the union of the Border with civil
Croatia, was denied.48 The male population of the
Border was still subject to military justice and
permanent military service, and the Border and its
inhabitants were proclaimed an "integral part" of the
imperial army.49 The economy of the Border was in a
dismal state, and all observers agreed that improvement
was possible only if the Border could be integrated into
Croatia proper.50

The Border was producing only half as

much grain as civil Croatia in the early 1860s, and a
deepening poverty in the regimental areas was easily
transmuted into political discontent.51
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The Croats had very little with which to bargain.
Jellacic had passed from the scene in the early 1850s,
and the spirochetes that ate away at his spinal cord
destroyed the major living link between the Croats and
the Dynasty.

It had also become open knowledge that the

military efforts of the Grenzers in 1848/49 were notable
more for loyalty than success.

The failure of Jellacic's

offensive against Budapest had dispelled a number of
illusions about the fighting ability of the Grenzers.
The Croats had carried the day in the Prater and down the
Landstrasse during the recapture of Vienna, but they had
displayed a distressing tendency to break away in search
of plunder.52

A decade later, Grenzer regiments sent to

Lombardy impressed Austrian officers as being chiefly
concerned with "stealing chickens, and exhibited an
extrodinary concern for their safety during battle."53
The Grenzers no longer had a place on the modern
battlefield; the soldier-farmer had been made obsolete
and was now failing at both professions.

The regiments

of the Border performed their traditional tasks of
hunting down bandits and facing down local Ottoman
garrisons, but they could no longer command any special
mystique.

Their major active function was maintenance of

the Pest-Cordon against a Turkey supposedly infested with
plague and cholera, so that
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if you dare to break the laws of the
quarantine, you will be tried with military haste;
the court will scream out your sentence to you from
a tribunal some fifty yards off; the priest, instead
of gently whispering to you the sweet hopes of
religion, will console you at duelling distance, and
after that you will find yourself carefully shot and
carelessly buried in the ground of the Lazaretto.94
The military authorities did not wish to give up
their control over the Border, since military control
provided, at least in theory, a base for future
operations against Hungary.

Yet attempts to isolate the

Border from the political life of civil Croatia and the
wider economy of the Monarchy produced nothing but
deepening dissatisfaction and poverty.59 By the end of
the 1850s the Croats, so highly praised for the loyalty
and devotion they had shown a decade before,56 were
considered unreliable.

Large numbers of Croats had

deserted in Lombardy in 1859, and the French had hoped to
induce them to rise in support of a French landing in
Dalmatia.97 In 1850 an Austrian observer had warned the
command in Hungary that "South Slav nationalism hides
dangerous tendencies behind a mask of outward
loyalty;"58 by 1859 it was necessary to shift Czech and
German regulars in large numbers to the Border.

The

English traveller George Spottiswoode found that "the
mountains swarmed with soldiers," and the army was
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interning in Josephstadt fortress as many nationalist
suspects as it could find.59
The new attitude of the Croats found political
expression in the aftermath of the war.

The imperial

government, beset by military disaster and financial
collapse, harassed by a well-organized and well-financed
press campaign mounted by the German Liberals and the
financial community,60 began its retreat from the
programs of Schwarzenberg and Bach, from a unitary state
and absolute imperial authority.

The October Diploma of

1860, the first constitutional experiment of Franz
Joseph's reign, promised an enlarged crown council drawn
from the monarchy as a whole.

Pressure from the German

Liberals and the Hungarians, both of whom sought more
from a constitution than a council with no control over
defense or foreign affairs and with only limited control
of taxation, forced its withdrawal within a few
months.61

Its successor, the Silvester Patent of 1861,

made the diets of the crownlands electoral colleges for a
central Reichsrat in Vienna.

Nine Croatian-Slavonian

delegates were to be sent to the Reichsrat, and the
Croatian Grenzers, though under military orders to
discuss nothing but the election of delegates to the
central Reichsrat, were allowed to participate in the
deliberations of the Croatian Sabor.

The Grenzers,

rebuffed in their attempts to petition the emperor over
the status of the Border, sided with the Sabor's block of
Croatian nationalists, and Grenzer votes gave the
nationalists in the Sabor a majority against
participation in the Reichsrat.67 The imperial
authorities were outraged by the open defiance of the
Grenzera, and the Border delegates were immediately
shipped back to their regiments and kept under open
arrest.

All Grenzer officers suspected of nationalist

sentiments were to be transferred out of Croatia— a
decision that applied even to Colonel Petar Preradovic,
the celebrated author of German romances of the Border:
the author of Das Uakoken Madchen was declared too
nationalist to serve in Croatia and Slavonia.63

The

decision to post suspect Grenzer officers to regiments
elsewhere in the Monarchy gave a number of nationalist
officers incentive to resign; the most radical took
service in Serbia, which had attracted the sympathies of
South Slav nationalists both Orthodox and Catholic.

The

group of ex-Habsburg officers in Belgrade devoted
themselves to organizing intelligence networks along the
Border and promoting insurrection in Bosnia in the hope
of using a Turkish war as the catalyst for the creation
of a South Slav state.64

The Monarchy's Italian provinces were under constant
strain from a nationalism that was, despite Radetzky's
efforts to separate the peasants of Lombardy and Venetia
from their politically-active betters, deeply rooted.
Yet the population was sufficiently quiet in the late
1850s for a ninth Italian regiment— the 55.(Como)— to be
raised.

Italian units were posted abroad, most often to

Bohemia and Hungary.

Yet the Italians, as exemplified by

the performance of the 45.(Verona) at Magenta and
Koniggratz, continued to give good service.

The fleet,

whose sailors and marines had mutinied in 1848, continued
to be drawn from Dalmatia and the Veneto.

The political

reliability of the fleet seems to have improved during
the 1850s— a function perhaps of the ongoing shift of
naval forces away from Venice to Pola and almost
certainly of the new life brought to the fleet by the
Archduke Maximilian, named to the admiralty in 1854.

The

young archduke's influence in improving the training and
outfitting of the neglected fleet went far towards
dissolving nationalism into professionalism.65

The

crews of the outgunned Austrian fleet that devastated
their Italian opponents at Lissa were, after all, largely
Italian-speaking.
The loss of Lombardy left the imperial
administration in the Veneto thoroughly demoralized.

The
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fortress towns of the Quadrilateral, Mantua, Legnano,
Peschiera, and Verona, remained in imperial hands, and
the ambitions of the Piedmontese were held at the line of
the Po and the Mincio.

The guns of the Quadrilateral and

the rail net centered on Mantua gave the imperial
defenses an overwhelming advantage on the frontiers of
the new Italian kingdom.

There were still seven Italian

regiments after 1859/60, including a new 79. raised at
Pordenone and an 80. raised at Vicenza in 1860.
Table 2.1
Italian Infantry Regiments 1848-60

1857

1848
13.
16.
23.
26.
38.
43.
44.
45.

Padua
Treviso-Venice
Lodi
Udine
Cremona-Brescia
Bergamo
Milan
Verona

TOTAL* 8

1860
13. Padua
16. Treviso-Venice
26. Udine
38. Rovigo
45. Verona
7 9. Pordenone
80. Vincenza
TOTALS 7

13. Padua
16. Treviso-Venice
23. Lodi
26. Udine
38. Cremona-Brescia
43. Bergamo
44. Milan
45. Verona
55. Como
TOTAL: 9
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Yet Benedek, arriving in Italy in 1861, found the
administration of Venetia, both civil and military, in a
state of "uncertainty, passivity, and impotence.1166
Little enough had changed in Venice itself.

The

imperial fleet was slowly shifting to Pola, but the
city's status as a free port brought in sufficient
merchantmen to fill the docks.

Austrian officers and

their friends still drank at Quadri's, staring across San
Marco at the partisans of a united Italy drinking at
Florian's.

The imperial administration and the populace

both spent the 1860s in lethargic anticipation.

Benedek

found the population "hardly conscious" of any connection
with the Monarchy, ruled "in greater part" by nationalist
ideas, but simply cultivating their own material
interests in disregard of the Austrians, in expectation
of change.67

Such expectations were not merely rumor or

nationalist propaganda: the Austrian cabinet had informed
Prince Richard Metternich in Paris in March 1863 that any
"policy of sacrifices" for Venetia would involve reviving
"dangerous tendencies among the nationalities at home"
and was too risky to consider.

Both the Prussians and

the Italians believed that a diplomatic arrangement which
would cede Venice to Italy in return for their support
for Austrian occupation of Bosnia and the Danubian
Principalities was possible.

At the beginning of 1866
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circles around General La Marmora, the Italian war
minister, were using the Vienna Rothschilds to convey
hints to the imperial government that Venice in return
for supporting Austria's acquisition of Bosnia,
Wallachia, and parts of Serbia would be an acceptable
trade.68
Austrian fears in Italy in the early 1860s were less
of war or revolution than of terrorist attacks by
Garibaldist irregulars.

The imperial ministry of finance

had informed the Archduke Wilhelm that for fiscal 1860
the army could get funds only after all the other
expenses of the state had been met— thus exercising a
veto on any Austrian action against Garibaldi's coup in
the Two Sicilies or Garibaldist movements in Umbria and
the Emilian Marches.69

The 2. Army, the imperial

garrison in Italy and once the centerpiece of the
Monarchy's defenses, dwindled from 150,000 men and 5500
horses in 1861 to 55,000 men and 3000 horses in 1863; by
1863 the Verona general command was reporting that some
regiments were down to a bare dozen men in a company.70
When in 1864 it was feared that 4000-5000 Garibaldisti
were readying a coup in Friulia, only fifty understrength
companies could be found for its defense.71

The Polish

revolt of 1863 revived revolutionary hopes throughout
Europe, and reports of Italian projects frightened

Benedek into proclaiming martial law in early 1864 and
threatening to shoot any captured irregulars out of hand.
Troops were alerted in Carinthia and the Tirol, and the
outcome was determined as much by the hesitation of the
Italian government in supporting Garibaldi as by the
imperial troops who spent endless weeks chasing down
partisans' lairs in the hills around Udine and Belluno.
Reports in 1865 of projects against Fiume and Cattaro and
of increased activity against Venetia being planned by
revolutionaries in Bologna led to increased patrol and
counter-intelligence activity, but concrete proposals to
reinforce the police led to an impasse over the legal
status of imperial and Lombard-Venetian gendarmerie
forces.72
The heart of the Monarchy's problem was of course
Hungary.

The Hungarian constitution had been suppressed

in 1849, and the old Kingdom of Hungary had been
dismembered.

Transylvania was carved away into a

separate unit, as was Croatia.

Hungary proper was

divided into six military districts based at Sopron,
Pressburg, Kaschau, Budapest, Nagyvarad, and Temesvar.
The Temesvar military region was joined to the Voivodina
in November 1849 and transformed into a new crownland
with Franz Joseph as Grand Voivode, leaving Hungary in
five parts, each ruled by a military governor and his
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civilian advisor.

The punitive regime of FBldmarachal-

leutnant Baron Haynau, whose armies had broken the
Hungarian forces in 1849, had served its purpose by mid1850, and the marshal was retired to his newly-acquired
Hungarian estates, where he spent his last years
wondering why his gentry neighbors refused to invite him
to their parties.73

His replacement was Archduke

Albrecht, who made his formal appearance as governorgeneral at Pressburg in mid-October 1851.74

The new

regime moved to hand over as much authority as possible
to the civilian specialists in charge of integrating
Hungary and its laws into the Monarchy as a whole, but
martial law officially remained in effect until May 1854,
and the new gendarmerie was backed by twenty-two
battalions of infantry designated for internal-security
duties.75
Albrecht's arrival gave no joy to those Hungarians
not attached to the court.

The Archduke's ten years in

office saw the creation of much of the economic
infrastructure essential to the country's later
development, and the new regime supervised the abolition
of feudal dues and the transfer of urbarial lands to
their new peasant owners.76

Nonetheless, the reforms of

the early 1850s were carried out by the bureaucrats, many
of them Czechs and Germans imported by Bach's ministry.
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and the decrees of January 1853 converting the
"provisional" decrees of 1849 into a permanent system
reiterated Bach's Verwirkungstheorie, under which
Hungary, by its treason and rebellion, had forfeited its
constitution and its right to exist as a separate
kingdom.77
The Archduke, whose rank was first seen as a
concession to Hungarian sentiments after the rule of
Haynau and his bourgeois civilian advisor Heinrich
Gehringer, was "an austere military figure to whom every
Hungarian was a rebel, actual or potential.1,78 And
Albrecht made no secret of his belief that he was ruling
over conquered territory.

The suspension of the customs

barrier between Hungary and the Austrian provinces gave
the hard-pressed Magyar gentry access to the German
demand for grain, but credit for expansion and
mechanization on gentry holdings was available only to
friends of the dynasty.79

The integration of Hungary

into the Austrian tax structure meant that Hungary was
now paying its share of expenses for the whole Monarchy,
and taxes increased tenfold as Hungary's privileged
position vanished:

the 1847 figures for taxes were 4.3

million florins in direct taxes and 5.3 million florins
in indirect taxes; the figures for 1857 were 41.5 million
and 65.6 million florins respectively.

The bulk of the
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direct taxes fell on the nobility; the peasantry found
itself bearing the cost of new taxes on food and
tobacco.80
There were of course real enemies of the state for
the governor-general to contend with.

In the autumn of

1851 the gendarmerie uncovered a conspiracy in the
Szekler towns of Transylvania, organized by an ex-Honvdd
colonel named Joszef Mack, who billed himself as
Kossuth's chosen agent and who had established a fairly
extensive network of terrorist cells across the country.
The affair was dealt with swiftly, as was a second, more
comic-opera, attempt at revolt by a radical named Oszlopy
the following June.81 The executions following the
suppression of Mack's conspiracy prompted the exiled
Kossuth to urge his followers to wait for a more
favorable international alignment, and the skill of the
authorities in intercepting radical communications
dampened conspiratorial enthusiasms at home.
Nonetheless, the imperial visit of 1852 was attended
by a massive military escort, as was the visit of both
emperor and empress in 1856.

In both cases the emperor

refused to wear the uniform of any of his Hungarian
regiments; security units enforced a ban on the redwhite-green national colors while the imperial
procession, decked in the black-and-yellow of the
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dynasty, passed by.83

Physical opposition to the new

order was confined to the hinterlands of the east and
south, where a tradition of banditry kept alive bands who
fancied themselves as partisans.

The 4. Hoch-und-

Deutschmeister, sent out beyond the Tisza to hunt
bandits, killed or captured 122 brigands in the last two
weeks of September 1850 alone,83 and the dreary work of
ferreting out brigands and self-proclaimed partisans from
among a sullen population went on throughout the decade.
The nature of Hungarian resistance had been defined
by Ferenc Deak as early as 1850.

Asked to serve on an

imperial commission on integrating Austrian and Hungarian
judicial procedures, he informed Vienna that "it is not
possible to cooperate actively in public affairs."88
Deak's attitude was shared by the majority of his class,
and the Magyar gentry withdrew to their estates.

The

imperial authorities were hardly anxious to recruit from
among a suspect people, but there were few enough
volunteers for imperial service in any case:

when in

June 1850 the authorities began recruiting civilian
administrators, only nine of 117 applicants were
Magyar.85
The ruling class of Hungary withdrew from public
life, leaving the collection of taxes and the levying of
recruits to the "Bach hussars” and the army.

Cynics
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claimed that the majority of the 156,000-man imperial
garrison in the late 1850s was there to collect taxes,
and the army and the finance ministry fought a savage
paper war over who would bear the costs of the endless
expeditions to collect taxes.

Thirty- two million gulden

were in arrears in Hungary in 1859, a figure raised to
forty-five million three years later by an exhausted and
exasperated army command.96 Those Hungarians possessing
sufficient influence, respectability, or wealth to defy
the bureaucrats openly did so, confident that a platoon
of soldiers would be helpless against local passivity and
obstinance.

When the Hungarian Diet assembled in 1861,

every single deputy was deeply in arrears with his
taxes.07 The habit of non-payment became entrenched in
the countryside.

Despite the coming of home rule and

Dualism, sweeps across the countryside by the (now
Hungarian) gendarmerie and army to collect>taxes were
commonplace throughout the last thirty years of the
century.00
The suppression of county authorities and the
enactment of uniform conscription throughout the Monarchy
in 1852 put the Hungarian conscript pool in direct
contact with the imperial authorities.

The law of 1852,

amended again in late 1858,09 set eight years as the
standard term of service throughout the Monarchy,

followed by a two-year reserve liability.

The emperor

proclaimed that a state "which can raise two hundred
thousand men without trouble...is not sickening for
revolution,"90 but the annual intake never reached half
that figure.

Hungarian recruits had been provided by the

counties, and the local high sheriffs and lordslieutenant had used the army as a dumping ground for
vagrants, insolent peasants, and petty criminals.

The

conscription laws of the 1850s and early 1860s still
exempted the Monarchy's propertied classes, but the
transfer of conscription power from local notables to
professional administrators meant that more Hungarians
faced the prospect of military service.

The quality of

Hungarian recruits may well have improved, but the
conscripts of the Bach era were levied by an authority
perceived as foreign, and they included men far more
disposed to protest both their own conscription and the
imperial regime in Hungary than their VormSrz
counterparts.

The army's methods for dealing with

recalcitrant private soldiers dated back to Eugene's day,
and the lash was applied with mechanical indifference.91
Resistance to conscription became endemic in Hungary, and
the imperial authorities became convinced that, given any
opportunity, there would be widespread desertion from the
Hungarian regiments.

Nonetheless, outright insubordination remained rare.
Magyar conscripts were difficult to catch, and the army
believed that Magyar troops could not be stationed in
Hungary,

yet in 1859 and 1866, when chances for open

defiance appeared, surprisingly few Hungarian soldiers
availed themselves of the opportunity to fight against
the Habsburgs.

In 1859 Kossuth obliged Louis Napoleon

and Cavour by forming a Hungarian Legion to fight against
the Austrians in Lombardy.

The Hungarian Legion, built

around a cadre of about 300 long-time emigres, despite
appeals by Kossuth to the Hungarian soldiers of the
imperial-royal forces in Italy, attracted few recruits.
By early July 1859 the Hungarian Legion numbered 4000
men, but the majority of those were something less than
volunteers.

The French command in Lombardy had simply

transferred all Hungarian prisoners to the control of the
Legion.

The new legionnaires found themselves given the

choice of the Legion or French prison camps.

The

Hungarian leadership extolled the "volunteers" in the
foreign press, but in private they were angry at French
ignorance.

"Hungarian" regiments were by no means all

Magyar, and the Legion found itself filled with Croatian,
Swabian, Slovak, Serbian, or Romanian soldiers who had no
wish to fight for a Magyar vision of Hungary.92

in any

event, the Legion saw no combat and most of its members
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were only too happy to accept the Austrian offer of
amnesty after the end of the war.
A number of Hungarians took service with Piedmont,
and five years after Solferino many were languishing at
Ancona, sick of being used to fight in Piedmont's
internal quarrels and busy petitioning Benedek in Venice
for amnesty and the chance to return home.93 Another
Legion was raised in 1866 to fight alongside the
Prussians but met with even less success.

Commanded by

Gyorgy Klapka, the defender of Komorn fortress, it never
exceeded battalion strength and was made up of emigres
long exiled from Hungary.

When Klapka attempted to move

into northern Hungary he found the local Magyar
population apathetic and the Slovak peasantry openly
hostile.

Harassed by the locals and given no support by

the Prussians, Klapka and his few hundred men fell back
across Moravia into Prussia.

Their sole achievement may

have been to raise Czech'support for the Habsburgs.
Frantisek Rieger, leader of the Czech deputies in the
Reichsrat, pointed out that a Magyar radical victory was
a threat to the Czechs and offered Czech support to the
imperial government.94
There had been no revolts in either Lombardy-Venetia
or Hungary in 1859, despite the fears of many Austrian
commanders (such as Archduke Albrecht) and the hopes of
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Kossuth and his fellow emigres.

Yet when the army began

to rebuild itself, to think of revenge in Italy or the
growing possibility of war with Prussia, its leaders were
faced with a long list of suspect nationalities and an
eroding financial base.

The loss of Lombardy left the

Monarchy in possession of a Veneto whose population
expected to be joined to Italy within a few years.

The

Croats were openly suspect, the Magyars sullenly
obstinate.

The Hungarian Diet had been suspended in

August 1861; by November the country was once again under
martial law, and the military engaged in a grinding,
often futile, series of tax-collection campaigns.93
Faced with discontent at home, the need to defend the
Monarchy's remaining Italian possessions, and the
possibility of a war over leadership in the Germanies,
the army found itself woefully short of manpower either
to fight abroad or to maintain order at home.
On paper, the imperial-royal army could field a half
million men upon mobilization.

The strength of the

infantry had been augmented in the summer of 1848 by
activating each regiment's first Landwehr battalion as a
fourth regular battalion, and the fourth battalions had
never been retired.

In mid-1852 the infantry had been

officially declared to consist of sixty-two line
regiments of four field battalions and a depot battalion
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each.96

This gave the army a mobilized strength of half

a million,97 but the actual number was far less.

The

Monarchy's financial straits and the difficulty of
extracting recruits from Hungary made a system of five
battalions too expensive to operate.

In 1855 the depot

battalions were dissolved and the fourth line battalions
thinned and returned to the regimental recruiting
districts to serve as training cadres.99

When in

September 1859 the decision was taken to enlarge the
infantry by eighteen regiments, there was a marked
shortage of soldiers.
The planned expansion envisaged transforming sixtytwo regiments of four battalions to eighty regiments of
three battalions and a depot cadre.

Each old regiment

would give up two battalions to the new regiments, and
units would be shuffled between older regiments to make
up for the loss of Lombard troops.

The 4. Hoch-und-

Deutschmeister gave up its 2. and 3. battalions to the
new 72. (Pressburg) and received the 3. battalion of the
14.(Linz).

The 48.(Nagy-Kanisza) took in the

3/52.(Funfkirchen) but sent out its own 2. and 3.
battalions to the 44., late of Milan, now re-forming in
Kaposvar.

The 44. in turn sent a cadre of officers and

MCOs from the 2/44. to the 6.(Neusatz).

The 20.(Neu-

Sandec) sent its 2. and 3. battalions to the 67.(Eperjes)

and took in the 3 . 5 6 ( W a d o w i c e ) T h e Lombard regiments
were given new recruiting grounds, often in Hungary,
where Italian troops had long been commonplace.

The

23.(Lodi) was shifted to Maria-Theresiopel, the
43.(Bergamo) to Versec in the Banat, the 44.(Milan) to
Kaposvar, the 55.(Como) to Brzezany in Galicia, and the
11. Uhlans, the only cavalry regiment raised in Habsburg
Italy, were sent to Przemysl.

Most of the Lombard

soldiers were simply released from service in 1860,
although some (especially the cavalrymen of the
11.Uhlans) seem to have served out their terms.

The

expansion could only take place by thinning already
understrength regiments. The 4.Hoch~und-DeutBcIme±ster,
brought home to Vienna in triumph in 1854, paraded on the
Glacis for the emperor and his new bride with a strength
of eighty men per company.

When in 1860 the 2/4. and the

3/4. were transferred to the new 72., company strength
fell to sixty.100
The 1860s opened badly for the army.

The expansion

of the infantry meant in concrete terms only a thinning
of existing resources: eighteen new regimental banners
implied the costs of eighteen new recruiting districts
and training depots and competition for a fixed (and
inadequate) number of warm bodies. The demands of the
Lombard war had meant an early levying of recruits, and
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the class of 1860 could not be raised.101

There was

little help to be had from outside sources.

Revived

parliamentary life in Austria was controlled by the
German Liberals, and memories of October 1848 died hard:
Liberal hatred of the army was exceeded only by Liberal
distaste for the Church.

The Reichsrat had a willingness

to pay for a gendarmerie that would keep the mob and the
Magyars in their places but no sympathy for enlarged
military budgets.103

The military budget fell from 179

million florins in 1861 to 118 million in 1863/64; after
the Danish campaign of 1864 it was cut again to 96
million.103
In theory, 310-320,000 men reached the age of twenty
every year in the Monarchy, of which 85,000 would be
recruited for eight years in the line and two years in
the reserves.

Allowing for a 2000-man naval levy, the

imperial army at full mobilization could draw on ten
classes of 83,000 men and a force of 50,000 Grenzers.
practice, only those recruits destined for the cavalry
saw eight years of service.

Artillery and engineering

troops generally served four to six years, and..infantry
only one and one half to three. After 1855, most of the
infantry were furloughed after eighteen months and did
(at most) an eight-week autumn drill for the rest of
their line obligation.104 Austrian military authorities

In
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continued to insist that long-service troops alone could
be properly trained and shielded from outside influences.
The latter belief was universal, though its empirical
accuracy has been questioned.105

The eight-year term of

service and the pressure of finances meant that the
imperial army would be only minimally trained and
woefully short of reserves.

Indeed, Benedek complained

from Italy in 1862 that the regiments of the 2. Army were
"wholly disorganized" and that, with only fifty men to a
company, no real tactical training was possible.

Some of

his battalions were down to a mere twelve men per
company, a state of only ghostly existence.105
It was nonetheless true that the Northern Army of
1866 was fully imperial-royal, drawn from all the
crownlands of the Monarchy, with Venetian infantry
alongside Hungarian, Bohemian, and Lower Austrian
soldiers.

Benedek's army was poorly trained and equipped

and led by men who had learned nothing in 1859, but there
was little open resistance to the war.

Mobilization on

the Border, where South Slav conspiracies had been
festering107, was "orderly, if unenthusiastic."10B
Italian attempts to promote an insurrection on the
Monarchy's flank were of no significance, and Garibaldi
spent much of August 1866 in a fit of rage and despair
over the "shameful apathy" of the peasants of the Veneto,

who gave aid and comfort to the "foreign mercenaries" of
the Habsburgs.109

A contemporary observer gave a rough

national breakdown of the imperial army as110

Cavalry
12
11
13

Infantry
23
23
13
7
7
7

German
Hungarian
Polish
Italian
Siebenburgen
Borderlands
Mixed

-

—

TOTAL:

80

TOTAL:

1
3
1
41

detailed analysis for the end of 1865 gives111
German
Czech-Slovak
Italian
Ruthene
Polish
Magyar
Croat
Slovene
Romanian
Serb
Other
TOTAL:

126,300
96,300
52,700
50,100
37,700
32,500
27,600
22,700
20,700
19,000
5,100
492,700

26 %
19.5
10.7
10.2
7.7
6.6
5.6
4.6
4.2
3.9
1.0

The Northern Army was woefully understrength.

The

Monarchy could raise only 528,000 men in 1 8 6 6 ~ o f which
463,000 (400,000 infantry, 29,000 cavalry, 24,000
artillery, 10,000 engineers) were combat troops.

Ninety*

four thousand men were needed to man the fortresses of
the Monarchy, thirty battalions of regulars (25,000 men)

were designated for internal security in Hungary and
Vienna; 20,000 more were kept in recruiting areas as
training cadres.

Only 310-320,000 men remained available

for a two-front war.

Friedjung estimated that Benedek

began his campaign with 238,000 men, and the 210,000
imperial-royal soldiers he commanded at Koniggr&tz were
roughly equal to the Prussian forces opposing him.
Archduke Albrecht, commanding in Italy, had only 74,000
men available at the outbreak of hostilities and only
110,000 available at Custozza to oppose a total Italian
force of 260,000 under La Marmora.112

Plaschka noted

that the Northern Army, fighting for hegemony in Germany,
had two regiments each from lower Austria and Styria and
one from Upper Austria; the bulk of the infantry was
drawn from Bohemia, Galicia, Venetia, and Hungary.

The

bulk of the Feldjagers were Bohemian, as were both
dragoon regiments and a majority of the heavy cavalry.
Plaschka believed that 1866 was the last truly heartfelt
merging of peoples for Kaiser and Reich.113
The debacle at Koniggratz was the product of years
of decay and neglect.

The army forfeited the remnants of

the prestige it had won in 1848, but it is important to
note that the imperial army was by no means finished as a
fighting force.

Albrecht, named to the disgraced

Benedek's command, hurried up to Vienna from his victory
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at Custozza, followed by 70,000 infantry and 3000
cavalry.114 Albrecht mobilized all available units,
called up another 83,000 recruits, and with 334,000 men
and 533 guns under his command was prepared to fight
on.115

The summer of 1866 was not so black as 1740, and

the archduke was ready to fight on the Danube and raise
the loyal populations of Bohemia and Moravia.116 Even
with the conclusion of an armistice with the Prussians,
the war went on in the south, and 20,000 imperial troops
a day poured back into Venetia, shattering the morale of
an Italian army just then rejoicing over small successes
near Trient.

French observers with the Italians,

expecting a temporary French stewardship over Venetia
before the Italians took possession, were furious that
the archduke's men were deploying on "their"
railroads.117 Albrecht's performance in Italy and the
crushing victory of the imperial fleet at Lissa saved the
Monarchy's position as a great power; the unitary
structure created in 1849 could not be saved.
The failure of the Silvesterpatent of 1861 had been
manifest in Hungary from the outset, and in 1863 the
Czechs and Poles had withdrawn from the Reichsrat as
well.

As early as the winter of 1863 groups of Hungarian

conservatives had presented the emperor with petitions
calling for "dualism in equality" under which an

indivisible Monarchy would support two parliaments and a
joint ministry for war and foreign affairs.

The ideas

were Count Gyorgy Apponyi's, and if they failed to
impress the imperial cabinet, they did impress Ferenc
Deak, leader of the moderates in the Hungarian Diet, who
appropriated them for his own.118

Deak's luck, which

had saved him from Haynau's courts-martial and from
political obscurity, gave him credit for the ideas behind
the Ausgleich, the future Compromise of 1867 between
Hungary and dynasty.

As opinion in Hungary turned

against the exiles of '48 after Kossuth proposed that
Hungary be joined to Serbia, Croatia, and the
Principalities in a Balkan federation,119 Deak's voice
became the dominant one on the Hungarian scene.

By the

beginning of 1866 the police reported to the interior
ministry in Vienna that the magnates of Hungary were of
no consequence; no voice other than Deak's counted.120
Certainly by December 1864 the emperor, at the urging of
Albrecht, whose tactical eye was always acute, was
secretly in touch with Deak.121

In April 1865 Deak

published an unsigned "Easter Article" in his party's
paper.

German translations appeared almost simul

taneously.

No one on either side of the Leitha, the

little river which served as the nominal boundary between
Hungary and the Austrian lands, doubted that the article

Ill
was Deak's; few people knew that the Imperial court had
had advance knowledge of its contents.122
Deak's proposals, generally known as the May
Program, were a decided retreat from the long-held
Hungarian insistence on a return to the constitutional
structure of April 1848.

"We stand ready," Deak wrote,

"to concert our laws with the continued existence of the
empire."123 A constitutional Hungary would admit that
it shared a common ruler and army with a constitutional
Austria and could accept the fiscal machinery needed to
fund a common defense and foreign policy.
produced immediate imperial responses.

The proposals

At the end of

April the emperor arrived at Pressburg without his usual
military escort to present gifts to the Hungarian Academy
of Sciences.

On 6 June he appeared without notice in

Budapest to announce the suspension of the military
courts that had governed since the uproar of October
1860.

On 20 September 1865 the Silvesterpatent was

suspended pending full conciliation with Hungary, and
elections for a new Diet were set for November.

On 14

December Franz Joseph opened the new Hungarian Diet; the
sole item on the agenda was the "revision," by which the
Magyars meant the re-enactment, of the constitution of
April 1848.

Deak and his followers, firmly in control of the
Diet, elected a committee of sixty-seven to conduct
negotiations.

The committee in turn elected a select

committee of fifteen, headed by Deak and his deputy and
heir-apparent, Count Gyula Andrassy, to act as its
executive body.

The Deak team was completely in control:

Andrassy chaired both committees and Deak's draft
proposals met no challenges.

The committee of fifteen

pressed on with its work despite the Diet recess
proclaimed at the outbreak of war.

Deak's famous

moderation— his celebrated remark to the emperor that
Hungary asked for nothing more after Koniggratz than
before— was a desire to present the Austrians with a fait
accompli.

Win or lose in Bohemia (and Deak was unsure

which would be better for Hungary124) the Hungarian
position would be clear.

The committee's draft was

published the same day, 25 June 1866, as the announcement
of Albrecht's triumph in Italy.
Deak and Andrassy had succeeded in controlling
events thus far; it was only on the question of the
future of the army that their hold was not secure.

It

was obvious that the dynasty regarded the army as its
ultimate guarantor, a point continually reiterated by
Albrecht, and the Hungarians found it self-evident that
Hungary could not truly be a nation without an army of

113
its own.

Demands for a separate Hungarian army went back

at least to the beginning of the century, and the Diet of
1839 had called for a force officered by Hungarians and
commanded in Magyar.125 A minority of Deak's committee
of fifteen, led by Kalman Tisza, insisted that in the
aftermath of KoniggrStz the moment had come to create an
Hungarian army.

The Pragmatic Sanction, Tisza claimed,

required that Hungary and the Austrian lands have only a
common defense and not a common army.126

Deak and

Andrassy, with greater realism, argued that the imperial
authorities would never accept a division of the army;
such a demand would be an open provocation.

If the

Committee made such a demand, Deak warned, they would
bring ruin to both themselves and the nation.127

There

was no way around the right of the monarch to an army
with a unified leadership, and Deak had no desire to test
the limits of imperial patience.

The majority of the

committee of fifteen voted to wait on the army issue
pending the outcome of the political settlement.128
The decision to wait did not mean that Deak and
Andrassy had decided to make any concessions to Vienna.
In late July Deak informed the emperor that, while
Koniggratz had not changed his demands, neither would he
support a second recruit levy in Hungary for the
continuance of the war.129 The introduction of
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universal service in December found no support in
Hungary, and Andrassy made violent statements against
such a "violation" of the "rights of the nation."
Imperial circles knew their limits as well: conscription
had been an attempt to circumvent Hungarian demands, and
shortly after the turn of the year it was quietly
suspended.130
Deak was willing to admit that a unified army was
the only practical form of military organization in the
modern world and that a concrete division of the army
would have a "crippling influence" on any effective
command in wartime.

The imperial government issued a

royal rescript on 17 November 1866 reaffirming the unity
of the army and the imperial prerogatives of command, but
indicating a willingness to compromise over recruitment
and supply.131

On 9 January 1867 the committee of

fifteen assembled under Count Ferdinand Beust, the Saxon
exile now serving as Franz Joseph's foreign minister, to
present its final report.

The final version accepted a

traditional reading of the Pragmatic Sanction.

The

monarch would have exclusive rights of command over the
army; the Hungarian parliament would be responsible for
conscription, quartering, and supply within the borders
of the Kingdom of Hungary.

I
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Thus far control of the army was restored to the
status of 1722/23.

Article 12 of the finished Ausgleich

document reserved to the Diet control over recruiting,
length of service, quartering, and supply.

The Consilium

Locumentale Hungaricum had had as much authority in the
eighteenth century.

Article 13 gave the Hungarian

ministry veto power over any basic structural alteration
in the military system that would affect Hungary, thus
giving the Hungarians power to block any real change in
the role of the army or its place in the Monarchy.1”
Article 11 of the Ausgleich expressed the committee of
fifteen's compromise; its language was sufficiently
obscure to give hope to those who still wished for a
Hungarian army:
In accordance with the constitutional sovereign
rights of His Majesty in regard to the area of
military affairs, all matters relating to the
unified leadership, command, and internal
organization of the army as a whole, and thus also
of the Hungarian Army as an integral part of the
common army, are recognized as being reserved to His
Majesty.133
The acceptance of the report was followed on 18
February by the appointment of an autonomous ministry in
Hungary.

Two days later the high command spoke out.

On

20 February 1867 the Archduke Albrecht issued an order of
the day acknowledging the existence of a Hungarian war
ministry, but insisting that the army was still a unified
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force and inveighing against any expression of
separatism.134

The language of Article 11--"Befehligung

und innere Organisation des ganzen Heeres und so aucJi des
ungarischen Heeres, als integrierenden Teiles des
gesamten Heeres"— was vague enough to mean anything from
Hungarian regiments within the army to national guard
units to regiments of a wholly autonomous force, and
Albrecht understood enough about Hungarian aspirations to
realize that such language would be an opening wedge in a
campaign to divide the army.

Over the next two years

Albrecht devoted himself to arguing at court against any
concessions to the Hungarians, and he finally took a step
unheard of for an archduke, publishing a nominallyanonymous pamphlet entitled Wie soil Oesterreichs Heer
Organisiert sein? (How Should Austria's Army Be
Organized?)135 in which he violently attacked the
Hungarian leadership for undermining the unified spirit
of the army.
The Hungarian radicals were quick to use Albrecht's
opposition to attack Deak and Andrassy for their failure
to restore a national army.

No Hungarian politician

could afford to seem too accomodating toward Vienna, and
any concrete work on reform, and restoration of full
recruiting, stalled.
in both capitals;

By autumn patience was wearing thin

another serious confrontation seemed
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In November -the emperor intervened personally.

Colonel Friedrich Beck of the imperial oiilltary
chancellery was sent to deal with Andrassy, and the
leading generals of the Monarchy were assembled and
ordered to map out a plan for army reform that would
maintain the unity of the army without violating the new
constitutional structure.

The emperor was a man of

limited range, but he was rigidly consistent once
committed.

He had accepted Dualism; he was now

determined to have both the Ausgleich and a unified
army.134
Andrassy was under sharp pressure to extract
concessions from Vienna.

Yet Beck, beginning a brilliant

career as the emperor's confidant, was able to present a
compelling case.

A national Hungarian army would have

its own Slav and Romanian regiments, and the anger of
even Palacky's Austro-Slavs over the Ausgleich opened the
way to demands for Slavic armies within the Monarchy.
any case— how long could Hungary stand aloqe?

In

The

spectre of Russian armies and Slavic insurrections
hovered over any vision of a separate Hungary.137
Andrassy was willing to yield on the question of using
German as the language of service (Dienstsprache) for the
joint army and went on to promise that he would not press
for the dissolution of the Border, a zone that the
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Hungarians saw as both infected with Slav nationalism and
a potential base for intervention in Hungary.

He could

not forego the creation of some kind of Hungarian force,
and he proposed that under a joint, imperial-royal
(Kaiserlich-k&niglich— k. -k.) regular army there would
exist "national" forces— an Austrian Landwehr and an
Hungarian Honvedseg— controlled by the two ministries.
Beck reported to his master that Andrassy's position,
given the state of affairs in Budapest, was reasonable
and perhaps even courageous.138 Beck did, however, see
the national guards as a militia on a Tirol model: men
over thirty already done with reserve service, used for
internal security duties, and likely to see action only
as auxiliaries in times of emergency.139 Andrassy's own
view was obscure, but the Diet was unlikely to accept so
minor a role for a revived Honvdd.
Albrecht was less easily convinced than Colonel
Beck.

A restored Honved would only glorify the traitors

of 1848/49, and it would give unreliable elements and
potential rebels access to training and weapons. More to
the point, local politicians would feel free to lavish
funds on the national guards in the name of national
pride and patronage while stinting the real army, the
joint imperial forces.140

The generals, convened in

conference in late February 1868, were in a dangerously
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restive mood.

FML Karl Moering argued that the moment

had come to force a break with Hungary; FML Count Bigot
de St. Quentin argued that the army, as final guarantor
of the Monarchy and the dynasty, must act to preserve the
emperor's role, even against the emperor's wishes.141
Nonetheless, habits of obedience were deeply ingrained,
and Cromwell's disease had never infected the Monarchy.
On 23 March the army command reported their acceptance of
Andrassy's proposals.
The Hungarians' appetite only grew with eating, and
throughout the balance of the year they made additional
demands.

Affairs had now come down to matters made all

the more virulent for their symbolic nature.

The

Hungarians sought to re-create the HonvSd of 1849 in
matters of uniform and organization; Albrecht and the
military would not countenance serving soldiers wearing
the costume of traitors.

Only in early June, again

through the efforts of Colonel Beck, was a settlement
reached.

HonvGd organization and uniform would follow

k.-k. patterns, but its units would be allowed
distinctive flashes, buttons, and banners.

Magyar would

be the language of command, and soldiers of the HonvSd
would swear an oath to both king and constitution.
mid-June the emperor was able to write Andrassy and

By
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congratulate him on his willingness to join in solving
the army question.
A final issue remained.

The Honvdd of course

contained hussars to support its infantry, but it had not
been given artillery.

The imperial command had followed

the example of the British after the Sepoy Mutiny: the
Indian Army, for all its excellent qualities, was not
allowed artillery.

The Hungarians saw the HonvSd as

their national army, and the opposition in the Diet
attacked Andrassy for allowing the Honvdd to be treated
as a second-rate force over the question of artillery.
Yet there would be no concessions here.

The imperial

command was absolutely unwilling to concede cannon to the
Hungarians.

In August 1868 Albrecht took time during a

tour of Croatia to pray at Jellacic's grave and reiterate
his views on unity and rebellion.

The emperor and his

high command remained firm: under no circumstances would
the HonvSd be given artillery.142

Andrassy backed down,

placating his vocal opposition with a pledge to strive in
the future for an increased role for the HonvSd.143
Those Hungarians who sought heavy weapons for their army
had to content themselves with the twenty batteries of
gatling guns the Diet provided its army.

The gatling

guns were the subject of a heated debate in military
circles that finally reached the emperor, who declared

121
them to be infantry weapons and not artillery.
victory was more than a little hollow.

The

The guns proved

unreliable and unwieldy, and by the mid-1870s they had
been withdrawn from service.

The Honvdd would have to

wait another forty years before it had a second chance at
artillery.
On 5 December 1868 an imperial order of the day
announced the arrival of the new state of affairs:
Today a new formation, the Landwehr (Honvedseg)
joins the army as a valuable addition to the common
defense...[This formation] serves the same end as
the Army...and I expect that all officers...and the
generals in particular will do their utmost to
strengthen the bonds between all the units of My
Army and that they will strengthen the spirit of
discipline and order and combat any divisive and
dangerous influences from the outset.144

Beck had drafted the order with an eye to both Albrecht
and Budapest.

The HonvSd was accepted into the army, but

it was an "addition" to the defenses of the Monarchy and
not a separate force.

Nominal command was given to the

Archduke Joseph, one of the members of the dynasty least
objectionable to the Hungarians, but actual control
rested with the defense ministry in Budapest.

The other

peoples of the Monarchy, and the Slav subjects of Hungary
in particular, saw the new arrangement as a threat: the
Magyar lords now possessed an army.

The fathers of
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Dualism, warned the Czech writer Frantisek Palacky, would
end by being the godfathers of Pan-Slavism "in its least
desirable form."145
The arrangements negotiated by Beck and Andrassy led
to a resumption of conscription and the extension of
universal service.

Subjects of the Monarchy were liable

for twelve years of service, although the annual intake
was limited by law to 95,000 men— 55,000 from the
Austrian lands and 40,000 from Hungary.

Yet the Monarchy

lacked the funds to absorb and train so many conscripts
as first-line troops, and the intake was broken down by
lot.

The unlucky were sent to do three years' service

with the joint army, then seven years with the reserves,
and finally two years with either the Landwehr or the
Honvdd.

A middle group did two years on cadre duty with

the Landwehr or Honvdd, and a lucky third group went
straight into an Ersatz-Reserve where they would receive
training only in time of war.

The joint army's active

forces numbered 255,000 in peacetime; wartime strength,
excluding the Grenzer regiments but including the
Landwehr and the Honvdd, stood at 800,000— half a million
men fewer than France, six hundred thousand fewer than
Russia.146
Dualism and universal service were not popular
everywhere.

The mountain population of Cattaro on the

Dalmatian littoral had traditionally been exempt from
conscription, and the loss of that exemption provoked a
revolt in 1869.

A badly-managed punitive expedition of

eighteen battalions found itself unable to cope with
mountain warfare, and in 1870 conscription was
temporarily suspended throughout the Krivosije.

The

Czechs were furious that the Magyars had achieved
autonomy and an army, and nationalist riots and refusals
to take the military oath took place across Bohemia.

The

military, however, had long known how to subdue unruly
Czechs.

Prague was under martial law from November 1868

to April 1869, and six battalions of infantry and a
squadron of cavalry were brought in to overawe the
Czechs.147
Albrecht had worried from the beginning that Dualism
would give the two parliaments an excuse to starve the
army, and in fact the army budget fell from eighty-five
million florins in 1868 to seventy-five million in 1869.
The war scare of 1870 brought it up to eighty million
again, but thereafter, and especially in the depression
years after 1873, the army found its budget slashed.

On

a percentage basis, the Monarchy spent less on its army
than any other major power,
Hungarian Diet.

the same was not true of the

While the Austrian Landwehr remained a

cadre force, the HonvSd, which was training almost twice
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as many men, was a favored child.

In its first years the

Honvdd was getting nine million florins a year.
Depression cut the figures to seven million for 1874-76,
but after 1877 the Honvdd budget soared past the nine
million level again.148
The organizational capabilities of the Honvdd grew
apace.

By 1870 Honvdd units were participating in joint

army maneuvers, and after 1873 the Honvdd possessed its
own divisional and territorial commands.

The credit went

to Baron Fejervary, late of the emperor's military
chancellery.

Archduke Joseph was titular commander of

the Honvdd, but actual control lay with Bela Szende, the
longtime Hungarian war minister.

In 1872 Fejervary had

been promoted to Generalmajor and transferred from
command of the 72. (Fressburg) Infantry to Budapest,
where he was named Szende's military secretary.149
Fejervary rapidly and effectively integrated ninety-two
battalions of Honvdd infantry and forty squadrons of
cavalry into twenty-eight infantry regiments and ten
regiments of hussars drawn from seven military districts
which, unlike those of the Landwehr, were not congruent
with joint-army corps areas.

In 1873 Fejervary was

responsible for just under 160,000 men; by 1876 he could
report that 200,000 men were combat-ready and deployed in
brigade and divisional frameworks.

Their training was up

to k.-k. standards, and done from Magyar and Croat
manuals Fejervary had had translated.180

Five years

later the imperial command concluded that, in sharp
contrast to the Landwehr, the Honvdd was a highly-capable
force181, lacking only artillery to be as good as any
k,-k. troops.

The irony here was that Fejervary was an

imperial loyalist to the core.

His appointment had

provoked sharp attacks in the Hungarian Diet, where some
deputies took note of his loyalty to the dynasty and
declared him unfit to command a Honvdd which represented
the Hungarian spirit and nation.182

The emperor had

accepted Dualism and intended to support it; Fejervary's
own attitude was the same.

The loyalist technician

presided over the creation of a Hungarian national force.
The Habsburgs had long devoted themselves to the
special skill of conservatives: salvaging what could be
salvaged from the corrosion of change.

Albrecht had been

gifted with a full measure of his family's talent, and,
although he had not been able to block the formation of
the Honvdd, he was able to hold the line around the joint
army.

Allmayer-Beck claimed that after 1867 the army was

a pawn in factional and national maneuverings— an object,
not an actor.183 Albrecht's achievement was to keep the
outside world beyond the doors of the officers' mess.
The archduke's deepest belief was that the officers must
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be kaiBertreu alone— that in the end only the loyalty of
the imperial officers held the Monarchy together.
Albrecht devoted himself to championing the altosterrelchisch virtues in the army.

There were, though,

far too few regular officers and NCOs.

Even with the

introduction of reserve commissions for men of education
who volunteered for a year of training, the ranks of the
Monarchy's defenders were thin indeed.

At the end of the

1870s there were only 12,055 regular and 5143 reserve
officers on the army list.154

The einjahrige provided

some relief, but also, as the story of the army after
August-September 1914 showed, brought the world of
partisan politics and partisan nationalism one step
closer to the army.
emperor's army.
beleaguered.

The post-1867 army saw itself as the

Yet it found itself increasingly

The Hungarians had achieved home rule and

were building their own army; the Czechs would demand the
same.

The army was now subject to the whims of parlia

mentary control; its foreign horizons dimmed year by
year.

The army had now to deal with the nationalities as

well as render service to the dynasty.

Yet it still had

its strengths; the measure of its vitality is that it was
able in the latter half of the 1870s to support one more
wave of reforms.
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CHAPTER 3
ARMY AND NATIONALITIES:
RUSSIAN THREAT, TERRITORIAL REFORM

On 30 July 1878 four divisions of the Austrian army
advanced out of Croatia and southern Dalmatia and entered
the Turkish provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The

imperial-royal forces, numbering some 72,000 men, had been
sent to occupy the two provinces under the just-concluded
terms of the Treaty of Berlin.

In early summer, Count

Gyula Andrassy, now the Monarchy's foreign minister, had
proclaimed that the whole operation could be carried out
by a couple of squadrons of hussars and a regimental
band.1

His remark was one of those unfortunate statements

that return with depressing regularity to haunt bellicose
politicians.

The initial force of four divisions proved

woefully inadequate, and five additional divisions plus
various specialist units had to be sent as reinforcements.
In the two-and-a-half months before the occupation of the
two provinces was officially declared to be complete {19
October 1878), nearly a quarter of a million of the
Monarchy's soldiers had been mobilized for service in
Bosnia.

In early October 1878 imperial-royal forces in

the field numbered 159,000 men; total Austrian casualties
for the campaign came to 5198 men killed, wounded, and
missing.2
136
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The campaign in Bosnia and the Herzegovina was the
first war of the Dualist age, and the Monarchy had
mobilized nearly a third of its wartime strength.

The

imperial-royal forces faced opponents of all kinds, from
battalions of Turkish regulars to bands of native
partisans, whose total strength was estimated at 93,000 95,000.3

The Bosnian terrain was inhospitable and the

local population largely hostile.
forces performed quite creditably.

Yet the imperial-royal
Indeed, as Gunther

Rothenberg pointed out, the Austrian performance in 1878
compares favorably with that of the German army in the
same countryside in the 1940s.4

The occupation campaign

was the Monarchy's major military effort in the halfcentury between the Ausgleich and the First World War, and
for the Monarchy's military leadership it ended twenty
years of military humiliation.

The successful occupation

of Bosnia in the face of determined opposition helped
erase the memory of those disasters, of defeat in the
field in Lombardy and Moravia, of the fiasco over the
introduction of conscription in the Krisvosije in 1869.
The post-Ausgleich army had fought and won its first
battles.

Yet the Monarchy's Balkan entanglements meant a

continuing threat of hostilities with Russia.

Throughout

the 1880s the army had not only to face the political
consequences of the Ausgleich and growing nationalist
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sentiment at home but to plan for a major war in Galicia
against an enemy vastly superior in numbers.
Relations between Russia and the Monarchy had been
strained since the Crimean War.

The Monarchy might have

been expected to repay Russian aid in Hungary in 1849 with
military support, but the Monarchy had instead declared
its armed neutrality and temporarily occupied the Danubian
Principalities.

The decay of Ottoman power in the Balkans

highlighted the potential for conflict between the two
states.

The Monarchy preferred that the Turks remain in

control of their European possessions, but should Turkish
rule collapse, its diplomats feared either a Russian
policy of outright territorial expansion or the creation
of independent Balkan states under Russian protection and
control, states which would also exert a destabilizing
influence on the Monarchy's South Slav populations.5
Yet hostility had not yet seemed inevitable at the
end of the 1860s.

Russian foreign policy under Prince

Alexander Gorchakov had sought in many ways to accomodate
the Monarchy.

Early in 1867 Gorchakov approached Count

Revertera, the Austrian ambassador in St. Petersburg, with
the offer of an agreement that would give the Russians the
right to occupy Ottoman-ruled Bessarabia in exchange for
Austrian control of either Albania or the Herzegovina.6
The idea of coordinating the Balkan policies of the two
states found a ready audience among the military circle
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around Archduke Albrecht, where this was seen as a gesture
of amity that might lead to an alliance directed against
Prussia.
The aftermath of the Franco-Prussian War put a halt
to any entente between Russia and the Monarchy.

On 31

October 1870 the Russians, taking advantage of Prussian
involvement in France, announced their decision to
remilitarize the Black Sea, closed to Russian warships
since 1856.

Fifteen years after their humiliation in the

Crimean War, the Russians had contrived to return to the
Balkan scene with a unilateral flourish.

There was an

immediate flurry of panicky talk in both Vienna and
Budapest.

Some Hungarian circles, led by Count Gyula

Andrassy, argued for immediate military action against the
Russians.7

Franz Baron Kuhn, the Monarchy's war minister,

saw the Russian actions in the Black Sea as a prelude to a
Russian march into the Balkans and sought unsuccessfully
to convince the emperor to order an immediate attack into
Russian Poland to seize Warsaw.8

Even Albrecht, a

proponent of a Russian alliance, was worried enough by the
Russians' unilateral action to order staff studies done
for a war against Russia.9
Albrecht was nonetheless unwilling to give his
support to Kuhn's and Andrassy's desire for a
confrontation with the Russians.

He remained convinced

that a Russian alliance was both possible and desirable,
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and as late as 1875 he would visit St. Petersburg in an
attempt to interest the Russians in an alliance directed
against the Germans.10 Albrecht's position was seen as a
personal affront by Andrassy, who had been named foreign
minister in the autumn of 1871, and early in 1872 Andrassy
had begun to complain to the emperor that Albrecht was
attempting to make foreign policy on his own.

Albrecht

and his supporters responded by pointing out that, with
its huge and restive Slav population, the Monarchy needed
the friendship of the Russians and that Andrassy's
policies were based on Magyar bitterness over Russian
intervention in Hungary in 1849 and not on any concern for
the interests of the Monarchy.11
Beyond any considerations of foreign policy, much of
the military leadership believed that the Monarchy's army
was completely unready for war with the Russians.

There

had been doubts about the army's readiness for war in the
summer of 1870, and, after the decision had been made to
remain neutral in the Franco-Prussian War, Franz Joseph
had ordered a special investigation into the combat
readiness of the army.
was not manpower.

The problem, the report indicated,

In six weeks the Monarchy could have

put 600,000 men into the field.
and 1866, was logistics.

The problem, as in 1859

The imperial-royal forces would

have been hard-put to feed, clothe, and provide transport
for themselves.

Albrecht, attacking the unwillingness of
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the Reichsrat to fund the army, claimed that any reserve
units mobilized in 1870 would have been untrained and
without arms.12

Despite the eagerness of Andrassy and

Kuhn for a confrontation with the Russians, Albrecht
contended that the army could not fight a major war.
Albrecht's views, published as an anonymous pamphlet
on "Das Jahr 1870 und die Wehrkraft der Monarchie” in the
late autumn of 1870, were of course politically motivated.
The archduke attacked the Hungarians and the German
Liberals of the Reichsrat for allowing the combat
readiness of the army to decay, and he was wholly opposed
to Hungarian desires for a war with Russia.

Yet, despite

his position that the army was unready for a major war, he
was more than willing to mobilize against Bismarck's
Prussia.

Albrecht's desire to fight a war of revenge in

Germany did not wane until late in the

1870s, though his

views, especially after the appointment of Andrassy as
foreign minister, represented an ever-smaller minority
among the emperor's advisors.13

The archduke did not wish

to give up his cherished vision of Austro-Russian forces
driving to the gates

of Berlin, of the black-and-yellow

standards of the Monarchy going up over the ruins of
Potsdam.

Nonetheless, Albrecht was well aware that the

army had its own Balkan policy, one which, while differing
sharply from the official foreign policy of Andrassy and
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the diplomats at the Ballhausplatz, was likely to lead to
conflict with Russia.
The army's interest in the Balkans had initially
centered on the problem of defending the Kiistenland, the
Monarchy's long, narrow strip of littoral that ran down
the eastern shore of the Adriatic from Istria through
Dalmatia.

The terrain was mountainous and desolate, and

much of the population had little use for any governmental
authority.

There were few roads, and the Kiistenland

lacked any strategic depth.

As long ago as the mid-1850s

the aged Radetzky had argued that the Monarchy would need
Bosnia to make Dalmatia secure— a point of view that Baron
Beck, the head of the emperor's military chancellery, had
been arguing since the mid-1860s.

The loss of Venice in

1866 had left Trieste and Fiume as the Monarchy's only
seaports, making the acquisition of a defensive hinterland
for the Kiistenland imperative.14
The military were well aware of the decay of Ottoman
power in the Balkans.

The last Turkish garrisons had left

Serbia in the early 1860s, and local revolt had become
endemic throughout the western Balkans.

By the beginning

of the 1870s the collapse of Turkish authority seemed all
too likely.

During his tenure as Hungarian premier,

Andrassy had argued that the Monarchy should work for the
cession of Bosnia to Serbia, a move that would separate a
grateful Serbia from Russian influence.15 The military,
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more concerned than Andrassy with defending the Dalmatian
provinces, was unwilling to see an enlarged Serbia, since
it would serve as a focus for South Slav nationalism.

By

extending the Monarchy's sway inland the military hoped to
channel Slav nationalism into acceptably pro-Austrian
sentiments.
Throughout the A usgleich negotiations Albrecht had
supported the creation of an autonomous South Slav
province based on the lands of the Military B o r d e r / 6 and
in reaction Andrassy and the Hungarian leadership had
feared that the military's interest in the South Slavs was
part of a plan to use the Grenzers of the Border and the
Slav populations of Turkish Croatia to put political and
military pressure on Hungary.17

The Magyar leadership had

refused to ratify the military budget in 1869 unless the
Military Border was dissolved/8 but even after the
incorporation of the Border into civil Croatia in 1871
Andrassy and his fellow Magyar lords believed that the
army, led by Albrecht, was carrying out its own policy in
the Balkans in an effort to use the South Slavs against
Hungary.
Andrassy and the Hungarian leadership wanted no more
Slavs in the Monarchy, no increase in the Monarchy's
Slavic population that might upset the political balance
of Dualism.

Andrassy's preference as foreign minister was

to support continued Ottoman rule in the Balkans.

The
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policies of Feldzeugmeiater Baron Franz Rodich, the
governor of Dalmatia, were designed to undermine Turkish
authority in Bosnia.

Rodich, acting with the support of

Beck and Albrecht, devoted himself to establishing contact
with Croatian nationalists in Bosnia and offering
financial support and protection to Catholic missionaries
preaching pro-Habsburg doctrines among the Croats across
the Turkish border.19 When Beck persuaded the emperor to
tour Dalmatia in the spring of 1875, Rodich arranged to
have Franz Joseph greeted by hand-picked deputations of
both locals and Bosnian refugees who petitioned for
Austrian protection. Feldmarschalleutnant Baron Anton
Mollinary, the imperial-royal corps commander in Zagreb,
was convinced that Rodich was actively encouraging revolt
in Bosnia.20 The Monarchy's military leadership had
serious reservations about a direct conflict with Russia,
but it was prepared to carry on an active policy of
destabilization in the Balkans despite the risk of Russian
involvement that an Ottoman collapse would bring.
Andrassy's own position in the mid-1870s was
considerably less confrontational than it had been during
the Black Sea crisis.

He had been unable to interest the

British in cooperating with the Monarchy against the
Russians,21 and by 1873 he had yielded to Bismarck's
pressure for a rapprochment with Russia.

Andrassy saw

Germany as both the Monarchy's natural ally and as
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supporter of Hungary's special position within the
Monarchy, and, despite his personal misgivings,22 he had
joined Bismarck in agreeing to a show of amity in the
Dreikaiserbund of 1873.

the Dreikaiserbund itself

provided for little more than consultations among the
three signatories in the event of threats to the peace,
but it had created a channel for Austro-Russian
discussions on the future of the Balkans.

When rebellion

erupted in the Herzegovina in the summer of 1875, both
Andrassy and Gorchakov sought to localize its effects and
induce the Ottoman authorities to reform their
administration of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The revolt itself was the product of local
conditions, not foreign intrigues.

There had been

widespread crop failure in 1874, and the Turkish
authorities in the Herzegovina had called in troops to
collect delinquent taxes, provoking an uprising that
spread across both provinces.23

Andrassy's policy of

maintaining Ottoman authority was rapidly overtaken by
events as the Turks were unable to put down the revolt.
Nor was the Dalmatian military command disposed to help
the situation.

Andrassy had secured imperial

authorization for the Turks to use the Monarchy's Adriatic
ports to move both troops and supplies into Bosnia, but
all through the summer of 1875 Rodich was allowing
chartered steamers to put in at Cattaro and unload
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shipments of rifles and ammunition for the rebels across
the border.24 Andrassy complained to the emperor about
"this enterprise of the military" and attempted to have
all imperial-royal units made up of South Slav soldiers
transferred out of Dalmatia.25 Nonetheless Rodich, well
aware that Andrassy would not consider any direct Austrian
intervention so long as the Turks had any control over the
situation,26 continued to aid the rebels.

Supported by

Beck and Albrecht, he allowed the rebels to use his
territory as a haven safe from Turkish pursuit and
established caches of arms and supplies for the
Bosnians.27
The success of the Bosnian rebels, and the uprisings
that broke out in Bulgaria in the spring of 1876, made the
collapse of Turkish authority seem ominously near.

The

governments of Serbia and Montenegro, prompted by domestic
pressures, began to move toward war with the Turks.
Belgrade and Cetinje seemed, much to the disquiet of the
Monarchy's diplomats and soldiers, to be filled with panSlav journalists, streams of Russian envoys, and
representatives of Russian "relief organizations" who were
busily dispensing funds to the Bosnian rebels.28

More

disturbing still was the* arrival in Belgrade of Russian
volunteers and adventurers, many of them army officers,
for service with the Serbian army against the Turks.

By

the beginning of summer it was clear that the Serbs and
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Montenegrins were about to go to war with the Turks, and
Gorchakov and Andrassy met to confer on Balkan policy.

In

July 1876, just after Serbia and Montenegro declared war
on the Turks, the two foreign ministers met at Reichstadt
and reached agreement.

In the event of a Turkish defeat—

something both men expected— the Monarchy would occupy
parts of Bosnia and the Herzegovina; Russia would obtain
Bessarabia and Batum on the Black Sea.

In any case,

neither party would intervene directly in the fighting.
The agreements— the Reichstadt Accords— were primarily
verbal and quite vague; neither minister had a clear
understanding of exactly how much of Bosnia and the
Herzegovina had been promised to the Monarchy.
Nonetheless, both states were now deeply involved in the
fate of European Turkey; neither could permit the other to
be the sole beneficiary of an Ottoman collapse.29
The Serbian and Montenegrin armies had been expected
to win an easy victory over the Turks.

By September 1876,

though, the Ottoman forces had managed to inflict a series
of sharp defeats on the Serbs, forcing them to ask for an
armistice guaranteed by the European powers.30

There

suddenly existed the possibility that the Turks, already
victorious over the rebellion in Bulgaria, might be able
to reassert full control over Serbia and Montenegro.

The

Russians were unwilling to tolerate the loss of prestige
involved in having two states which had been the object of
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much diplomatic and financial patronage crushed, and they
were equally unwilling to give up their promised
territorial gains.

By the end of 1876 they were preparing

for a war with the Turks.

Bolstered by further agreements

with the Monarchy in January and March 1877 over the
disposition of Bessarabia and Bosnia, the Russians
declared war on 24 April 1877.
By early summer the Russian armies were on the
Danube.

Yet at the Ballhausplatz suspicion was growing

that the Russians were likely to ignore their agreements
with the Monarchy and impose a victor's peace.

At the end

of July 1877 Andrassy, though sharply opposed by Albrecht
and Beck, was arguing in favor of using the army to
threaten Russian supply lines in Romania.31

He was

willing to accept the military's view that a Russian war
would be long and bitter and would in all likelihood end
in the destruction of at least one combatant,33 yet for
the four months that the Russian armies were stalled
before the Turkish citadel of Plevna, Andrassy continued
to urge the military to support at least the threat of
action against Russia.
On 15 January 1878 Franz Joseph presided over a
ministerial council with Beck and Albrecht in attendance.
The Russians had taken Sofia on 4 January and were moving
across Rumelia toward the western approaches to
Constantinople.

Russian peace terms, first announced in
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December, included the creation of a large Bulgarian
client state and contained no mention of the cession of
Bosnia and the Herzegovina to the Monarchy.

Andrassy was

convinced that war was at hand and he wanted only
technical advice from the military.33
The military offered Andrassy two plans, offensives
launched from either Transylvania or Galicia.

The plans

did not derive from the study prepared by Albrecht during
the Black Sea crisis of 1870, but from staff exercises
done in 1874 for Feldzeugmeister Baron Franz John, the
chief of the general staff.34 Albrecht and Feldmarachalleutnant Baron Anton Schonfeld, the new chief of the
general staff, supported the idea of an offensive from
Galicia or the Bukovina as the more technically sound of
the two options, but their advice came hedged with
warnings: the Monarchy could not support a long war, and a
second front was likely to erupt if the Italians scented
blood.

Furthermore, a war against Russia would leave the

Monarchy vulnerable to any demands Germany, as a potential
partner for either side, might choose to make.

A

protracted war would also lead to domestic difficulties,
to unrest among the Monarchy's Czech and South Slav
subjects.33 Albrecht's position was supported by Count
Bylandt-Rheidt, war minister since 1876, who argued that
mobilization alone would cost 310 million florins for the
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first ninety days.

The Monarchy could not afford that,

let alone bear the costs of a major war.36
Andrassy continued to press for action throughout
February, but on 24 February he was informed by the
emperor that there would be no mobilization.

The Monarchy

would accept the German call for a conference on the
Balkans at Berlin.

Andrassy was authorized to Beek

parliamentary approval for sixty million florins for
"special military requirements," a euphemism for the costs
of occupying Bosnia and the Herzegovina, but there would
be no war.

Franz Joseph was prepared to enforce the

Monarchy's claim to Bosnia, but not to risk a major war.
The Congress of Berlin fulfilled the Monarchy's hopes.
The Russians were forced to abandon their designs for a
greater Bulgaria powerful enough to dominate the Balkans,
and on 13 July 1878 the Monarchy, supported by both
Bismarck and Britain, received a European mandate for the
occupation of Bosnia and the Herzegovina.
The army was able to complete the occupation of the
two provinces in just over ten weeks.

However, any

satisfaction over the actual occupation was short-lived.
The flow of Russian aid to Serbia and Montenegro in 187576 and the Russian designs reflected in their demands on
the Turks at the end of 1877— a greater Bulgaria
garrisoned by Russian troops, Bosnia and the Herzegovina
under Ottoman control, Serbia and Montenegro given a
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common border— had given the military a disheartening
vision of the future.

Despite Bismarck's efforts to link

Russia and the Monarchy with Germany in at least nominal
friendship and despite Albrecht's desire for a Russian
alliance, the army was now aware that its next major
opponent would in all likelihood be Russia, and the army
was far from convinced that it could sustain a war with a
major power.
Discussion of the imperial-royal forces' combat
readiness had begun as long ago as the late summer of
1870, in the aftermath of the Monarchy's decision not to
intervene in the Franco-Prussian war.

The weaknesses in

the army's supply and transport systems and the unreadi
ness of the reserves discovered by the investigating
committee established to look into the state of the army
had served as a basis for Albrecht's polemics against the
unwillingness of the Reichsrat to support the army, and
those discoveries had led to the establishment of a
special commission on mobilization for various wartime
scenarios.37

The commission's work was slowed by the

bureaucratic fights between the war ministry and the
general staff that plagued the army throughout the early
1870s,36 and it was not until 1874 that recommendations
for mobilization were ready in preliminary form and not
until 1876 that new mobilization instructions were fully
ready.39

By that time, however, Serbia and Montenegro
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were at war with the Turks, the Monarchy was preparing to
occupy Bosnia, and the possibility of conflict with Russia
had become clear.

In mid-1876 Count Arthur Bylandt-

Rheidt, the Monarchy's war minister, began talks with
Baron Schonfeld, the chief of the general staff, on
implementing measures for more rapid mobilization, and in
November 1876 Schonfeld established a special department
under Feldmarschalleutnant Baron Anton Vlasits of the
general staff's planning section to develop mobilization
plans for concrete situations, meaning plans for a war
against Russia.40
Staff studies developed in 1874— -the studies which
formed the basis for the plans offered to Andrassy in
January 1878— suggested that war with Russia would begin
with a clash in Galicia.41 The Monarchy's forces would be
hopelessly outnumbered in the field, and the solution
first suggested in 1874— a quick spoiling attack into
Russian Poland— became the foundation of Austrian war
plans for the next forty years.

The war plans finalized

in 1880 assumed that the initial level of enemy forces
would be thirty-four Russian divisions— twenty-two on the
Galician front, twelve in the south.

They would be

opposed by twenty-five and a half imperial-royal
divisions— twenty in Galicia, five and a half in the
south.42 The initial disparity of forces would be
worsened if troops had to be kept on alert against the
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Italians.

Schonfeld warned that even an ostensibly

neutral Italy would have to be watched if war came in the
east.

In the event of serious tensions or open

hostilities, anything up to a third of the Monarchy's
forces could be tied down on the Italian front.43 The
Monarchy, if it fought alone, would be fighting against
vastly superior numbers.
The only solution seemed to depend upon speed of
mobilization.

The imperial-royal forces would have to

depend on an aggressive defense, on exploiting interior
lines of communication.

Yet in the mid-1870s the

Monarchy's railway net, at just under ten thousand
kilometres of track, was barely sufficient for such a
role.

The rail lines had only come under government

control after the financial crisis of 1873, although Beck
and the war ministry had long argued for nationali
zation.44

The military did manage to have two new lines

built into Galicia and to have the five existing lines
double-tracked,45 but it was obvious that, given the
limitations of the rail net, any attempt to reinforce
rapidly the Galician front, especially if the order of
battle had to be shifted and secondary fronts opened,
would lead to chaos.46 Too many units were stationed too
far from their recruiting zones and home depots.
There was no deliberate policy of non-national
stationing of units.

By the late 1870s half of the

Hungarian infantry regiments were on Hungarian territory.
Yet the Lands of the Crown of St. Stephen were extensive;
to be "at home" for an Hungarian regiment did not
necessarily mean being near the regiment's recruiting
district.

The 2.(Fogaras) was at Kronstadt, the

51.(Klausenberg) at Peterwardein, the 33.(Arad) at
Karlstadt, the 60.(Erlau) at Budapest.
was true all across the Monarchy.

The same pattern

Being in its own

crownland did not mean a regiment was in or near its
recruiting district.

A Bohemian regiment such as the

73.(Eger) might be stationed at Theresienstadt, or the
Galician 55.(Brzezany) at Lemberg.

Of the eighty

imperial-royal infantry regiments, only ten were stationed
in their respective recruiting districts in 1877.47

Early

in 1881 Schonfeld presented Albrecht with a "Memoir on the
Revision of Mew Scenarios Respective to a Russian War"
that listed the hindrances that this kind of stationing
presented to "a more rapid and effective opening of the
campaign and thus to an energetic conduct of the war."48
There was, Schonfeld pointed out, no relationship between
the corps commands and their component regiments.

For

XIII.Korps (Zagreb) or III.Korps (Graz) to be brought up
to wartime strength, their designated regiments would have
to be assembled from all across the Monarchy.

This would

be a transport nightmare, and with the post-1878 necessity
for keeping a large occupation force in Bosnia, the order
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of battle was permanently distorted.

Only a territorial

reorganization of the army, Schonfeld argued, would allow
for an effective mobilization and rapid reinfocement of
the Galician front.
Albrecht's own views were rather complex.

The

Archduke agreed with Schonfeld on the need to restructure
the army.

Schonfeld's "On the Combat-Readiness of the

Various Armies* Parallels Between a Territorial System and
Our Own"49 had argued that the Monarchy had chosen to rely
on a small field army to buy time while it mobilized, yet
nonetheless failed to provide trained reserves or cadres
for corps or division-level mobilization.

Albrecht agreed

that there were far too few first-line battalions, and the
Monarchy, unlike any of the other great powers, was
counting its second-line formations, its reserves, as part
of its operational army.

At the beginning of hostilities,

only thirty-two of the forty divisions existing on paper
could actually take the field.50 Yet he was hesitant
about a full program of territorialization.
distrusted the Hungarians on principle.

Albrecht

Nothing had

happened in thirty years to give him faith in the Magyars,
and the archduke had no wish to see the Magyar lords with
their own independent army.

Throughout his tenure as

inspector-general, Albrecht had concerned himself with the
education and training of the army and its soldiers, and
he was not at all sure Schonfeld or the more "modern"
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generals understood just how heterogeneous the Monarchy
and its army really were.
In April 1881 Albrecht presented the emperor with a
memorandum on his own views.51

A greater "stabilization"

of the army and its garrisons was needed, Albrecht argued,
but a fully territorial organization was not possible.
The army, Albrecht stressed, was, except for the dynasty
itself, the only unifying element of the Monarchy (”ausser
der Dynastle, das einzige Band der Reichszusaimengehorigkeit").

An army where regiments were raised and

garrisoned permanently in their recruiting districts would
degenerate sooner or later into a collection of provincial
militias (Provinzialmilizen) with no sense of the Monarchy
as a whole.

Albrecht had a sharp awareness of the dangers

of exposing the army to local politics, and he found
nationalism to be a "dangerous tendency growing day by
day."

But his concern was less with the possibility of

subversion and revolt than with the slow decay and
spiritual dissolution of the army.
Albrecht accepted Schonfeld's view that the complex
linguistic map of the Monarchy gave a certain safety to
territorializations no territorial corps would be all of
one language, and no single corps could form an
independent army.52

The Archduke's own point was that the

Monarchy was divided into cultural as well as linguistic
zones.

The backlands of Ruthenia or Transylvania were
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separated from Bohemia or Lower Austria not only by
language but by decades, if not centuries, of cultural
development.
Albrecht's own conservatism was a kind that freed him
from the prejudices of the bourgeois age: he believed
unguestioningly in the superiority of the Dynasty and the
aristocracy which served it, and from his eminence as a
Habsburg and an archduke national prejudices and national
claims to superiority were utterly irrelevant.

The Magyar

lords were all rebels at heart, he believed, but unlike
Franz Ferdinand a generation later he never extended that
belief to a hatred of Hungarians.

He was very much his

father's son and very much a man of the first years of the
nineteenth century, if not the eighteenth.

Every people

had its special qualities, and the strength of the
Monarchy derived from knowing how to recognize and combine
those qualities inside the army.

The "polyglot

composition of the army" was its strength, Albrecht
declared.

One could find nowhere else in Europe "a better

J&ger than the Tiroler or Inner-Austrian, a finer light
cavalryman than the hussars of Hungary, a more cold
blooded cannoneer than the Bohemian, a more fearless
sailor than the Dalmatian."*3
Nonetheless, whole provinces and peoples were
intelligenzlos, lacking educated classes.

The Monarchy

was not so badly off as Russia, where seven conscripts in

ten were illiterate, but neither was it France, where even
with the presence of recruits from Brittany and Guyenne,
illiteracy was at only 5.5%— nor was it Germany, where
only 0.2% of new conscripts could not read and write.*4
Twenty-two percent of all conscripts in the Monarchy were
illiterate in the 1880s.

At the end of the decade forty-

two percent of all Hungarian recruits were illiterate, and
as late as 1900 so were nineteen percent of the recruits
from Lower Austria itself.

The state of affairs worsened

mile by mile in the eastern provinces.

In Galicia only

thirty percent of all adults were literate.

In the

Bukovina literacy was at twenty-nine percent; in Dalmatia
it was twenty-two percent.**

For all Albrecht's faith in

the courage of the ordinary infantryman and his bayonet,
he was not fool enough to believe that one could do
without technical specialists.

The "rawest peoples"

(rohesten Volkstammen) of the Monarchy could provide no
technical NCOs.

If the mountains of the Monarchy provided

no cavalry, that could be remedied.

The cavalry had

always been concentrated where it was most needed.

But

there would be no engineers or gunnery NCOs from Ruthenia
or the depths of the Alfdld.
hideous enough.

The poverty of the east was

A Galician, social reformers pointed out,

could do only a quarter of the work of an average European
worker, and had access to less than half of what his
counterparts in the West ate.56

The lack of education
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meant that any units recruited and garrisoned on a purely
local basis would suffer from a critical lack of
engineers, gunners, and logistics staff.
The army of the Monarchy, like all others, depended
on the quality of its officers.

The officers of an army

set its tone, imparted its spirit, and gave it its sense
of purpose.

The occupation of Bosnia, Albrecht wrote, had

been a good thing for the spirit of the army*

the

officers and men had experienced an arduous but successful
campaign against an elusive and tenacious foe together.
The officers of the Monarchy, whatever their nationality,
had fought for a common purpose.

The Monarchy's officers

had of necessity to be above nationality, to be
professionals committed only to the Dynasty; there was no
other course open to a multinational state, or
"formation," as Albrecht put it in one insightful
moment.57
Albrecht feared that territorialisation would reduce
the officer corps to a kind of epauletted proletariat.
The officers of a regiment would be permanently on
station, and Albrecht foresaw the stagnation of morale and
skill.

A young lieutenant posted to a regiment would in

all likelihood remain there for the greater part of his
career.

A Hungarian, Polish, or Croatian officer posted

to Budapest, Lemberg, or Zagreb would be subject to
national agitation, yes, but an officer posted to a
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garrison in the Carpathians or deep in the Hungarian
steppe would be cut off from the world.

What professional

skills, what breadth of outlook would survive a decade of
isolated parade squares and empty horizons?
Territorialisation, Albrecht continued, was no
panacea for the army's difficulties.

It could not be

complete— and was indeed complete nowhere in Europe.

The

regiments had been drifting homeward ever since the
Auagleich, but fifty-one regiments and eighteen battalions
of Jagera, 169 of 450 battalions, or about two-fifths of
the army, were outside their recruiting districts.

Some

areas were too unsettled for the use of purely local
troops.

Just then a sharp little campaign was being

fought to introduce conscription in the Bosnian hills, and
such areas would require a leavening of soldiers from
elsewhere.

Other areas could not support the number of

troops needed for garrisons.

After all, Vienna supported

the 4. and Budapest the 32. Infantry, but in 1881 the
infantry complement of the Budapest garrison was drawn
from six line regiments (IR 6, 32, 33, 67, 68, 70) and the
40. Feldjager battalion.

Vienna's garrison was drawn from

seven infantry regiments (IR 17, 34, 38, 47, 52, 58, 63)
and the Tirol Jagera.58

Still other places, Bosnia, the

Tirol, Dalmatia, would need extraterritorial units to
maintain any balanced corps composition.

The Archduke
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estimated that at least a quarter of the army, and perhaps
more than a third, would continue to be extraterritorial.
Albrecht was not opposed to territorial garrisoning
on principle.

He recognized that speed of mobilization

was critical, and he was not averse toward moves to bring
the regiments closer to their reserves and depots.

Nor

did he believe that the army had to be stationed according
to some policy of divide et intpera.

National tensions

needed to be recognized, but stagnation was a more
pressing danger.

Of all imperial institutions, he

thought, the army alone was concerned with the Monarchy as
a whole.

The most important of all questions was the

unity of the army, its sense of being the defender of an
empire and not a province.

It was not enough to be simply

loyal; the army had to transcend national and local
feeling altogether.

The Bosnian campaign had, he

believed, given the army a sense of common purpose, a
feeling too valuable to be thrown away in dozens of
isolated garrisons.

Psychological and spiritual unity

was, in the end, far more valuable than the gain of a few
days in mobilization.
Albrecht concluded with his own set of proposals for
territorial reform in an appendix on "The Weaknesses of
the Infantry and their Remedies."59

Each recruiting

district would provide two regiments of three battalions
each.

One regiment would remain at home and the second
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would be employed elsewhere; every three to four years the
regiments would alternate.

Reservists of both would do

their training and annual maneuvers at home, under the
supervision of a joint recruiting staff.

The army, with

close attention to population changes, should then be able
to field fifteen corps of two divisions each.
The Archduke's proposals were immediately countered
by Beck, who, as Schonfeld's health failed, was emerging
as his successor as chief of the general staff.60

Late in

April 1881 he produced a "Study on the Means of Removing
the Defects in Garrisoning and Order of Battle which
Hinder the Rapid Mobilization and Strategic Concentration
of the Army."61

Like Albrecht, Beck recognized the

problems posed by the heterogeneity of the Monarchy and
its peoples.
would cost.

He also raised the issue of how much reform
The army had initially asked for sixty

million florins to cover the costs of the Bosnian campaign
and had then asked for fifteen million more.62

The

Reichsrat, angered by what it saw as the army's endless
need for money, had tried to slash both the military's
budget and peacetime strength.

Count Eduard Taaffe, the

emperor's chosen Kaiserminister, had been hard-pressed in
1879 to secure a defense bill that maintained the army at
its current levels of manpower and spending.63

Total

reform might be too expensive to be politically possible.

Beck accepted the need for rapid mobilization as the
basis for all discussion.

In the 1870s he had argued that

a Russian war would be long and bitter, and his assessment
had not changed.

Yet he did believe that any future war

would have to be brought to a rapid conclusion.

Win or

lose, the finances and internal political and national
structure of the Monarchy could only support a swift war.
Territorial garrisoning was the only way to ensure a swift
mobilization.

Yet, like Albrecht, he saw the limits of

territorialization.

No troops were raised in Bosnia yet,

and a large extra-territorial garrison would be needed
there.

Vienna, with its status as Haupt-und-Rezidenz

Stadt and its growing socialist movement, required six
more regiments than could be locally raised.
Beck also stressed the incoherence of the army's
order of battle.

Peacetime military districts did not

correspond to wartime commands.

Two corps commands were

based in Prague and would compete for staff during
wartime.

The staffs assigned to Krakow, Trieste, and

Innsbruck were no more than skeletons.

Administrative and

wartime command functions overlapped everywhere.

If

peacetime commands were assimilated with wartime zones,
substantial savings could be made in both time and money.
Such consolidations could be carried out without appealing
to the politicians for more funding.

In point of fact,

the order of battle could then be expanded.

With total
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mobilization, the Monarchy could field 1.1 million men,
but these would face 2.6 million Russians and quite
possibly 900,000 Italians as well.

Any expansion of the

order of battle was valuable.64
There were. Beck pointed out, eighty line infantry
regiments.

With the consolidation of administrative units

and a territorial basing, these could be converted to 132
regiments of three battalions each, yielding thirty-two
divisions of four regiments, or sixteen corps of two
divisions.

Beck followed Albrecht's idea of having two

regiments per recruiting district, one of which would be
extraterritorial.
prevent stagnation.

Transfers between home and abroad would
Each existing field artillery

regiment would give up a battery to serve as cadres for
artillery to support the newly enlarged infantry, and here
Beck saw the only problem: given the widely varying
cultural levels of the Monarchy's provinces, there would
be a shortage of technically-competent troops.

It would

be some time before the territorialised army could have
sufficient artillery support.
Both Beck's and Albrecht's views had been made known
to the general staff in the early spring of 1881.

In the

first week of March Bylandt-Rheidt had ordered staff
studies done on various reform proposals.65

The only

proviso handed down by the minister was that nothing be
done that would entail altering the basic system of
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conscription; the basic Wehrgesetz had been put through
after hard fights in 1867/68, and those parliamentary
battles had been too vicious to begin again.

The general

staff planners produced their own views within a few weeks
of Beck's and Albrecht's.

Their "On the introduction of a

Territorial Organisation of the Army," like Beck's
memorandum, sought to combine territorialisation with
expansion.es
The staff proposal began by assuming that the purpose
of territorialisation was to hold the movement of men and
supplies to a minimum.

The major assumption was that

recruiting would become possible in Bosnia in the very
near future.

The staff, like Beck, saw no point to the

current chaos of military and general (administrative)
commands but saw "fatal political consequences" in trying
to adapt areas of unequal size and composition into
territorial units.

The solution seemed to be a

decentralised system of independent corps commands each
responsible for its own recruiting.
The staff paper envisioned fifteen corps areas that
would support two divisions each.

The units within each

zone would be permanently integrated into higher tactical
formations.

The regiments would be kept permanently as

part of active divisions, thus enhancing their ability to
be mobilized rapidly and sent to the front.

The

territorial zones would be supplemented by sixty newly
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raised over-strength mobile battalions which would serve
in those areas where extraterritorial units would be
required.

Thirty one mobile battalions would be assigned

to Bosnia-Herzegovina, the adjacent Sanjak of Novi-Bazar,
and Dalmatia; twenty-nine would be used in Vienna,
Budapest, Trieste, and the South Tirol.

The mobile forces

would be attached to local divisions for tactical and
training purposes, but their officers would be rotated
rapidly through the new battalions— a move the staff hoped
would help prevent stagnation among the officer corps.
The reorganized army would contain 119 regiments of
three battalions each, the sixty mobile battalions,
fourteen JSger battalions raised in the corps zones, and
ten battalions of Kaiserj&gers from the Tirol.

An

additional field artillery regiment would be formed by
separating one battery from each of the thirteen existing
regiments.

The staff hoped for further expansion of the

rail net, and railway service units, recruited throughout
the Monarchy, would be expanded and placed directly under
the control of the general staff.

Other independent

technical units, such as the fifteen battalions of
pioneers and engineering specialist units for mountain
service in Tirol and Dalmatia, would be under local
control.

Recruiting and administration would be

decentralised, and each corps command would be responsible
for raising and training troops in its oyn area.
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The staff proposal did not mention the costs involved
in setting up the new system.

For example, the costs of

repatriating regiments to their home districts were never
mentioned.

The staff was aware of the confines of the

defense budget and had chosen to ignore them.

Even one

time expenditures such as transport costs in returning
units to their recruiting districts, costs that could
quite clearly be justified, were seen at a ministerial
level as an open challenge to the politicians.

No reform

could be undertaken that would alter the arrangements of
1867/68, and no reform would be acceptable that would
require increased expenditures.

The war ministry thanked

the staff for its work, but Bylandt-Rheidt informed the
planners that, alas, "on political grounds" their designs
had to be rejected.*7
Late in May a series of conferences on reform were
held at the war ministry with the emperor as chairman.
Beck and Albrecht were present as were Bylandt-Rheidt,
Feldzeugmeister Baron Johann Philippovic, who had
commanded XIII. Korps in the Bosnian campaign and was now
commander of the Vienna garrison, and Generalmajor Count
Franz Welserheimb, the Landwehr minister.
representatives were present.

No Hungarian

The agenda of the meetings

covered the proposals of Beck, Albrecht, and the general
staff as well as a list of issues drawn up by the emperor:
the permanent maintenance of corps formations, territorial
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and administrative boundaries, the number and strengths of
divisions and corps, command relationships in the major
provinces, numbers of regiments per recruiting district,
location of regimental districts, garrisoning of Jager
battalions, recruitment for the artillery, and assignment
of technical and specialist units.68
Albrecht, pointing to the experiences of 1866 and the
difficulties encountered in 1878, argued that the
peacetime army had to be divided into established corps.
Philippovic answered by drawing on the findings of the
commission of inquiry into the occupation campaign.69

The

current division of the army into line regiments and
reserve commands was, he argued, the only "wholly sound
basis" for army organization.

While some reorganization

was desirable, any radical restructuring would entail, if
nothing else, assuming European peace in the next two
years, an assumption Philippovic was not prepared to make.
Beck objected to Philippovic's assertions.

He

repeated the arguments made in his earlier memoranda and
pointed to the experiences of foreign armies.

Germany,

France, Russia, Italy, and even Turkey had found
territorial organization to be the most effective form of
military administration.

Beck's arguments were based on

Schonfeld's work of late 1880 and early 1881 on a
Maximal fall, a worst-case scenario for a Russian war.

The

key to Austria's war-fighting capability would be a quick
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combination of forces in Galicia.

That much was basic.

And at present a quick combination could not be achieved.
In case of war there would have to be a massive
reshuffling of regiments before the army was ever ready to
take the field.

Eleven regiments would have to be brought

from Bosnia and the Herzegovina, refitted, and shipped to
the front.

A whole list of dismal examples could be

cited* the 24.Division, based at Przemysl, would have its
technical staff and supply depot at Brvinn in Moravia; the
artillery assigned to VI.Korps (Kaschau) was at WienerNeustadt.

All the Jager battalions designated for the

Bohemian commands were in the Bosnian mountains.

In fact,

only twenty percent of the infantry and sixteen percent of
the Jagers would be available upon the outbreak of war.70
The numerical situation vis-^-vis Russia would only worsen
with mobilisation.

Mobilisation Day
10

20

30

40

50

Russia
Infantry
Cavalry
Guns

116,000
42,000
280

240,000
53,250
960

492,000
73,200
1,760

194,500
24,300
390

438,300
39,600
1,380

684,000
82,400
2,360

Austria-Hungary
Infantry
Cavalry
Guns

72,000
9,000

476,100
39,600
1,452

776,000
98,400
2,680

170
On the fortieth day of mobilisation Russian superiority on
the Galician front would amount to nearly a quartermillion infantry, 40,000 cavalry, and over 900 guns.71
Welserheimb, the Landwehr minister, indicated that
all this was obvious.

A system of territorial corps was

the quickest, most efficient mobilisation scheme.
went without saying.

So much

What was not obvious was how such a

system could be reconciled with or adapted to political
realities.

Above all, how could the transition to such a

system be paid for?

The Monarchy's forces were still

using the time-honored expedient of saving money by
keeping large numbers of men on furlough.

The Monarchy

had already been subjected to the contempt of its German
ally for this and other military economies.

When the

Austrians proposed to save money in 1879 by sending 18,000
men on extended leave, Bismarck pointed out that they
could save still more money by sending 100,000 home, or,
better yet, achieve real economies by disbanding the army
altogether.73

The Monarchy had oqly one ally, and, as

Albrecht insisted, one could not rely on that ally's
promises.

There was no point in drawing up reform plans

that could not be funded.

Welserheimb's point was that an

abortive reform, or a half-done one, would be worse than
simply learning to live with the present system.

And it

took no imagination to envision the Germans' contempt for
their ally if the Reichsrat rejected as too expensive a
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plan to make the Monarchy's forces ready for a major
conflict.
Bylandt-Rheidt was inclined to support the staff's
call for mobile units separate from the territorialized
corps formations.

A corps system, he pointed out, would

facilitate the attachment of Landwehr units to the line
army.

Welserheimb had estimated that 80,000

Landwehr/Honved troops could be integrated into the line,
providing the equivalent of three new divisions.

The

mobile battalions would give the army more flexibility in
dealing with contingencies while the bulk of the Landwehr
and the Honved could be assembled in brigades and trained
alongside the regulars for their wartime duties of manning
garrison depots and guarding lines of communication, thus
releasing more regulars for the Galician front.
Territorialization would make it easier to integrate
the Landwehr into line formations; there was no
disagreement on that point.

In reality, though, the

Landwehr was made up of two very different components, the
Landwehr of the Austrian crownlands, the Hungarian Honved,
and could not be treated as simply part of the regular
army.

Welserheimb saw his own task as overseeing the

integration of the Austrian Landwehr into regular
formations, but his counterpart in Budapest took a very
different view.

Bela Szende, the Honved minister, spent

much of his time protesting to the imperial-royal war
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ministry that the Honved was not part of the regular order
of battle and should never be considered as such.
Treating it as such implied that it could be used outside
Hungarian territory without the assent of the Hungarian
Diet, a clear violation of the terms of the Ausgleich.
Szende's latest protests had inspired Bylandt-Rheidt to
retort that the role of the Diet was to provide the
necessary laws for the use of the army as determined by
the emperor and his war minister.73 At the moment,
though, neither the emperor nor Bylandt-Rheidt was
prepared to argue the terms of the Ausgleich with the
Hungarians.

The emperor informed Phillipovic and

Welserheimb that one could not treat the Landwehr and
Honved— especially the Honved— merely as reserves.

The

"national" formations were not an integral part of the
field army, and, despite the military difficulties raised,
their special constitutional position had to be
recognized.
Albrecht brought the conference back to technical
issues by calling for discussion on the number of
territorial corps to be formed.

The archduke now took

territorialization for granted; one simply had to make it
work.

The obvious thing was to match the corps boundaries

with the crownlands, to structure the army to avoid
conflict and duplication of effort with civil authorities.
To that end he proposed a structure of thirteen corps,
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nine of two divisions each and four "front-line" corps
zones of three divisions each, plus an independent corps
in the Tirol and a joint army-navy command in Dalmatia.
His change of heart was part of a shift on Albrecht's part
toward a belief in the need for a decisive encounter early
on in any new war.

Like Beck, Albrecht had come to

believe that the Monarchy could not survive an extended
war.

He did, however, sound a note of caution.

The

Monarchy was unlike any other state in Europe, and even
with territoral reform no one at the conference table
should be so naive as to believe that it would ever be
able to mobilize as fast as the Germans.74
The archduke's views were shared by, and to some
extent created by, Beck, who, as the archduke aged and his
eyesight failed, had become Albrecht's advisor and
confidant.

Beck himself had already moved to a belief in

the primacy of rapid mobilization and a decisive initial
encounter.

In part this was simply acceptance of

conventional strategic wisdom in Europe, of beliefs drawn
from studies of 1859 and 1866, from a partial
understanding of the Franco-Prussian War, and an absence
of any understanding of the American Civil War.

The

conventional wisdom was that the coming of the railroad
meant that, since troops could be assembled and moved to
the front at speed, war itself would be no less rapid.
The doctrine of rapid decision highlighted the
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weaknesses of the Monarchy's army, and it ran counter to
the intuitions of both Albrecht and Beck.

Yet its

corollaries had a definite appeal for Beck and the staff.
The reforms necessary for rapid mobilisation were logical
enough, since the imperial order of battle was totally
chaotic.

More importantly, a rapid decision in the field

would place few strains on the political structure of the
Monarchy.

The Monarchy had been capable of fighting on

after Koniggr&tz, and Albrecht for one had been willing to
fight the Prussians on the Danube or in the streets of
Vienna.

Yet the attitude of the Hungarians had been the

key in forcing the emperor to make peace.

The Monarchy

might survive a defeat: in Napoleon's day Francis 1 had
become rather skilled at salvaging the Monarchy after
military disaster.

But the Monarchy would not survive a

protracted agony.
Beck, officially chief of the general staff since
early June 1881, was aware as well that any corps system
would benefit the military to the exclusion of the war
ministry.

The corps would absorb the ministerially

controlled reserves administration, and the decentralized
corps would be responsible to the staff.

For Beck, given

the long fights over the powers of staff chief and war
minister in the early 1870s and his own efforts to be
directly subordinate to the emperor,75 territorialisation
was a personal victory.

Beck, always the consummate
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military courtier, seems to have won the archduke over to
his views.
Bylandt-Rheidt had received an imperial order to set
up a ministerial committee to work out the details of
territorialisation.

He had informed the emperor at the

outset that there was no way to hold the line on costs.
The staff proposals on new troop formations alone would
cost at least 900,000 florins.

Thus the key instruction

relayed by Beck from the emperor, that any new system be
no more expensive that the old, was immediately void.

The

committee was ordered to observe the present limits on
recruit contingents, to match military and political
boundaries, and to make only the absolute minimum number
of changes in the cavalry and the specialist units.
The committee had been chaired by FML Baron Vlasits,
chief of the general staff's planning section, and Vlasits
had assembled the chiefs of the railway, topographic, and
recruitment sections of the staff into a working group
that was overseen on occasion by Beck himself.

The

ministerial committee began its work in late July 1881 and
issued its report in mid-April 1882.76

The committee also

met, with Beck presiding, to consider the lessons of the
latest (November 1881-late May 1882) rising in southern
Dalmatia and Bosnia itself.

Three divisions and naval

support had been required to put down the revolt and begin
to enforce conscription, and Beck impressed on the
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committee the need for substantial mobile forces which
could be kept on extra-territorial duty in Bosnia.77
The ministerial committee's final report was based on
the two goals of rapid mobilization and maintenance of a
strong extra-territorial force in Bosnia and the
Herzegovina, though it also set out two variants by
Albrecht and Beck (Projects A and B) that called for an
expansion of the number of infantry regiments in the order
of battle.

These projects called for an infantry

establishment of 120-132 regiments organised half as cadre
units with a minimal peacetime strength and half as
reinforced mobile units, though in March 1882 Albrecht
also suggested a structure of three cadre battalions and
one overstrength mobile battalion per regiment.76
Requirements for Bosnia, Dalmatia, and the South Tirol
would take eight to nine battalions from each corps, which
meant that most regiments would field one extra
territorial battalion at any given time.79
Project A called for fifteen corps commands of two
divisions each; each division would be made up of fifteen
battalions.

Project B called for sixteen corps commands

of two divisions each; the battalion strengths of the
corps would vary from twenty-seven to thirty.

There was

also a less ambitious Project C, a proposal which had
Bylandt-Rheidt's personal support.

Project C called for

fifteen corps of two divisions, with Trieste as a special
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separate region.

The thirty infantry and eight cavalry

divisions of the army would be territorial so far as
possible, even for units designated for other corps in
wartime.

There would also be ten Landwehr divisions,

three from Cisleithanian lands and seven from Hungary.
Each of the existing eighty line regiments would give up
one battalion to form twenty new regiments.

The reformed

army would consist of one hundred regiments, each of four
battalions plus a small recruiting depot cadre.

Project C

had the advantage of being less expensive than the other
proposals, and on 11 May 1882 Bylandt-Rheidt formally gave
Project C his endorsement with only one change— the total
number of reformed regiments was raised to 102.80
On 22 May 1882 copies of the ministerial committee's
draft report on Project C were circulated to all section
chiefs of the general staff, and on 3 June the work was
declared complete.

Bylandt-Rheidt estimated that, if

implementation of the reforms began in September 1882, the
army would be ready for a trial .mobilization under the new
system by March 1883 and full mobilization by May 1883.81
On 10 June Bylandt-Rheidt presented the committee's report
to the emperor, and two days later imperial sanction was
given to reforms based on Project C.

On 17 June Bylandt-

Rheidt officially informed the Landwehr and Honved
ministers; on 28 June the Hungarian government was
presented with the details of the army reforms.

Final
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authorization was given by Franz Joseph on 30 June.

The

changes were slated to begin on 9 September, two weeks
after the end of the annual summer maneuvers.82
The garrison changes entailed by the reforms were not
inexpensive.

The staff estimated that changes within the

Monarchy proper would cost 280,700 gulden and that
transport in and out of South Tirol, Dalmatia, and the
occupation zone in Bosnia-Herzegovina would cost a further
294,300 gulden, a total of 475,000 gulden for transport
costs alone.83

Thirteen regiments would be sending

battalions to the occupation zone.

Two battalions each

from twenty-one line regiments and four J&ger battalions
would be coming home.

The least expensive change would be

in moving the 9. Jagers from Briick-an-der-Mur to Judenburg
in Styria— a mere 200 gulden.

Moving three battalions of

the 21. (Ceslau) from Prague to Riva in the South Tirol
would be the most expensive— 11,000 gulden.

The total

costs of the changes— transport, relocation, and the
establishment of twenty-two new line regiments— came to
over 700,000 gulden, which had to be met from the mere
78.000 gulden in the 1883 army budget for "orderly
development of the army" plus an extraordinary grant of
650.000 gulden.
The Monarchy was now divided into fifteen corps
commands, each responsible for conscription and training
within its zone.04

The corps commands were established as
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Corps Command

HQ
Krakow
Vienna
Graz
Budapest
Pressburg
Kaschau
Temesvar
Prague
Josefstadt
BrUnn
Lemberg
Hermannstadt
Zagreb
Innsbruck
Sarajevo

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11

12

13
14
15

I.Korps had originally been headquartered at Sarajevo; the
title was soon shifted over to the Krakow region, perhaps
in symbolic recognition of the primacy of the Galician
front.

Each corps contained two divisions of two

territorialised regiments each.

The 2.Division, at

II.Korps (Vienna), was made up of the 3. (Kremsier) and
4 . (Vienna) Infantry.

The 29.Division, with IX Korps at

Josefstadt, was made up of the 42.(Theresienstadt) and the
36.(Jungbunzlau).
Imperial-royal regiments had long since borne
honorific titles, the most famous being the 4 .Hoch-undDeutschmeister.

They now joined, at Albrecht's

suggestion,89 their recruiting district names to the
honorifics in an effort to harness local patriotism to
regimental spirit.

Thus the 1.Infantry was now the Kaiser

Franz Joseph Infanterie-Regiment Troppau Nr.l; the 4. was
now the Hoch-und-Deutschmaister Infanterie-Regiment Vienna
Nr. 4. Territorial titles were also an effort to emphasize
unity in the twenty-two new regiments.

Battalions

separated from older regiments or JUgera converted to line
infantry were not always in "national" units.

Seven

battalions of Jagera were attached to other-language
regiments.

Seventeen Hungarian battalions found

themselves in Austrian units; one Moravian and one
Bohemian battalion found themselves in Galician regiments;
a Carniolan battalion was attached to a Croat regiment; a
single forlorn battalion from Lower Austria was sent off
to Hungary,66

But territorial titles were a way of

instilling unit pride; the new regiments had no battle
honors or famous honorary colonels-in-chief y e t f and a
territorial title was a substitute for a regimental
history or a famous patron.
The actual transfers and reorganisation went
smoothly.67

By mid-1883 the Monarchy's infantry had been

territorialized.

Extra-territorial units were still

stationed in Dalmatia, Bosnia and the Herzegovina, South
Tirol, and in Vienna itself.

At the end of 1883, though,

almost nine soldiers in ten of the imperial infantry—
eighty-nine of 102 regiments— were serving in their
recruiting districts.
their regiments.

The new system kept reservists with

Regiments could alternate one battalion
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at home with three detached, or three at home with one
detached; reservists would always train with their
designated regiments.98 Only the cavalry, grouped
permanently in wartime formations on the frontier to face
any surprise descent by Russian forces, were expected to
do long extra-territorial service, and even here, twothirds of the Monarchy's mounted troops were, given the
nature of cavalry recruiting, in or near home.89
The changes did accomplish one desired end:
mobilisation time against Russia fell from forty-five days
in 1881 to thirty-five in 1883.

By the end of the decade,

the new system, coupled with expansion of the railway net,
brought the time down to just over three weeks.90

It was

a change from the plans of 1881, when the staff had had to
admit that the infantry would not have its logistics train
or full artillery support until day seventeen of
mobilization, while the Russians would have nineteen
infantry divisions and twenty cavalry divisions fully
ready in Galicia by day fourteen.91
Yet the reforms did not alter the basic weaknesses of
the army.

The number of regiments had been raised, but

not the number of recruits.

The census of 1880 had

provided figures showing that a larger army could
certainly be raised, but there was no political will to
change the annual conscript quotas.

The imperial

authorities had fought hard for the defense bill of 1879,
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which had done little more than maintain existing levels
of financial support, despite the increased involvement of
the Monarchy in the Balkans.”

The next proposed

expansion of the army, a decade later, provoked a major
crisis with the Hungarians.
the army.

Nor was there more money for

In 1892 a study by the general staff put the

Monarchy fourth among the five great powers in total
defense spending since 1867.93

Total Defense Spending 1867-1892 (in French francs)
France
Russia
Germany
Austria
Italy

23.15 billion
22.43
14.21
7.00
6.82

The Monarchy, one English historian noted, spent the
equivalent of 13.2 million pounds on its military
establishment in 1880, and 13.6 million in 1900.

In the

same period Germany's defense budget grew from 20.4
million English pounds to 41 million.

Russia, the

Monarchy's planned principal adversary, enlarged its
military spending from 29.6 million pounds to 40.8
million.94 One British officer, writing at the height of
the Balkan crisis, believed the imperial-royal forces to
be "very formidable" and led by a competent and highlymotivated officers corps.95 Yet though the army of the
Monarchy was capable of fighting well, its weaknesses in
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manpower, logistics, and funding had notbeen remedied by
territorial reform.

The army was better

sited to mobilize

after 1883, but it was no more capable of fighting an
extended war than it had been in 1876.
In the event of war with Russia, the army would find
itself confronted with a vastly superior adversary.
Despite the territorial reforms, the army was well aware
that it could not fight such a war alone. By the mid-1880s
the Monarchy was nominally allied with Romania and Italy,
but the alliances existed only on paper, an affair of
German sponsorship.

It was quite clear that neither was

reliable, and that the "allies" still coveted Transylvania
and the South Tirol.

The army had come to be dependent on

the German connection to hold off the Russians.

The war

plan of 1881 counted on forty German divisions of infantry
and nine of cavalry to move against the Russians.96

Yet

despite talks between Beck and his opposite number Count
Helmuth von Moltke, there were no binding plans for joint
operations.

Albrecht of course was not surprised:

he

suspected the Germans of, in true Prussian fashion,
plotting some treachery that would abandon the Monarchy to
the Russians.

Beck spent much of the 1880s trying to

extract definite promises from the Germans, and in 1887/88
the Germans finally let it be known that they would engage
only seven corps and four reserve divisions against the
Russians— a cut of about forty percent from earlier
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expected levels.
unforeseen.

The problem had not been wholly

The war plan of 1881 had noted that even with

French neutrality, Germany would need fifteen divisions of
infantry and three of cavalry to cover the French
frontier.

The French, if they chose to fight, could bring

forty line and twenty-four reserve infantry divisions into
quick service against Germany.97
The conclusions were not hard to draw.

In any two-

front war the Monarchy would have to rely on its own
resources, and those were few indeed.

In December 1886

Albrecht wrote the emperor that, in truth, little could be
done to make the army ready for a major war.

Existing

resources could be more efficiently utilized, but without
radical changes in the political sphere, few real
improvements could be made.

Such changes were highly

unlikely— and, ultimately, undesirable for their internal
consequences.98
Abroad, the Monarchy faced superior Russian armies.
At home, the army was now explicitly territorialized, the
troops in daily contact with their neighbors from civilian
life.

As Albrecht had predicted, the cultural disparities

within the Monarchy became increasingly visible.

At a

period when other European powers were shortening terms of
service for their conscripts in order to maximize the
number of trained reservists, the general staff
emphatically rejected any such scheme for the Monarchy.
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The period of active service, the staff insisted, was
short enough as it was.

Any effort to lower it to two

years would keep the military from having time to train
the less-developed nationalities in basic technical
skills."
The quality of the Monarchy's officer corps remained
generally high.

The Monarchy did not produce any stellar

names— any Moltkes or Roons— but its officers, especially
in the artillery, had been solid and competent.
was a shortage of regular officers.

Yet there

The limited budget

kept pay low, and the imperial-royal officer, while held
in some regard in social circles, could command nothing
like the prestige of his German counterpart.

The Monarchy

commanded the services of some 17,000 regular officers in
the 1880s, and with its low pay and slow promotion
attracted few more.

The regulars were in great measure

what the Habsburg ideal called fort non-national
professionals serving their emperor with a loyalty that
mirrored that of a Catholic order.

"The word service,"

wrote one army commentator, "has a magical power in our
Army...[and] the Army, animated by the dynastic idea,
alone represents unity in our state, and is the rock upon
which the whole edifice of the State rests.”100

But in

the last half of the 1880s the Monarchy came more and more
to rely on reserve officers, whose numbers grew from 5840
in 1885 to 12,171 in 1892.101 Reserve officers, drawn in

large part from the one-year volunteer cadets, lacked the
purely dynastic and professional allegiances of the
regulars.

They were not subject to the language

requirements imposed on the regular officers, and by the
end of the century there were regiments where the reserve
officers were wholly unable to speak with their men.

A

hundred years before, officers, as Wellington said about
the British army, could not be expected to speak with
their men; in an age of nationalism they had to for their
own purposes and welfare.103

The military authorities

tried to avoid the demoralisation that Albrecht had feared
by shifting its regular officers around the Monarchy with
some frequency.

The reserve regiments fell to reserve

officers drawn from the universities and not the military
academies, and it was these officers who began to insist
upon an increasingly "national" tone in the attitudes of
both Landwehr and Honved units.103
There had been a homeward drift of the Monarchy's
regiments throughout the 1870s, and after 1883 almost nine
in ten of the Monarchy's infantrymen were based in their
own recruiting districts.

During the arguments over

territorial reform the problems of national tension and
nationalist agitation had been largely brushed aside.

All

the authors of territorial schemes, from Albrecht and Beck
down, had admitted that national problems would affect a
territorialized army.

Yet the issue had received no real
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attention.

The Russian danger was of prime concern, and

rapid mobilization was the order of the day.

There seemed

in fact to be no immediate nationalist threat.

The

Hungarian leadership, uneasy about Russian involvement in
the Balkans, had backed the army bill of 1879, while Count
Taaffe's ministry, with the Czechs and Poles in the
Reichsrat gathered into the conservative "Iron Ring"
coalition, had temporarily quieted the Slavs.

In 1882/83

the national horizon had been, if not clear, at least a
lighter shade of grey.
The calm would last only a few more years.

The army

bill of 1889 would call forth a resurgence of Magyar
obstructionism and separatism, and Taaffe's proposed
language ordinances of 1890 set off violence in the
streets of Prague between Czechs and Germans.

The Magyar

oligarchs might hope the joint army could keep the
Cossacks from the streets of Budapest, but they also saw
it as an obstacle in the way of a separate Hungarian
national army.

In Bohemia the army was increasingly seen

as an instrument to keep peace in the streets, and the
idea that one had to be German or Czech, that one could
not be Bohemian, was shouted at the conscripts with
disturbing frequency by civilian crowds.

The army had

been reorganised to face the Russian foe with greater
speed.

That much had been achieved, but Albrecht and Beck

had had to admit that all such reforms were limited: there
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were sharp limits on what could be achieved with the
resources at hand.

The emperor's soldiers, officers and

men, regulars and reservists, were chief among those
resources.

One could expect professionalism and loyalty,

and the Monarchy's armies gave that to the end.

But the

army was now subject quite overtly to national demands.
As national peace broke down in the 1890s, it would be the
territorialised army that would feel the sharpest strains.
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CHAPTER 4
ARMY AND NATIONALITIES: CRISIS IN BOHEMIA AND HUNGARY

As the army of the Monarchy looked back from the
years just before 1914, the 1870s would take on a golden
tinge in its collective memory.

It was true that the army

had acquired a new enemy in the east, and the growth of
Russian power could be neither minimized nor ignored.

Yet

the army had fought a successful campaign in Bosnia and
the Herzegovina, and a generation of the Monarchy's
officers would look back on the Bosnian campaign as a time
of shared purpose and positive achievement.

The Balkan

crisis had even prompted the Hungarian leadership to offer
its public support to the army during the negotiations
over the army bill of 1879.

The territorial reforms of

1881-83 had given the army extra time to mobilize against
a foreign threat, and the army's professionalism and
loyalty were taken for granted.

Throughout the arguments

over territorial reform there had been no doubt cast on
the loyalty of the multinational army.
The army had devoted itself during the 1870s to
technical concerns that had culminated in the reforms of
1881-83.

Those reforms were in part a reflection of

domestic stability.

There had been no systematic

separation of regiments and homelands before 1848, and
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after 1867 the regiments had slowly begun to return to
their home areas.

The territorial reforms overseen by

Bylandt-Rheidt had given official sanction to
territorialization, and official complacency mirrored
domestic peace.

Yet from the mid-1880s on, the army was

increasingly involved in suppressing domestic unrest in
the Cisleithanian lands.

The end of the 1880s saw the

beginnings of a twenty-year struggle between the imperial
government and the Hungarian leadership over the nature of
the army.

The 1880s began with Czechs and Germans rioting

against one another in the streets of Prague with new and
bitter intensity, and with troops and workers facing one
another in the streets of Vienna.

The era would reach its

climax twenty years later in a constitutional crisis that
saw the army preparing to endure another round of civil
war in Hungary.
Count Taaffe, named Austrian minister-president in
1879, once observed that his government would keep peace
by keeping all the nationalities a little bit unhappy.
Like so many policies pursued in the Monarchy, this was at
best a short-term expedient.

Yet Taaffe's maneuvering

kept Cisleithanian politics in precarious stability for
fourteen years.

The emperor's chosen KaiserminiBter was

adept at juggling liberals and conservatives, Poles,
Czechs and Germans.

The chambers of the Reichsrat,

though, were not the streets of the Monarchy.

Taaffe, who

served as his own interior minister, received daily
reports from all the cities of the Monarchy on the growth
of nationalism, socialism, anarchism, and anti-semitism.
There were riots in Prague in 1881 over the creation of
separate German and Czech universities, and the
gendarmerie had to make armed forays to rescue German
students from Czech lynch mobs.1

The government's

language ordinances of 1880 mandating linguistic equality
for German and Czech in public affairs provoked violence
between Bohemian Germans, who were outraged at the thought
of losing civil service jobs to bilingual Czechs and
Bohemian Czechs who sought to have Czech declared the
official language of the province.

In a very few years

governments in the Cisleithanian lands would fall over the
issue of how many courses in German and Slovene would be
offered in an obscure provincial high school, but for now
Taaffe was convinced that the nationalities could be
managed.

In the early years of Taaffe's regime the threat

of social radicalism rather than the threat of nationalism
kept lights burning deep into the night in offices in the
Innere Stadt.
The army saw itself as the shield of the dynasty, and
it remained available to the government as the ultimate
guarantor of the social order.

In the autumn of 1882 the

Vienna garrison was called out when the police failed to
quell large-scale riots in the working-class areas in the
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west of the city.

Ten months later troops of the city

garrison were sent into Alsergrund, Vienna's Ninth
District, to put down widespread riots and arson; fighting
went on for several nights while soldiers cleared the
streets at bayonet point.2

Yet the military leadership of

the Monarchy exhibited remarkably little enthusiasm for
armed repression.
The military leadership relied on loyalty to the
dynasty and to superior officers, on devotion to the
ideals of hierarchy and obedience, to hold its polyglot
army together.

It saw socialism, for all its ability to

transcend national lines, as ultimately promoting national
division within the Monarchy by undermining faith in
dynastic loyalty and the traditions of deference.3 The
army had little sympathy for socialism or social protest.
No imperial-royal officer would have considered, as
Boulanger did in France, ordering his troops to share
their rations with striking workers.

Yet the army was not

willing to impose order with the mailed fist alone.

The

troops of the Vienna garrison were called out to disperse
crowds by force throughout the 1880s and 1890s, but the
"assistances" given the civil authorities were restricted
in scope.

Army regulations specified that the use of

force beyond the minimum necessary for self-defense
required the joint authorization of both the local
commander and the ranking civil authority.

Troops were
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given no special training in dealing with civil disorders,
and in fact service regulations called for the
concentration of troops in defensive positions in the
event of outbreaks and regarded patrols by small units as
unduly provocative.4
Internal security is a job rarely popular with
regular officers.

British officers in Georgian times

hated having their men called for riot duty as much as
they hated having their units sent to build roads in
Scotland.5 The officers of the Third Republic saw riot
and strike duty as one more trick devised by the
politicians to ruin the status of the army; the army had
to play "the role of workingman's villain [thus]
shattering the image of a body above class and political
faction."5 American officers in the 1870s and 1880s
expressed the same fears; they had no wish to be seen as
the hirelings of mine and rail owners, and they loathed
the thought of being used not to defend the nation but to
do a policeman's job.7 The feeling was common among
contemporary Russian officers as well.

A soldier's job

was something more than that of a policeman, and for all
the legendary willingness of the Cossacks to charge into
crowds with sabres bared, few of the tsar's officers
relished the thought of giving up the relative certainties
of warfare for the uncertainties of crowd control.®
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The army of the Monarchy was called upon to render
numerous "assistances" in the final decades of the
nineteenth century, but it should be noted that the
military moved with some circumspection.

Rothenberg

claimed that the Monarchy and its army "maintained
internal security by means no more ruthless than in other
states of the day."9

One might argue that the Monarchy

was actually far more reserved in its use of armed force
than some other states.

There was violence between troops

and crowds, and bayonets were bloodied and rifles
sometimes fired, but the Monarchy had no Bloody Sunday, no
Pullman Strike, no Fourmies Massacre.
Whether from unwillingness to use indiscriminate
force, scrupulous obedience to regulations, or a distaste
for an "unprofessional" and morale-sapping role, the
regulars of the Monarchy did not provide a mailed fist at
the ready disposal of Taaffe and his successors.

The

force immediately available to the authorities, and most
amenable to use, was provided by the gendarmerie.

A call

to the local garrison for "assistance" presented the local
authorities with the problem of dealing with the military
and its own ethos and command structure, as well as
providing an admission that the civil authorities were no
longer able to cope on their own.

The local gendarmerie

detachment, however, came directly under civil control and
could be deployed immediately.
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At its foundation in 1849 the gendarmerie had
consisted of one thousand men organized into sixteen
detachments.10 During the 1850s it served both as a rural
guard and a political police in Venetia, Vienna, and
conquered Hungary, and it grew to four thousand men in
1854 and finally to nineteen thousand by 1859.

After the

loss of Lombardy and Venetia it had been reduced to 7900
men, and in 1867 it was divided into separate Austrian and
Hungarian services.

Early in 1870 the Landwehr and Honvdd

ministries relinquished control of the gendarmerie to the
interior ministries of the two halves of the Monarchy.
Baron Kempen, the first commander of the gendarmerie,
had tried to build an elite force on military lines, and
his cadres had been trained by NCOs hand-picked from the
ranks of distinguished regiments.11

Kempen organized the

gendarmerie battalions on an army model and subjected them
to military discipline.

Even after their transfer to the

control of the interior ministries, the gendarmerie
regiments maintained their military appearance and
training.

Ministerial ordinances stressed that, while the

gendarmerie was under the supervision of the ministry of
the interior in all service and financial affairs, its
organization, discipline, and equipment remained
military.12

The Austrian gendarmerie in the 1880s was

made up of 133 officers and 8120 men divided among
fourteen local commands:
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1. Lower Austria (Vienna)

8. Upper Austria (Linz)

2. Bohemia (Prague)

9. Dalmatia (Zara)

3. Tirol-Vorarlberg

10. Silesia (Troppau)

(Innsbruck)

11. Salzburg (Salzburg)

4. Moravia (Briinn)

12. Carniola (Laibach)

5. Galicia (Lemberg)

13. Bukovina (Czernowitz)

6. Styria (Graz)

14. Carinthia (Klagenfurt)

7. Istria (Trieste)
Unlike the Royal Hungarian gendarmerie, which rapidly
became the agent of local landlords and the ruling party
in Budapest, the Cisleithanian service retained the high
reputation Kempen had sought to create, and its
capabilities were regarded as close to those of regular
army units.

The Austrian gendarmerie was indeed able to

undertake purely military missions:

in 1880-82 it saw

combat service in Istria and Dalmatia against the revolts
in the Krisvosije.13
The Cisleithanian gendarmerie continued to grow
throughout the remaining years of the century— 146 line
officers, 21 staff officers, and 9300 men in 1895 rose to
181 line officers, 25 staff officers, and 11,900 men in
1904.14 The growth reflected the rise of social and
national unrest in the 1890s; the addition of a staff
section for planning suggests both the increasing
importance of the gendarmerie as a security force and the
need to plan for the careful deployment of units that,
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while self-consciously elite, by no means possessed
overwhelming force.

The list of major gendarmerie

deployments against labor unrest is indicative of the
decline of Taaffe's era of carefully-balanced peace:
Leoben, Donawitz, Seegraben (1889); the Vocklabrucker coal
fields throughout 1889-91; Gablenz, Reichenberg, and
Teplitz (1890); Ebenfurt, Hochwolkersdorf, ZUckmantel, and
Prossiwitz (1890); Mahrisch-Schoberg (1893); PolnischOstrau and Falkenau (1894); and defense of the Briirer
coalfields and local government buildings and major
firefights with anarchist groups (1896).15

By the end of

the century the gendarmerie also served to hold the line
against nationalist disorders.
The gendarmerie was more responsive to governmental
desires than the army and, as an arm of the police, it was
a less provocative symbol than the army, whose open
dynastic orientation evoked memories of 1848/49.

The

gendarmerie was the major element in restoring order in
Vienna and northern Bohemia in 1897, in Prague, Lau,
Prerau, Holleschau, and Mahrisch-Weisskirchen in 1899, and
in riots by Italian and German student groups in Innsbruck
in 1901 and 1904.16
The frequency of calls on both the gendarmerie and
the army increased sharply in the early 1890s, largely
because of growing violence between Czechs and Germans.
Count Taaffe had been adept at balancing the demands of
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political parties, but the conflicting demands of Czech
and German nationalists in Bohemia did not allow for an
equilibrium constructed from the dissatisfaction of all
parties.

Taaffe's government had tried since 1880 to

reach a permanent accord with the Czechs, but by refusing
to declare German as the "official language" of the
Cisleithanian half of the Monarchy and by ordering that
all verdicts handed down in the provincial courts of
Bohemia and Moravia be given in the language of the
parties involved, the government had deeply angered the
Bohemian Germans.17

The dispute over the language of

judicial opinions in Prague and Brtinn drove the German
deputies into a boycott of the Reichsrat.

The Czechs were

unwilling to make any gestures of conciliation, and the
radical Young Czechs insisted on both a special
constitutional status for Bohemia and full linguistic
equality, which the rise in Czech population relative to
the Germans would soon convert into dominance.
arguments went on in the streets as well.

The

Insults and

ink-wells were hurled in the Reichsrat and the Bohemian
Diet; paving-stones were thrown in the streets of Prague
and Briinn.

The years immediately before 1890 saw the

growing presence of gendarmes and soldiers on Bohemian
streets as civil government became even weaker.
William Jenks noted that in the 1880s "no serious
student of the Habsburg sickness looked beyond Bohemia for

signs either of possible improvement or of the.
agonies of dissolution.

. .

. . An unresolved war between

Germans and Czechs was a malignancy that threatened the
very essence of the Austrian state."18

It was Taaffe's

attempt to work out a compromise settlement in Bohemia
that brought down the Iron Ring in the end.

Agreements

reached between Czechs and Germans in January 1890 under
government sponsorship were put before the Bohemian Diet
the following May.

The German deputies had ended a four-

year walkout to attend.

The Young Czechs, whose radical

stance had excluded them from the negotiations for a
Bohemian settlement, attended with every intention of
provoking violence.

The Bohemian Diet collapsed into

chaos and fistfights; the session was prorogued and the
chamber cleared by the police.
Prague then erupted into demonstrations far more
violent than those seen in 1868.

Czech mobs attacked

German shops and passers-by, imperial eagles were pulled
down from public buildings, and statues of the emperor
were defaced. Count Thun, the imperial governor, found the
civil police wholly overwhelmed and called out the
gendarmerie and the garrison.

Prague and much of the rest

of Bohemia came under a state of siege.

The Prague

garrison, its infantry component made up of elements of
five line regiments and a FeldjSger battalion, all
Bohemian19, was able to clear the streets and restore
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order at bayonet point, but the city would remain under a
state of emergency throughout most of the decade.

Count

Thun, who had been cheered on his appointment as the
Staathalter destined to preside over the arrival of
Bohemian autonomy, found his name a byword for rule by
military force.

The mood in Bohemia, symbolized by a

German boycott of the Bohemian Exhibition of 1891 and by a
bomb attack on the emperor's rail coach outside
Reichenberg20, continued to deteriorate.
The Reichsrat elections of 1891 devastated the ranks
of the conservative Old Czechs, destroying one of the main
supports of Taaffe'8 coalition.

The victorious Young

Czechs, the new victors in Bohemia, were of no mind to
cooperate with the government, and both Taaffe and the
emperor thought the Young Czechs too radical to be part of
a government coalition.

Taaffe carried on for another

year, trying to keep the system in balance, but by the
autumn of 1893 his final attempt at conciliation, an
effort to expand the franchise in the Cisleithanian lands,
collapsed.

The Iron Ring was replaced by a stopgap

ministry of technicians, and its achievements would be
largely forgotten in the furor of the 1890s.

Taaffe had

held his coalition together by an elaborate game of
keeping all his plates in the air.

His fall left both his

successors and the commanders of the security forces only
the fragments of political peace.

J
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The deepening German-Czech conflict also encouraged
national unrest elsewhere in the Monarchy.

The nego

tiations for the army bill of 1889 had brought forth a new
flowering of Magyar nationalism.

Magyar nationalism both

provided an example for the Young Czechs and derived part
of its intransigence from Magyar fears that the Czechs
might achieve their own Ausgleich.

In Carinthia and

Styria there emerged Slovene pressure on the provinces'
Italians and Germans.

The Alpine Germans, the backbone of

the Monarchy, began to be restive, and Fan-German
sympathies were violently expressed in Linz, Graz, and
Vienna.

The crowds cheering the Pan-German leader Georg

von Schonerer down Vienna's Landesgerichtstrasse to his
imprisonment for destroying the offices of Neues Wiener
Tageblatt21 marred the celebration of the emperor's
birthday and offered the unpleasant and distasteful
spectacle of a Viennese crowd cheering for a Prussian
king.

The possibility that the Germans of the Monarchy

could become disaffected was a disheartening omen for
peace in the Cisleithanian lands.
Taaffe's immediate successor lasted a little less
than two years in office.

Prince Windischgratz, grandson

of the hero of 1848, attempted to deal with the Bohemian
problem by maintaining the state of siege in Prague and
extending the Landwehr term of service.

Yet it was not

the unrest in Bohemia that brought down his ministry.
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The Windischgratz ministry fell over an utter triviality,
a symbol of the decay of affairs in Cisleithania.

Funds

had been earmarked for the construction of a Slovene
Untergymnasium in the village of Cilli in southern Styria.
German Liberals, aghast at the thought of allowing
Slovene-language classes in a town thought to be a German
stronghold, withdrew their support from the government.
The emperor and his advisors determined to have no more
governments dependent on parliamentary whims and declared
that Austria would be governed by extra-party technicians.
The Slovenes of Cilli got their Untergymnasium in the next
year's budget; the town itself remained a German enclave
until its remaining inhabitants were driven out or
slaughtered by the advancing Red Army in the spring of
1945.22
The state of secondary education in a provincial town
of south Styria was an issue of the greatest triviality,
but it proved that government in the Cisleithanian lands
was no longer able to function on a parliamentary level.
The Austrian half of the Monarchy would be largely
governed in the future by bureaucrats.

The dynasty had

always leaned heavily on its non-national administrators
and its army; in the mid-1890s these seemed to be its only
sustaining forces.
The ill-fated Windischgratz was replaced by Count
Casimir Badeni, the long-time imperial governor of
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Galicia.

Badeni had earned a reputation for efficiency

and a strong hand.

He had kept the Ruthenes in line, kept

Russian terrorists from using Galicia as a sanctuary, and
championed the fortification of the Russian frontier.
Moreover, he had the support of the bureaucrats and the
army.

The Badeni ministry was charged with rebuilding

Taaffe's coalition of Slavs and conservatives in order to
maintain social peace and to reach an equitable and
workable truce in Bohemia.

Badeni was first able to force

through an extension of the franchise in an attempt to
reach those peasants as yet uncorrupted by nationalism.
Like the emperor, Badeni believed that the nationalism of
the middle and lower-middle classes was the force that
could wreck the Monarchy.
In the early spring of 1897 Badeni set out to
conciliate the Czechs.

The Reichsrat elections of March

1897 had been another resounding success for the Young
Czechs, and Badeni hoped to win the more moderate of them
to the side of the government.

The state of siege was

lifted in Prague, press censorship was curtailed, pardons
were granted to a number of convicted radicals, and Count
Thun was removed as governor.

In April new language

ordinances were issued for the civil service in Bohemia
and Moravia.

Effective 1 July 1901 all imperial civil

servants in the two provinces would be required to know
both Czech and German; local courts would be obliged to
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hear cases in the language of the plaintiff; and internal
administrative correspondence would be conducted in
whichever language the original paperwork concerning an
issue had used.

Badeni defended his decrees as being

vital to the welfare of the Monarchy, and he joined Czech
spokesmen in pointing out that no more was being required
of German bureaucrats than Bohemian landowners required of
their gamekeepers.”
The German parties, almost to a man, refused to
accept decrees handed down by a cabinet dominated by
Poles.

Five of the key ministries, including Interior,

Finance, and Foreign Affairs, were held by Poles24— and
that allowed Czechs to displace Germans.

One of Taaffe's

Polish ministers had long ago warned the recalcitrant
German Liberals that the Monarchy could be governed
"without the Germans;" the German parties believed the
Monarchy was now being governed "against the Germans."25
Violence erupted throughout Bohemia and spread to the
alpine provinces.

The Reichsrat, its sessions disrupted

by the increasingly violent actions of German deputies,
was yet again cleared by the police.

The gendarmerie had

to be called in to clear mobs off the Ringstrasse in
Vienna.

The city garrison was called out, and troops were

in the streets in Salzburg, Graz, Linz, and Prague as
well.

The level of violence rose all through the summer,

and later writers described the temper in the Austrian
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lands as "revolutionary" and reminiscent of 1848.26

By

late summer, with the army in the streets and the
decennial negotiations with Hungary impending, the idea of
declaring martial law throughout Cisleithania and ruling
through military governors-general was in the air.
The Vienna garrison, drawn from the 4 . (Vienna), 61.
(Temesvar), 64.(Broos), 66.(Ungvar), 68.(Budapest), 71.
(Trencsin), 84.(Vienna), and 1. and 4. Bosnians, was able
to clear the capital's streets with well-timed appearances
and the application of rifle butts.
less fortunate.

Other garrisons were

Riot duty is always wearing, and few

things erode morale more rapidity.

The Prague garrison

had been on constant call since Taaffe's day, and the
demands had taken a toll.

The 28.(Prague) Infantry was

moved out of the city in 1893 and sent to Linz and then on
to Trient in 18 9 5 .27

Rothenberg claimed that the 28. had

become "unreliable,"2® though he did not cite any specific
instances of disaffection, and some units of the 28.
remained in the city.29

The 28., an almost wholly Czech

regiment, may have shown nationalist tendencies or it may
have been simply exhausted by riot duty.

Constrained to

use minimum force, it may have been battered by the crowds
and sent away to recover its morale.

After all, there

could be nothing pleasant about living in daily contact
with a population that might be hurling brickbats at
soldiers or attacking patrols.

In any case, the transfer
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of the 28. was not a harbinger of military unreliability.

In 1897 the Prague command was faced by outbreaks of
rioting on a scale unknown since 1848.

Czech mobs took to

the street to attack Germans and destroy property owned by
Germans and Jews.

Count Coudenhove, the new governor,

called out the city garrison.

The troops were from the

28., as well as the 73.(Eger), 88.(Beraun), 91.(Budweis),
and 102.(Beneschau) as well as the 7.Dragoons and 22.
Feldjagers.

All were Bohemian units, and most were

largely Czech.

Although I Korps (Krakow) and II Korps

(Vienna) had been alerted in case reinforcements were
required, the local forces served quite admirably.30
While the Prague garrison was able to maintain order
in the city, its counterpart at Graz was far less
fortunate.

Styrian Germans had never forgotten the Cilli

affair, and the riots against the Badeni Ordinances gave
German nationalists a chance to settle scores not just
with the Slovenes but with political rivals as well.

On

20 November 1897 violence broke out between rival crowds
of Social Democrats and Christian Socialists, the latter
made up largely of students.

A full third of the city's

195 policemen were sent to disperse the crowds, but the
police were driven off by rioters armed with paving-stones
and clubs.

Socialist leaders were unable to calm their

followers, and the Christian Socials had no wish to calm
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theirs.

The city authorities then requested aid from the

Graz garrison.
The garrison was not a large one.

Graz was the

headquarters of III Korps, but its barracks were occupied
only by the 7.(Klagenfurt), 27.(Graz), and 2.Bosnian
infantry and the 5.Dragoons (Marburg).31 All were Styrian
or Carinthian units except the Bosnians, and the Bosnians
would take the blame for all future events.

The Bosnian

regiments had been raised in the mid-1880s after the
suppression of the conscription revolts in the Occupied
Provinces and the Krisvosije.32 Conscription had been
exceedingly unpopular, and attempts to levy troops had
sparked a year-long revolt.33 Nonetheless, Bosnian units
were soon raised, and Bosniaken were considered to be fine
military material, a reputation they would maintain and
enlarge after 1914.

For the moment, however, they could

not be kept in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

It was unwise to keep

armed natives in a newly conquered zone with a centurieslong history of violence and instability, and they had
been moved into the Monarchy proper to relieve line
regiments with battalions detached to the
Okkupationsgebiet.

Rothenberg believed they had been

brought in as outsiders to quell urban riots,34 but their
appearance in Vienna (1892) and Budapest (1891) probably
reflected convenience as much as anything else.
capitals, with garrisons of half-a-dozen infantry

The two
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regiments and assorted cavalry, artillery, and support
units, were convenient places to park new regiments.

The

capitals' garrisons required more men than could be raised
locally, and Bosnians in fezzes seemed no more unusual
than swaggering mustachioed hussars on the cosmopolitan
streets of Vienna.
1896.

The 2. Bosnians had arrived in Graz in

They were a long way from their depot at Banjaluka,

and the good people of Graz were violent nationalists.
On the night of 20 November 1897 two companies of
Bosniaks were sent into Graz to restore order.

Repeated

appeals by local Social Democratic officials for the crowd
to disperse failed to produce any result, and toward
midnight the Bosniaks made a bayonet charge to clear the
streets.

By 2 a.m. order was restored, but one rioter was

dead and four badly wounded.

The violence ended for the

moment, but the Bosniaks had become an immediate target
for popular hatred.
"Muslim mercenaries".

They were reviled as outlanders and
The latter term was particularly

galling to the army, since it was usually prefaced with
achwarzgelb, black-and-yellow, the dynasty's colors.

The

students and burghers of Graz began to sport blue
carnations, the symbol of German nationalism, and attack
the black-and-yellow of the dynasty.
On 26 November a socialist crowd attacked the offices
of the city's Christian Social newspaper.

The Bosniaks

were called out again, supported by the 5. Dragoons and
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the 27.(Graz) Infantry.

Bosnian troops dispersed the

crowd, but it soon reformed, counterattacked behind a
barrage of paving stones, and was only then driven off at
bayonet point.

A half-squadron of dragoons, penned in the

Auerspergplatz by a hostile mob, battered their way out
with the flat of the sword.

FML Anton Succovary,

commanding III Korps, had to deny publicly press reports
spreading throughout Cisleithania that his cavalry had
made repeated sabre charges into the crowds.

The edge of

the sword, Succovary insisted, could only be used in selfdefense or upon his direct, and as yet ungiven, order.35
On 27 November the Christian Socials came out to seek
revenge, and fighting erupted in the city's Hauptplatz.

A

socialist group, fleeing from patrols of the 7.
(Klagenfurt) Infantry, was stopped from looting wine shops
by the arrival of more of the 7.

On their return to the

Hauptplatz they were confronted by a company of Bosniaks.
Paving stones began to fly, and the Bosniaks fixed
bayonets and charged.

One platoon, clearing out side

streets, was cut off in the Murgasse and beset by stones
and roof-tiles hurled from surrounding buildings.
battered Bosniaks gave ground down the alleyway.

The
When the

situation became dangerous, their lieutenant ordered a
volley.

The rioters scattered, leaving one man dead,

another dying, and twenty wounded.

The arrival of cavalry

reinforcements drove off the rest of the crowd.

The men
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of the 7. gave chase to the edge of the Stadtpark, but the
officers of the regiment chose to forego entanglements in
the unlighted park.

Bayonet fights in a darkened wood

hardly seemed worthwhile.
The official report from Succovary to the war
ministry was succinct enough:
On the night of the 26/27th as well as the
27/28th assistances were rendered against street
demonstrations caused by students and workers. On
the first night no major clashes took place. Last
night four companies of one hundred men each and one
squadron were employed. A group of BosnianHerzegovinian Infantry Regiment Nr. 2, belabored by
stones in the Murgasse, opened fire, killing one
civilian and wounding others; order was restored
thereafter. Assistances were concluded between 0100
and 0300 hours. At 1600 hours today, upon request of
the governor, six battalions and one squadron under
Generalmajor Siglitz were held ready on the
Hauptplatz and in barracks. Reports to follow after
full investigation.3*
The Bosniaks were of course absolved from any
wrongdoing.

The official report37 made clear that the

officers of the garrison had used force quite cautiously.
Given the level of threat, Succovary and his junior
officers had not even taken advantage of moments when army
regulations38 would have permitted sabre charges and aimed
fire.

Nonetheless, the Bosniaks became the object of

virulent local hatred.

At a Sunday concert in early

December crowds greeted the men of the 7. as "German
brothers" and offered them beer and cigarettes.

The

Bosnians, on the other hand, were subject to both verbal
and physical abuse, and the regiment was marched back to
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barracks by officers unwilling to order a charge with
bayonets and rifle butts into well-dressed Sunday
promenaders.

The mayor of Graz was informed that the

Bosniaks would be kept out of sight as much as possible
and, most humiliating to Succovary and the garrison
command, sent out only in tandem with German units.39
The garrison officers, from German and Bosnian
regiments alike, were excluded from Graz society; shops
and restaurants became unwilling to serve officers.

All

over Graz the Styrian equivalent of the "no redcoats
wanted here" that faced Kipling's Tommy Atkins began to
appear in shop windows.40

The local press attacked the

"provocative presence" of "foreigners"--off-duty Bos
niaks— in the town.

Any brawl between a Bosniak and a

local in a tavern became an unprovoked attack by bayonetwielding "Turks" on

peaceful German citizens.41

German

nationalists spoke of events in Graz as a "neu
Tiirkenkrieg" and promised more violence.42
The furor over the Bosniaks in Graz reached the floor
of the Reichsrat in early December.

The government had

suffered the humiliation of Badeni's fall in November; the
Polish strongman had become, after Ficquelmont and
Metternich, the third Austrian minister in history to be
driven from office by public clamor.43

The attempt to

govern "against the Germans" had failed, and once more an
interim bureaucratic cabinet was appointed to pick up the
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pieces.

On 7 December the imperial war minister, the

delightfully named Krieghammer, rose to defend the honor
of the army and the competence of III Korps' commanders:
Insofar as the polyglot composition of the
Austrian army is concerned, I can assure you that
every regiment, wherever its men are recruited, will
carry out its duty against the internal and external
enemies of the Monarchy, and in this regard it makes
no difference whether a regiment comes from the north
or the south or what tongue it speaks. In the army
every nationality is held in equal value and equal
regard. No officer recognises any differences among
the nationalities.44
Krieghammer's assurances were both heartfelt and
true.

The army remained loyal and supranational; its

ability to cobble together a functioning system out of
disparate nationalities was a model for the Monarchy's
ruling class, men like Badeni or Taaffe or Krieghammer,
who saw themselves as servants of the dynasty and not a
nation.
evident.

Yet the limitations of the army were also
The army had performed with discretion and

loyalty throughout the 1880s and 1890s.

But it could only

restore order, not create the conditions for peace.

It

could clear the streets and keep hostile nationalities
apart, but it could not be used to govern.

The Budapest

oligarchy could solve its problems with recalcitrant
peasants or insolent Croats and Romanians by ordering the
Honved to fire on a crowd, but Cisleithania could not be
governed by ordering the army to fire on the Czech or
German middle classes.

In the autumn of 1898 crowds of
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burgers pelted the unlucky Graz garrison with rocks and
garbage, and the emperor, in an uncharacteristic display
of truculence, demanded to know how the troops had allowed
themselves to be humiliated and why their officers had
failed to order the use of firearms.45

It was, however,

politically impossible to fire on the middle classes, on
well-dressed crowds of property-owners, students, and
professionals.

In a parliamentary era, one could not

shoot down the people who made up the backbone of the
state.

So long as no political solution could be reached,

the army would remain a useful instrument, but one fated
to be abused by the crowd and battered by both
parliamentary deputies and paving stones.
Political problems do not exist in isolation; they
feed off one other.

German and Czech intransigence fueled

each other, and by the end of the 1890s disquieting
linkages were forming all across the Monarchy.

Magyar

successes in 1867 had inspired Czech nationalists to
demand autonomy for Bohemia.

Every Czech success

threatened the privileged, not to say dominant, position
of the Magyars in the Monarchy, and every Czech demand
provoked the Magyar oligarchs to pre-empt any hope of
Czech victories over Vienna by making their own demands.
The successes of the Magyars in acquiring the Honved
provoked Young Czechs to demand their own autonomous
units.

The Hungarians, agitated by the success of Czech

221
linguistic demands, moved to defend themselves from
Slavdom by increasing their campaign to Magyarise the
minorities.

Demands that Magyar be accorded greater use

in Hungarian regiments were met with a Czech campaign
calling on Czech recruits to respond in Czech instead of
army German on the parade ground.46
Hungary had been quiet during the 1880s; the Russian
threat had been a powerful impetus to cooperate with the
imperial authorities in strengthening the army.

The

increased Russian troop strength in Poland was just as
menacing at the end of the 1880s, and there was little
outright hostility to the army.

Nonetheless, the

Hungarian leadership used the debates over the army bill
of 1889 to pressure the imperial government for
concessions.

The initial demands were largely symbolic, a

matter of Count Kalman Tisza, the Hungarian premier,
covering his left flank against his more vocal opposition.
Yet they became the opening moves in a game that very
nearly brought down the Ausgleich.
In the midst of the 1889 debates Hungarian deputies
began to demand that Hungarian regiments be commanded in
Magyar and that Hungarian regiments be granted the right
to carry Hungarian flags and bear Hungarian emblems on
their uniforms.

Such demands had an obvious emotional

appeal, and Tisza's opposition used them as a stick to
beat the premier and his more moderate Liberals.

Tisza
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had devoted no little time and effort to building a
working relationship with his counterparts in Vienna, and
he had no wish to provoke a crisis.

He was nonetheless

all too aware that he was constrained to exact concessions
from the imperial authorities.

In any case, he agreed

with his opponents that a greater role for Magyar in the
Hungarian regiments would aid the ongoing effort to force
Hungary's Slovaks, Romanians, and Serbs to adopt the
language of their masters, and so Tisza brought up his own
series of linguistic demands during the army bill
negotiations.
The imperial government was vulnerable to Hungarian
pressure in 1889.

That spring saw a sharp increase in

Russian troop movements in Poland, and the army wanted its
annual intake of conscripts raised above the levels
negotiated in 1879.

The army requested an enlargement in

joint (imperial-royal) army conscription from 89,000 men
to 103,100.

The number itself was not large, but the

army, which had been unable to win parliamentary approval
for adjusting recruiting quotas according to population
growth, was desperate for manpower, and it was willing to
bargain for even a few thousand extra recruits.

The

general staff and the war ministry were aware that
Hungarian rapacity, fed by nationalism and the imperial
weakness revealed by the Czech-German conflict, was
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growing, but there was no alterative to negotiating with
the Magyar leadership.
Tisza arrived in Vienna in the fall of 1889 with his
hand strengthened by the increasing level of furor in the
Hungarian Diet and by riots in the streets of Budapest
demanding greater "equality" in military affairs for
Magyardom.

He was not prepared to advance the demands of

the more vocal members of the Diet for full use of Magyar
as the language of command in the Hungarian regiments, let
alone the demands of opposition leaders like Count Albert
Apponyi and Ferenc Kossuth for expansion of the Honved
into a national Hungarian army.

Tisza had called out

aging survivors of the Ausgleich negotiations to argue
against the demands of Apponyi and the younger Kossuth.
Andrassy himself was brought into the Diet to proclaim
that the demands for a Hungarian national army were
dangerous not only to the Monarchy but, in the face of
Russian sabre-rattling in Poland and Bulgaria, dangerous
to Hungary as well.

The architects of the Ausgleich,

Andrassy said, had not pressed for military separatism,
and such a course was doubly dangerous now.47
Tisza did not find the negotiations with the imperial
government very difficult.

In return for his support for

the army bill he was able to return to Budapest with what
he felt was an appropriate number of concessions.

Magyar

one-year volunteers were no longer required to be fluent
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in German, and, symbolically, the title of the joint army
was to be altered to show Hungary's status.

The army was

now designated k.-und-k., kaiserlich-und-koniglich,
imperial - and - royal.

The added article represented the

self-governing status of the Kingdom of Hungary within the
Monarchy.48

The Hungarians had asked for the change as

long ago as 1875: Bela Szende, then Honvdd minister, had
petitioned Vienna to adopt k.-u.-k. gemeinsames Heer or
simply das Heer for the army's title.49
und had been creeping in.

In any case the

The imperial war ministry had

protested in 1873 that k.-u.-k. was being "smuggled in" by
the Hungarians and the popular press, and the common usage
of the term both within and without the army subverted its
joint and dynastic status.50

The concessions, like so

many arguments based on symbols, left no one happy in the
end.

The army disliked any concession to Hungarian

demands for separatism, and the Hungarians resented still
being linked in an imperial designation.
The position of the military on both symbolic and
linguistic concessions was straightforward.

The army was

the single major joint institution in the Monarchy.
Division of the army seemed tantamount to division of the
Monarchy.

At best, the Monarchy would be a mere personal

union, the Austrian lands and the Kingdom of Hungary held
together only by the person of Franz Joseph.

At worst, as

the Archduke Albrecht had predicted, the Monarchy would
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dissolve into a welter of fissioning parts.

Linguistic

parity for Magyar was a first and fatal step toward
separatism.

The "independence" parties in Hungary did

not, the army believed, seek merely to protect the
national identity of Hungarian troops, but to enforce
Magyar domination within Hungary.
There were in any case purely military objections to
any Hungarian demands for language concessions.

Only

thirty-six of the Monarchy's 102 regular infantry
regiments spoke one tongue, and of the forty-one regiments
raised in Hungary only seven were purely Magyar
speaking.51

The military consequences of linguistic

parity were quite obviously unfortunate: increased
difficulty of communication within the army and decreased
speed of mobilisation.

There were already HonvSd staff

officers who spoke no German.52

There was simply no way

to reconcile military necessity with two official
languages of command.53
The Magyar position was not quite so simple.

Tisza

was a firm supporter of the terms of the Ausgleich as they
stood.

He had been Andrassy's chosen successor, and he

had inherited a healthy fear of the Russians.

He had

become skilled at using the Honved to keep the minorities
in line at bayonet point, and he had no wish to force
issues in the joint army.

Yet the army bill debates of

1889/90 had been Tisza's swan song.

He had made himself
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seem insufficiently radical to the followers of Apponyi
and Ferenc Kossuth, and, by the spring of 1890, he found
himself vilified in the Diet and by the opposition press
and resigned the premiership in disgust after fifteen
years in power.
His Liberals remained in control of the government,
but there was no firm leadership to defend the Ausgleich
arrangements.

The opposition held the high ground of

political symbolism, exploiting Magyar fears of the
nationalities, emotional bonds with the revolution of
1848, hatred and fear of Slavic (i.e., Czech) successes,
and pride in Hungarian sovereignty.

All factions agreed

that the use of Magyar in Hungarian regiments was vital to
Magyarising the nationalities, and Apponyi's faction
disdained the joint army as a foreign occupation force and
hoped to see the Honved and the Hungarian joint regiments
merged into a national army.

Ferenc Kossuth added

antidynastic sentiment to a disdain for the army as an
institution.5<
The early 1890s saw a rapid growth of opposition
sentiment in Hungary.

Opposition to the Liberals, to the

party which had supported the Ausgleich, grew as memories
of 1849 faded.

The joint structure of the Monarchy came

to seem, as Norman Stone had it, a "luxury".55

The Czechs

were forcing the Germans from dominance in Bohemia, and
the Magyars could hardly do less.

The arrival on the

political scene of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, who had
become Franz Joseph's heir-apparent following the suicide
of Crown Prince Rudolf, did little to inspire confidence
in the future of Dualism.

Other members of the dynasty,

notably Albrecht, had been hostile to Hungary in the past,
but the new imperial successor manifested an open and
total hatred for all things Magyar.

Albrecht had despised

the Hungarian political leadership but believed that the
ordinary Hungarian soldier, if properly led and fairly
treated, would be loyal to the Monarchy and the emperor.
Franz Ferdinand openly doubted the loyalty of all
Hungarian officers56 and proclaimed that all Hungarians,
cabinet minister, prince, cardinal, burgher, peasant,
hussar, servant, were each and every one revolutionaries
and potential traitors.57 The Liberals depended on the
Ausgleich; Dualism seemed likely to pass away with the old
emperor.
The final Ausgleich negotiations of the century
arrived in the wake of the Badeni riots in the Austrian
lands.

The opposition parties had taken advantage of

Hungary's celebration of one thousand years of nationhood
to proclaim 1896 a year of political truce, and it was
only to be expected that, after such a well-publicized
display of graciousness, 1897 would be a bitter year for
both the ruling Liberals and the imperial government.
There was growing sentiment on the part of the

professionals and small businessmen who made up the
backbone of the opposition parties in favor of a separate
Hungarian customs area58, and the long-playing crisis
across the Leitha had its repercussions in Hungary.
Bohemian "state rights" were seen by the opposition as a
prelude to a tripartite Monarchy, and there was an impetus
to extract concessions from Vienna before Prague could win
any victories that would incite the nationalities in
Hungary or diminish Hungary's role in the Monarchy.

There

was no hope of unseating the Liberals in any sort of
ordinary election; Tisza had built up a party structure
that gave them an unassailable edge even without himself
as premier.

In any case government controlled both the

location of polling places and the counting of ballots.
The "electoral geometry" designed to keep the
nationalities in their place kept the Magyar opposition in
its place as well.

Yet there was capital to be made.

The

imperial government had shown its weakness in Bohemia, and
the opposition stood to gain support by scourging the
Liberals for their failure to take full advantage of
imperial disarray.
The demands made in the Hungarian parliament after
1896 reflected a deep strain of national arrogance as
well.

In the late spring of 1897 the Young Czech press

began to demand that Czech recruits called up for service
but not yet in uniform, conscripts in limbo between
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arrival at a barracks and the issue of the blue-grey
soldier's plumage, be allowed to respond to commands in
Czech.59

The harried imperial authorities were having

none of it, however.

Conscripts who chose to answer zde

instead of hier at roll call were threatened with martial
law and military courts, as were those politicians and
journalists who egged them on.

The Young Czechs retreated

before a display of imperial determination, and the Czech
failure, well-publicized in Budapest, was a goad to
Hungarian nationalists: the Magyars would be able to win
the sort of symbolic victory that had eluded the Czechs.
The first demands of the opposition parties, the socalled '48 parties, concerned the economic provisions of
the Ausgleich.

The economic treaties between Hungary and

the Austrian lands expired at midnight on 31 December
1897.

The '48 parties had devoted themselves to a policy

of obstructing the renewal of the Ausgleich treaties
throughout the year, and their demands on the government
had driven the Liberals away from any productive
negotiations.

On New Year's Day 1898 the opposition

parties announced that Hungary was no longer integrated
with the rest of the Monarchy’s economy; Hungary was free
to establish its own customs zone and erect protective
tariffs.

The government, however, managed to force a one-

year "temporary" renewal through the Diet, and early in
the year the Austrian and Hungarian premiers signed a
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memorandum of understanding which extended the economic
clauses of the 1887 agreements pending some definitive
action on the part of the Hungarians.60 The opposition's
position was that the agreement was totally illegal and
that the country was being governed ex lex, outside the
law.

The opposition managed to block the 1899 budget and

recruiting authorizations and announced that, should the
imperial authorities attempt to collect taxes or levy
recruits, the king would be in violation of the
constitution and his coronation oath.61
The imperial government now found its ability to
maintain the army under attack.

Recruiting in Hungary was

a problem under the best of circumstances.

Hungarian

poverty kept the physical quality of conscripts below that
of their Cisleithanian counterparts, and the army had to
take an older age group in order to find a sufficient
number of physically acceptable men.62

Opposition

successes in 1898 meant that the recruit levies for 1899,
1900, and 1901 had to be met by a painfully hammered-out
set of emergency measures and annual bills.

Time-expired

men were retained in service, and men from the
Eraatzreserve were called up to active service.
Hungarian obstruction also came at a time when the
army, dissatisfied with the recruit quotas of 1889, was
preparing to plead for more men.

War minister Krieghammer

had hoped to use 1899 to ask for more recruits; he was now
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forced to try emergency measures to keep the army manned
at all, even at the level of 1889.63

In the autumn of

1902 Krieghammer, despairing in an attempt to gain formal
approval for using the Eraatzreserve as a permanent source
of peacetime manpower for the joint army, finally asked
for an increase in the recruiting quotas.

The joint army

would receive annual levies of 125,000 men— 71,562 from
the Austrian lands and 53,438 from Hungary.

The proposal

was the spark that ignited five years of crisis in
Hungary.
The upheaval in Hungary is conventionally known as
the crisis of 1905, the year of greatest drama.

Its

origins may have been in the demands of the opposition, of
the professional classes and small businessmen, for a
protective customs zone and a separate national bank64,
but by the end of 1902 it had evolved into a fight over
the nature of the army.

Contemporary observers understood

that the army was at the center of opposition demands65
but were unaware of the depth of the crisis or its
severity.

In 1902 the army attempted to expand its

recruit quotas to keep itself effective against the
numerically superior Russians and found itself under
attack at every turn by Magyar nationalists.
In October 1902 the war ministry presented the
Hungarian Diet with a request for a substantial increase
in recruiting; Hungary's share would be 16,292 more men—
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10,727 for the joint army, 3000 for the Honved, and 2565
for the supplementary reserve.

No one doubted that

Hungary's population could support the increase.

There

were even inducements— new NCO schools and military
hospitals for the Honved— designed to win favor among the
nationalists.

Yet the '48 parties had been battered by

Liberal electoral chicanery in 1901, and the army bill
seemed to be the perfect emotional issue on which to build
popularity and recoup their fortunes.

And, as one

opposition spokesman pointed out, "Our king is well along
in years, and we must use these few [remaining] years to
take advantage of his attention to the law and his oath.
Every Hungarian knows that dark days are coming for our
country. . ."6S
The opposition was prepared to seize the moment, and
on 27 January 1903 the Party of Independence presented the
government and the imperial authorities with a list of
military demands:

Hungarian officers to serve only in

Hungarian regiments; all officers in Hungarian regiments
to be fluent in Magyar; Magyar to be the language of
command and service in Hungarian regiments; Hungarian
regiments to bear Hungarian national crests and flags;
regiments raised on Hungarian soil to swear allegiance to
the Hungarian Constitution; active service to be reduced
from three years to two; and Hungarian regiments to be
stationed only in Hungary in time of peace.67
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The military and the imperial government found the
demands totally unacceptable, but they were frighteningly
popular in Hungary.

They had an immediate appeal to

national emotion, and, by asking for a reduction in the
terms of active service, the opposition parties Btood to
gain a major body of support on purely practical lines.
The military could see only disaster ahead.

Taken as a

body, the opposition demands called for the creation de
facto of a separate Hungarian army, stationed only in
Hungary and commanded in Magyar, loyal to the Hungarian
constitution— meaning loyal to the Magyar oligarchy and
not to the dynasty, flying national red-white-green flags
instead of Habsburg black-and-gold.

The opposition

demands called for a return to the state of affairs of the
spring of 1848 and the first heady days of "reforms."

The

end, the military leadership believed, would be the summer
and autumn of 1848 againi reform would be followed by an
attempt to assert Hungarian independence, and civil war
would follow.
The opposition demands had seized the emotional high
ground in Hungarian politics, and there was a steady flow
of Liberal politicians away from government positions and
toward more strident nationalism. Obstruction in the Diet
prevented a succession of short-lived ministries from
doing anything to reach a lasting agreement with Vienna.
A four-month bill allowing the government to levy recruits
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expired in April 1903 and, without any renewal possible
over opposition obstruction, Hungary was once again ex lex
as of 1 May 1903.

By June the emperor was ready to go

outside the halls of the Diet to find a premier, and in
late June Count Karoly Khuen-Hedervary, the long-time Ban
of Croatia, was named premier.

Khuen-Hedervary had made a

name for himself as an iron-fisted viceroy in Zagreb, but
his tenure as premier was no happier than that of Badeni,
another viceroy who found the capital more troublesome
than the provinces.

The Magyarone aristocracy of Croatia

were no more than kept puppets, and the Honved was always
at hand to deal with Croats who took to the streets.

The

politicians of the Diet were arrogant, anarchic, and free
from the threat of viceregal police.

Khuen-Hedervary,

used to issuing orders, was unable to reach any
compromises and unwilling to yield
personal pride.

on any point because of

By mid-August 1903 he found himself

increasingly isolated and powerless, and he handed in his
resignation.
There was now no chance of securing a recruit bill in
1903, let alone securing Hungarian
expansion of the army.

agreement to any

Hungarian conscripts of

1900due

for discharge on 1 October 1903 were informed that they
would be retained indefinitely.

In mid-August the emperor

visited Budapest but found no one willing to form a
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ministry.

By September he took the occasion of cavalry

maneuvers at the Galician village of Chlopy to speak out:
I have determined to satisfy myself once more
concerning the instructional establishments,
leadership, and conduct— -as well as the overall
constitution and readiness— of all my troops. . . I
must and will maintain their existing and proven
arrangements. My Army in particular— whose solid
framework is being threatened by one-sided ambitions
wholly ignorant of the noble ambitions it has to
fulfill for the welfare of both state-regions of the
Monarchy— must know that 1 will never relinquish the
rights and powers which are granted its Supreme
Warlord. Joint and unified as it now is shall my
Army remain— the strong power for defense of the
Austro-Hungarian Monarchy against every foe.68
On 22 September the emperor informed Khuen-Hedervary
and, through him, the entire Hungarian leadership, that
his position was inflexible.

He did, however, hint that

there existed the possibility of some negotiated changes
in the administration of the k.-u.-k. army.

The emperor

pointed out that, while he had always defended the
Ausgleich and the rights of the Hungarian nation, he could
not diminish his sovereign rights under the Ausgleich, nor
would he agree to any measure that would weaken the army
and thus be detrimental to both partners in the
Monarchy.69
The Liberal leadership met in Budapest a week later
to work out a compromise on the army question.

A working

group of nine, headed by ex-premier Kalman Szell and Count
Istvan Tisza, son of Kalman Tisza, was formed, and on 18
October the committee issued its recommendations:
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Hungarian emblems should be given greater prominence; the
Hungarian military commands should correspond with local
civil authorities only in Magyar; Magyar should be used in
all military courts convened in Hungarian regiments;
Hungarian troops should, insofar as military necessity and
administrative requirements allowed, be commanded by
Hungarian officers; all Hungarian officers should be
transferred to Hungarian regiments; and Hungarian cadet
schools should be expanded.

The committee went on to

recognize that the language of service and command was a
prerogative of the crown and "for grave political reasons
affecting the larger interests of the nation" refrained
from seeking changes.70

Within a week, the emperor

accepted the proposals as a basis for negotiation and
authorized Count Istvan Tisza to form a cabinet.

The

rights of the crown had been recognised; Franz Joseph felt
the rest of the proposals to be purely administrative
matters open to discussion.
Tisza was not a popular man in Vienna.

He was no

less a nationalist than his fellow Magyar lords, and he
had once dismissed a report on Hungarian affairs by an
Austrian minister-president as "the dilettante opinion of
a distinguished foreigner."71

He was nonetheless the only

Hungarian leader not afflicted by the chronic
shortsightedness of his class, and he had no patience with
the anarchic grandstanding that party politics had become
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since his father's death.

Tisza was willing to accept the

personal costs of the premiership— accusations in the Diet
and the opposition press that he was a traitor to Hungary
and no more than the bought agent of the court— and his
high-handed methods had some success at checking the chaos
beginning to permeate political life.

In March 1904 Tisza

bludgeoned through temporary recruit and budget bills,
allowing the army to release some reservists and timeexpired men and finally permitting the government to pay
some of its bills.

He was adept and ruthless in shutting

off political opponents, and he was no less hard-fisted in
dealing with disorder beyond the Diet.

The Honved was

called out in early 1904 to break a major rail strike, and
on Tisza's orders recalcitrant strikers found themselves
forcibly enlisted in the Honved and subjected to military
law.
Nonetheless, the situation in Hungary continued to
deteriorate.

Tisza's insistence on parliamentary order

provoked greater discontent within Liberal ranks and drove
once-loyal deputies deprived of their time-honored rights
to filibuster and shout imprecations closer to Apponyi and
Ferenc Kossuth.
well.

Violence had begun in the streets as

In October 1903 a wreath commemorating the rebel

generals executed at Arad in 1849 appeared on the Kossuth
monument at Szeged, supposedly delivered in the name of
the third-year men of the local garrison.

Military police

of the 46. (Szeged) sent to remove the wreath found
themselves opposed by civil police sent by the county
authorities to defend it.

In the ensuing fight two

civilians were seriously wounded.”

Fights between

soldiers and civilians, or duels between officers and
satisfaktionsfahig Magyars, had never been uncommon in
Hungary; they now became epidemic.

Violence in the

streets was reflected in the Diet, and Magyar deputies
proved no less fond of smashing furniture than their Czech
counterparts.

When Tisza proclaimed to his constituents

that a joint army was required for Hungary's security and
that order in parliament was vital if Hungary was not to
go the way of the disintegrating Cisleithanian lands, the
opposition leadership arranged a display of violent
physical displeasure.

The proud opposition leaders,

including an ex-premier, had themselves photographed
smiling proudly in the ruins of the Diet chamber, pieces
of shattered benches and desks clutched in their hands
like swords of honour.73
In mid-December 1904 Tisza dissolved the Diet and
announced new elections for January.

He seems to have

hoped that the electorate would reject the
irresponsibility of the opposition or, alternatively, that
the opposition, if confronted with a serious chance of
power, would moderate their demands.
Tisza seriously miscalculated.

In either case,

The opposition had long

since captured the emotional issues of the campaign, and
Tisza's role in breaking parliamentary "freedom" to
obstruct business had driven a large number of local
notables, the men who ran the county administrations, into
the opposition camp.

The election campaign was marked by

serious outbursts of violence, and Cisleithanian troops,
as opposed to the Honved, which usually enforced the
government's will at the polls, had to be called in.74
The election itself was held four days after "Bloody
Sunday" in St. Petersburg, and the massacre of Russian
workers, graphically and widely reported in the Hungarian
press, was linked to reports in Independence Party papers
that the emperor had offered k.-u.-k. troops to help the
tsar shoot down the workers of St. Petersburg.75

Tisza

himself remained oddly passive throughout the campaign,
and for the first time in living memory the considerable
repressive apparatus of the Hungarian government was not
brought to bear on voters.75 The combined opposition
parties won 231 seats to the Liberals' 159, a massive
repudiation of the policies of Tisza and the supporters of
the Ausgleich.
The victors assumed that, having broken the dominance
of the Liberals, they could dictate terms at the Hofburg.
Ferenc Kossuth was granted an audience (in Magyar) with
the emperor, who indicated his willingness to go forward
with the proposals drawn up by the Committee of Nine
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headed by Tisza and Kalman Szell in October 1904.77

The

younger Kossuth showed some personal tact before the man
who had been his father's arch enemy, but the younger
Andrassy announced that there could be no hope of an
increase in the recruit quota, and that he, Andrassy,
would join a new government only on the basis of an
independent customs zone and a full implementation of
Magyar language of command.78

Gyula Justh, one of the

younger leaders of the Party of Independence and newlyappointed speaker of the Diet, informed the emperor that,
even if Magyar became the language of command in Hungarian
regiments, Hungary still demanded an independent national
army, a point of view expressed again by the Diet in an
address to the throne offered that spring.79
Late in March Feldmarschalleutenant Heinrich von
Pitreich, the imperial war minister, and Admiral Count
Rudolf Montecuccoli, the chief of the naval staff, arrived
in Budapest to meet with the new majority leadership on
military questions.

Montecuccoli was the architect of the

remarkable growth of the k.-u.-k. fleet, and he hoped to
avoid any crisis that would slacken the flow of funds and
men for his new and cherished navy.

Pitreich was known as

a moderate on "superficial" issues such as flags and
emblems, and was ready to compromise.

His own view was

that externals were of limited importance.

Hungarian

troops had sported distinctive dress since Theresian

times, and they would be no less brave or loyal for having
St. Stephen's crown on their uniform buttons in place of
the double eagle.

A willingness to compromise on small

things, Pitreich held, was the key to saving the larger
goal of a unified and enlarged army.80

Pitreich's

willingness to be flexible was unable to win over the
parties of the victorious coalition.

The new majority

rejected any growth in the military budget and insisted on
Magyar as the language of command in all Hungarian units.
By May it was obvious that the new Diet was firm in its
position and that no government could be formed that would
be acceptable to the crown.

The flow of emissaries from

Vienna to Budapest, and from government offices to those
of Ferenc Kossuth and Count Apponyi, came to an abrupt
halt.

Late in May Franz Joseph decided upon a new

expedient!

a non-parliamentary ministry.81

Non-parliamentary ministries were nothing new west of
the Leitha; the Austrian lands had long been governed by
cabinets of technicians.

In Hungary, though, a cabinet

could not be purely "colorless” politically; it had also
to be identifiably Hungarian.

The choice of premier,

announced on 28 May, was Feldzeugmeistsr Baron Fejervary,
commander of the Royal Hungarian Life Guards.

Fejervary

was 72, with a long and honorable history of service to
the dynasty.

He had been decorated for bravery under fire

at Solferino and had gone to service both in the emperor's
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military chancellery and as commander of line regiments.
He was a loyalist to the core, but his "Hungarian"
credentials were no less impressive.

In 1872 he had

served as deputy to Bela Szende, the first Honved
minister, and from 1884 to 1904 had been Honved minister
himself.

The Honved existed as a fighting force largely

due to Fejervary's untiring efforts.”

The old general

was not averse to a separate Hungarian customs area, nor
was he a friend of the nationalities or the lower
classes.83

Even at the nadir of its popularity, the

Fejervary government was willing to send the gendarmerie
and the Honved out to the Dunatul to smash harvesters'
strikes at the behest of many of those same magnates
(including Apponyi) who branded Fejervary a traitor®4 and
to use regular cavalry against striking miners at
Fiinfkirchen.85

Hungary, Fejervary said, could be governed

only with a club, but it had to be painted the national
red-white-green.66
Initial reaction to his appointment justified Henry
Wickham Steed's report in the London Times that, in
leaving retirement to take up the premiership, Fejervary
was "sacrificing his brilliant past and comfortable
present, and. . . condemning himself to spend the
remaining years of his life as an object of hatred."®7
The Budapest press announced his arrival by headlining
"The Bodyguards Are ComingI" and by treating his

appointment as a kind of royal coup.

The Fejervary

government never shook off its military stigma.

To its

enemies it remained the Trabantenregierung (Magyar:
Darabont-kormany), the Life Guards' Regime.

On 20 June,

the day before Fejervary was to be presented to the Diet,
the coalition leaders issued a statement terming the new
government illegal and unacceptable.88

The next day

Fejervary faced the Diet, read out the proposed program of
his ministry in the face of mounting unrest and abuse from
the deputies, and then produced a royal rescript
proroguing the Diet.

Legally, the Diet had now forfeited

its place as a legislative body; any enactments it might
make were invalid, illegal, and could be treated as acts
of rebellion.89

The cabinet members left the platform for

their offices.

The deputies, left alone, raised a cheer

for Norway, which had declared itself independent of
Sweden two weeks before.90 The deputies went on to vote a
resolution of "national resistance" calling on all county
and local governments to refuse to collect taxes or to
call up recruits.

The coalition ordered the proclamation

printed and sent out to all local officials, and a
"steering committee"— in effect, a government-in-exile—
was set up to make policy.91 The '48 parties, in refusing
to govern or to allow the functions of government to
proceed, had finally emulated their fathers and
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grandfathers: they were, not to put too fine a point on
it, in rebellion against their king.92
The melodrama in the Diet was great fun for observers
from the Viennese popular press; it was less amusing for
observers in the k.-u.-k. army.

The generals knew

rebellion when they saw it, and they had no intention

of

being caught off-guard as their counterparts had been in
1848.

The army was the ultimate guarantor of the

Monarchy, and by midsummer 1905 the operational planning
bureaus had begun to draw up contingency plans for a
military solution to the crisis in Hungary.
In four decades of Dualism there had been any number
of imperial officers who wished to repay Magyar insolence
with a march on Budapest.

Such was the stuff of talk over

the late-night brandy in the officers' mess.

Yet the

emperor had firmly defended the Ausgleich settlement, and
there was no

desire at the top to replace the Dualist

structure by

force, to give choleric colonels and majors

their chance to cross the Leitha and "sort the bastards
out."

When Crown Prince Rudolf suggested in 1886 that

anti-military and anti-Dynastic riots in Budapest be put
down by a military government, Archduke Albrecht rebuked
him for showing such immaturity.93

Baron Max-Vladimir

Beck, Austrian minister-president from 1906 to 1908 and
cousin of the chief of the general staff, bluntly told his
old pupil Franz Ferdinand to give over his dreams of
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shattering the Magyar oligarchy by force:

it was no

longer 1849, and no conquest of Hungary was conceivable.94
The plans that emerged in the summer of 1905 were put
together by the Operations Bureau of the general staff and
later collected in the Kriegsarchiv as Fall U. (Fasz.
182).

Glaise-Horstenau's biography of Beck claimed that

in case of major disturbances in Hungary, the 4. Infantry
Division (Briinn) and cavalry from the 15. Dragoons would
occupy Budapest, while the 25. Division, based on Vienna,
would join the Styrian 5. Dragoons to secure the
connections between the two capitals.95

Yet until

Rothenberg and Peball published a precis of the Fall U .
documents in 1969, the level of force expected had not
been analyzed by historians of the Monarchy.

The

description given by Glaise-Horstenau implied an
occupation, an extension of the "assistances" rendered the
civil power.

The documents in Fall V. bear out Baron

Beck's point that Hungary could only be pacified with
shattering levels of force.

Fall U. is a plan for a full-

scale civil war.
Fall U, is not a single coherent plan, but rather a
collection of plans.

And it lacks the appended

information that such a plan would generate later in the
century— consideration of casualties, of foreign political
ramifications, and, most importantly, how it would be
funded.

The basis of Fall U. is a study of "A Military
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Solution of the Hungarian Question" dated Raab, February
1904 and signed by Generalmajor Moritz von Auffenberg,
commanding the 65. Infantry Brigade.

Building upon this

is a longer "Study U.," dated Vienna, 13 August 1905,
undersigned by Colonel Heinrich Krauss-Elislago, chief of
the Operations Bureau, and annotated by FML Oskar
Potiorek, deputy chief of the general staff.

There is

also a manuscript on "Solution of the Hungarian Crisis by
Force of Arms," signed by Oberstleutnant Artur von
Mecenseffy of the Operations Bureau and dated Vienna, 19
July 1905.

The Mecenseffy study has various appendices

containing drafts of imperial proclamations on public
order to be issued in both Hungary and Cisleithania and
orders for the commanders of IV., V., VI., XII., and XIII.
Korps in case the staff plans became operational.
Auffenberg's work, the basis of the other two
proposals, is dated February 1904.

The other two studies

are dated July-August 1905, though the Mecenseffy
manuscript has an undated appendix on "Kriegsfall U .—
General Mobilisation.

Appendix to the Wartime Order of

Battle Effective 1 April 1905."

Rothenberg and Peball

could not determine an exact date for the start of staff
planning96, but the addition of an Hungarian appendix to
mobilisation orders effective in April and the completion
of Mecenseffy's work in mid-July suggest

that work began

before the presentation of the Fejervary

government to the

247
Diet and may have begun as a staff question not long after
Pitreich and Admiral Montecuccoli returned from Budapest
at the end of March.
Auffenberg's work was in any case a "private" matter.
Sometime in late 1902 Auffenberg had surveyed the
Hungarian situation and begun to draw up plans for an
armed intervention.

His work was something more than a

pipe-dream of "sorting the bastards out".

Auffenberg

claimed later that he had resolved to look at the state of
affairs in Hungary "with the conscientiousness of an
historian and with the care of an imperial soldier fearful
for the future of the Dual Monarchy."97 But this is quite
disingenuous.

Auffenberg had been made Generalmajor in

1900, and he was very much the ambitious officer.

He was

courting Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his party, and
Auffenberg was sending along lengthy observations on the
state of the army and the situation in Hungary to the
Archduke's retinue at the Belvedere in Vienna.

He hoped

to use Franz Ferdinand's patronage to win his marshal's
baton, and indeed by 1911 he would be the Belvedere's
choice for war minister.98 The Archduke found in
Auffenberg's reports exactly what he wanted to hear:
reports from an officer with both line and staff
experience that argued for shattering the Magyars by
force.
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Auffenberg's goal was the "complete and fundamental
reduction of Hungary and the permanent establishment of a
promised new order;"99 his means were speed and force:
"offensive d outrance, an offensive carried out to the
final consequences of the opportunity."100 Auffenberg
proposed to mobilise the Cisleithanian troops of the
Monarchy plus Romanian and Croat troops of the Hungarian
regiments against the HonvSd, unreliable Hungarian units,
and elements of the civil population armed and led by
nationalist radicals.

His own figures, inconsistent both

within the plan and arithmetically, give totals of 371
battalions, 198 squadrons, and 150 batteries/1202 guns
(Appendix II: Order of Battle) or 399 battalions, 212
squadrons, and 144 batteries/1136 guns (Part IV:
Operations Plan) available for disposition in three
armies.

A main force (Danube Army) of 194 battalions, 102

squadrons, and 80 batteries drawn from II., III., VIII.,
IX., and XIV. Korps would move out in two columns, ViennaPressburg-Esztergom and Graz-Szombathely, to link up on
the Danube at Budapest.

A northern army (144 battalions,

84 squadrons, 54 batteries) would move Przemysl-EperjesKassa, split through Eger and the line Ungvar-Munkacs and
reunite on the Tisza.

A small southern army (33

battalions, 12 squadrons, 16 batteries) would leave the
line Belovar-Esseg, move to Pecs and then divide, one
column occupying Kecskemet while the bulk of the southern
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forces would reach the Danube and move north to join the
Danube Army.101
The key to the problem was Budapest itself, and
Auffenberg proposed to strike hard for the capital.
Auffenberg saw concentrations of "reliable" artillery at
Pressburg, Odenburg, and Komorn {although supported only
by five "reliable" battalions of infantry) and groupings
of loyal units around the capital— two battalions of the
23. (Sombor) and three battalions of the 3. Bosnians in
Budapest, plus two battalions of the 76. (Odenburg) at
Gran and one battalion of the 69. (Stuhlweissenburg) plus
one squadron of the 12. Uhlans at Stuhlweissenburg.102
The western approaches to the capital were vulnerable, and
Auffenberg proposed to strike at the heart of national
resistance before forces in eastern Hungary, with its
heavy concentration of "unreliable" troops along the line
Kaschau-Miskolcz-Debreczin-Grosswardein, could be raised
and Honvdd units moved west or the loyal garrisons
overwhelmed.
Initial Hungarian opposition would, Auffenberg
estimated, come from 170 battalions, 150 squadrons, and
200 guns.

He assumed from the outset that the HonvSd

would be openly hostile, and that, if given time, the
Magyar political leadership would attempt to arm the
populace and set inactive or reserve officers at their
head.

He did not expect whole HonvSd regiments to mutiny
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instantly but foresaw instead an ongoing flow of Honved
troops to the enemy.

The same would be true of regular

Hungarian regiments.

Auffenberg counted ninety-two

battalions of twenty-three regiments as unreliable, and to
those he added one hundred squadrons of hussars. Fiftyfour squadrons of Honvdd hussars, about eighty battalions
of Honvdd infantry, and 150 to 200 guns, or about 1/4 of
the Hungarian artillery, to make up his total.103
Auffenberg was not concerned with the political
consequences of his plan.

He regarded the Slovaks as

broken by the Magyars and thus likely to follow their
masters' lead.104

Beyond that, Auffenberg's concerns

were purely technical.

The Russians were distracted in

Manchuria, the Magyars were moving toward rebellion, and,
looking out from brigade headquarters at Raab, Auffenberg
saw the time at hand for a final settling of accounts with
Budapest.

In any case, Auffenberg could not afford to

dwell on political matters.

Even had they been within his

competence, he could not afford to bring them to the
attention of the patron he was courting.

The archduke was

always ready to have his prejudices confirmed, but he was
known to dislike meddlers.
The general staff could afford no such inhibitions.
Any military settlement in Hungary involved more than
sending in troops.

Disturbances in Hungary covered a

range of possibilities, from passive resistance by local
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authorities to widespread rioting to outright rebellion.
Suppression of disturbances by military force would have
effects not only on the local population but on the
regiments of the k.-u.-k. army drawn from Hungary as well.
The "Solution of the Hungarian Crisis by Force of Arms”
drawn up by Mecenseffy was concerned in large part with
the problem of isolating the army from the political
effects of an intervention.

Mecenseffy's introduction

pointed out:
We are concerned with, to face facts, the
suppression of the revolutionary attempts, and also
with the suppression of possible risings which might
spread to part of the Army.
In order to prevent the
latter, the most important task of the army
leadership lies in. . . the management and
maintenance of discipline in the army. Whether this
can succeed, since the uninterrupted subversive
activity of the Party of Independence has been
indecisively and passively regarded for months, is
another question.105
The operational possibilities envisioned by
Mecenseffy and the staff were not terribly different from
those seen by Auffenberg.

All five corps bordering

Hungary (I, II, X, XI, and XIII) would be mobilised, with
VIII. and IX. Korps acting as a strategic reserve.

There

would follow a concentric advance into Hungary proper.
Units from I. Korps would advance to Turocz-Szt. Marton,
Sillein, and the valley of the Waag; X. Korps would move
via Ungvar-Nagy Mihaly and Kaschau; XI. Korps would move
troops to Maramores-Sziget, Huszt, and Munkacs; XIII.
Korps would move troops up to Nagykanisza and Pecs; II.
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Korps at Vienna would send out eight to ten battalions
with a strong artillery component by ship to Pressburg and
Komorn.

Cavalry would move to Komorn by land, screened by

the guns of the Danube Flotilla.

The western lines of the

Hungarian rail net would be seized by advance units.
Troops designated for occupation duties would be mobilised
behind the forces making the initial move into Hungary and
could be rapidly fed into areas secured in the initial
coup de main.106

Transport capability at the Vienna

docks (Donaukanal, Winterhafen, Brigittenauer Lande,
Donau-Ufer, Kaisermiihlen), estimated for early September
would be 2320 men (or 1890 men plus 130 horses, or 1890
men and 60 guns)—

or 2650 men if the ships of the

Pressburg-Vienna local run were taken from trade.107
Mecenseffy divided the Hungarian units of the joint
army into "reliable" and "unreliable" categories on a
simple basis: units with more than fifty percent Magyar
personnel were automatically regarded as unreliable.
Joint army units plus the inherently unreliable HonvSd
forces in the five Hungarian corps area included 150
battalions, 120 squadrons, and forty-four batteries with
fifty percent plus Magyars, and sixty-three battalions,
five squadrons and forty-four batteries of "loyal"
troops.108

Even if one assumed that some Magyars in

unreliable units would simply desert rather than go into
open rebellion and that not all units were at full
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strength, a rebel command would have fifty- one regiments
of infantry and seventy-seven squadrons of hussars
immediately available at full combat strength.109 The
non-Magyar population at large could be expected to be
passive.

They had been "made cunning through experience

and bitter disappointment," a reference to the treatment
of the Croats in 1849 and the events on the Border in
1868, and they had no reason to trust the imperial
government to protect them against Magyar revenge.

As

much as the Croats, Romanians, Serbs, and Saxons hated the
Magyar oligarchs, in a separate Magyar state their sheer
mass might provide them with political weight.110 The
imperial military could expect no help from the nonMagyars this time, and it would have to contend alone with
treason in the Honved and unreliability in the ranks of
the joint army.
The Operations Bureau of the general staff received
Mecenseffy's work in mid-July.

Through July the

Coalition parties had devoted themselves to promoting a
policy of total non-cooperation with the Fejervary
government by the country and municipal authorities.

In

mid-July the city of Budapest announced that not even
voluntary recruits would be accepted for the joint army
and that the city would not accept any tax payments.
Within a few days the interior ministry had set about
annulling such local ordinances and using the gendarmerie

to deliver and enforce conscription orders.111

The

Fejervary cabinet had begun to consider the idea of using
the gendarmerie and the military simply to replace the
county administrations, local bodies whose impotence had
been emphasized by their willingness to beg the "illegal"
Fejervary government for aid when farm-labor and miners'
strikes broke out all through the Dunatul.112

The

Operations Bureau, considering the decay of affairs in
Hungary, decided that "under the present circumstances in
Hungary, military measures for the restoration of the
legal order could be especially urgent around the time of
the 15th of September.1,113

In mid-September, then, the

4. Infantry Division (Brtinn) would enter Budapest to
secure the government offices and the royal arsenals.
"Studie U," the most elaborate of the staff designs,
is based both on Mecenseffy's plan and the results of a
meeting of the operational and transport staffs (a meeting
attended by naval delegates and a deputy of Beck's from
the emperor's military chancellery as well) held at the
war ministry in Vienna on 3 August.114

The final draft,

undersigned by Krauss-Elislago, had two variants.

The

first, "Suppression of Localized Unrest in the Streets,"
was straightforward enough.

The twelve battalions of the

4. infantry Division, joined by the 11. Dragoons, slated
to be transferred to Slavonia after 7 September, and thus
immediately available, would occupy Budapest in support of
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the civil authority.

Krauss-Elislago did not, however,

wish to repeat Windisch-Gratz's error of 1848.

Budapest

was the economic and political center of Hungary, but it
was not the whole of the country.

A second variant,

sketching out requirements for subduing widening unrest
and outright rebellion, was also presented.
The second plan called for the immediate appointment
of FML Prince Lobkowitz, commanding IV. Korps, as supreme
commander and military governor in Hungary.

Budapest

would be immediately occupied, and the rail centers at
Bruck-an-der-Leitha, Raab, and Komorn would be seized.
Budapest could be reinforced by joining the 15. Dragoons
to the 11. Dragoons already in place.

The 25. Infantry

Division, with twenty-six battalions, would then move into
IV Korps.

The 12. Infantry Division and six squadrons of

the 5. Dragoons would move from X. Korps (Krakow) to V.
Korps.

Thirteen battalions of the 2. Infantry Division

and the 6. Uhlans would move into VI. Korps. VII. Korps
would get six battalions of the 14. Infantry Division
(XIII. Korps), and XII. Korps would get six squadrons of
the 14. Dragoons and ten battalions from the 11. Infantry
Division (Lemberg).115

Full mobilization would proceed

in the Cisleithanian lands and Bosnia-Herzegovina along
the lines already laid down in Kriegsfall I— mobilization
against Italy.116 At full strength, 406 battalions, 197
squadrons, and 123 batteries of regular troops and 300
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battalions, 186 squadrons, and 112 batteries of the
Landwehr would be available for operations against
Hungary.117
Krauss-Elislago calculated that rebel forces would at
most come to 282 battalions, 146 squadrons and 78
batteries, drawn from the following sources:118
Battalions

Squadrons

Batteries

Honvdd

97

54

Hungarian Landaturm

87

27

Unreliable k.-u.-k.

47

65

Questionable k.-u.-k.

51

—

74

146

78

TOTAL

282

4

The figures for the Hungarian Landaturm reflected staff
estimates of the civil population likely to join an open
revolt.

Krauss-Elislago, though, was more cautious than

Mecenseffy or Auffenberg in labelling k.-u.-k. units as
unreliable.

Units with less than twenty percent Magyar

personnel were believed inherently reliable; units above
seventy percent Magyar were written off as unreliable.
Units at twenty to seventy percent— fifteen infantry
regiments— were "questionable" and slated for special
treatment: removal from areas of disaffection and
indoctrination by their officers on the topic of loyalty
under trying circumstances.
problem here.

Krauss noted a special

Three battalions of the 60. (Eger), a
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regiment ninety-eight percent Magyar, were in Vienna,
along with six squadrons of the 4. Hussars and three
battalions of the "questionable" 101. (Beckescaba).
Special attention would have to be paid to such
potentially hazardous situations outside Hungary.119
The staff plans were presented to a full crown
council held at Bad Ischl on 22 August 1905.

There was no

effort to present a military solution as the sole or even
leading option open to the imperial authorities.

Count

Goluchowski, the foreign minister, and War Minister
Pitreich favored discussing the military option, but
Goluchowski, along with Baron Gautsch, the Austrian
minister-president, also favored continuing negotiations
with the coalition in Budapest.

Fejervary was against any

attempt to install a military government in Hungary.

He

would, he claimed, be unable to find sufficient
administrators willing to serve a military regime.

The

time when a few score "Bach hussars” could govern Hungary
was gone; Fejervary was convinced that the administration
would collapse from desertions by bureaucrats if the army
moved in.

In any case, Fejervary said, he could not

support leading the Monarchy into civil war.120
On 24 August the Operations Bureau took note of how
far preparations for Fall U. were to go.121 The staff
was told to count on the Diet being prorogued between 15
September and 10 December.

Ersatzreserve troops would be
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called up in September to keep the infantry up to
strength; the cavalry and artillery would continue to be
kept at full strength with time-expired men.

Should a

military government be installed, the Budapest command
would be in charge of full implementation of
recruiting.122

The Danube Monitor-Gruppe and its patrol

boat escorts would come under IV. Korps command effective
1 September.

The naval units would then go on exercises

at Dunafoldvar while the sympathies of their Croat and
Magyar crews were determined.

Two monitors, staffed with

hand-picked crews, would be kept on alert at Budapest.123
Fejervary had insisted that joint rather than purely
Cisleithanian units be used for the occupation of Budapest
by 4. and 25. Divisions; the action, he maintained, would
be in defense of state order and not a war against
Hungary.

Prince Lobkowitz would be given twenty-two

battalions at his immediate disposal in case of
disturbances— ten battalions of Bosniaks and Bosnian
Feldjagers and twelve battalions of Hungarian troops from
6. (Ujvidek), 51. (Koloszvar), 72. (Pressburg), and 61.
(Temesvar) Infantry, all from regiments with less than
fifty percent Magyar personnel.

The 6. (forty-one percent

German, thirty-two percent Croat), which had served in
Budapest from 1890 to 1902, would be moved from Vienna
back to Budapest at the end of August in order to relieve
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local garrison units for maneuvers and move them out of
the city.124
In August and September the operations planners could
look at Fall U. with some certainty that the first option,
the occupation of Budapest, would be set in motion.
Fejervary's government had been able to break a number of
county assemblies, but resistance continued throughout
most of the country, and government officials were subject
to social ostracism and threats of mob violence.

Reports

in the press that the government was considering the
proclamation of universal suffrage, joined with reports of
revolutionary upheavals in Russia, led to increasing
unrest on the left in both Hungary and the Cisleithanian
lands.

On 23 September, in an audience of less than five

minutes, the emperor and the leadership of the coalition
reached an impasse: the coalition leaders refused to make
any concessions on their military demands.125 On 8
October the war ministry despatched sealed letters to each
of the corps commanders.

Enclosed was the proclamation of

martial law in Hungary and an appendix placing the HonvSd
under the direct command of Prince Lobkowitz, the new
military governor of Hungary.126
The army was ready to move at the beginning of
October.

It was, however, increasingly obvious that a

military solution was losing favor among the emperor and
his advisory.

Fejervary had never been enthusiastic about

the use of armed force, and neither had his imperial
master.

Franz Joseph at seventy-five still retained vivid

memories of 1848, and as he aged his taste for "rigorous
measures"127 declined.

In the summer of 1905 he had gone

to Prince Alfred Windischgraetz's castle at Stekna with
the generals gathered for the year's Kaiaermanover.

He

had told his generals that he was deeply moved to be
there, in this last citadel of unswerving loyalty.128
Yet he had no wish to draw the sword again.

At dinner one

night he had asked FZM Alexander von Krobatin what would
happen if Hungarian affairs continued to deteriorate.
Krobatin's reply was hearty and straightforward:
shooting, Majestyl"
silence.129

"Why,

The emperor strode off in indignant

Imperial assent would be required for the

order to execute Fall U .; short of an actual armed rising
by Magyar nationalists, there was little imperial will to
send in the army.
In any case, Fejervary and his interior minister had
decided on an attempt to break the Magyar leadership—
"insolent oligarchs" (UbezmUtige Oligarchen) Fejervary
called them130— by purely political means.

Kristoffy and

Fejervary had been dropping hints that the government
might favor universal suffrage throughout the summer, and
Kristoffy had begun to court Hungary's small socialist
party.

Fejervary found the social democrats to be "ganz

traitable" and began to hint that the Hungarian socialists
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might be acceptable as full partners in the political
process and that no real danger might arise to Hungary and
the Monarchy from a thorough-going reform of the Diet.131
Fejervary and the emperor were both confident that the
threat of universal suffrage by decree would ultimately
break the resistance of the coalition.

When in mid-

September a mass demonstration in Budapest put 100,000
workers in the streets to demand electoral reform, the
government refused to send for troops and contented itself
with cordoning off the plaza before the Parliament
building.

The Budapest garrison had been reinforced with

two detachments of Honvdd from Odenburg, and, while on
alert, was nonetheless ordered to keep out of sight until
sent for.

When the agitated deputies demanded that the

government protect them from the workers, Kristoffy's
chief of police informed them that they would have to look
after themselves.133
The coalition leadership, headed by Ferenc Kossuth,
attempted to counter Fejervary and Kristoffy's appeal to
the workers and the nationalities by flirting with the
South Slavs.

On 4 October a conference of Croatian

political leaders issued the Fiume Resolutions, offering
political support to the coalition.

The Fiume Resolutions

were matched on 17 October by a similar Serbian resolution
at Zara, thus presenting the imperial government with the
spectre of the South Slavs allied with the Magyars.

The
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Fiume Resolutions raised the possibility of unrest in
Croatia and Slavonia, unrest that would prevent the
military from using all its southern forces in Hungary
proper and from drawing replacements out of the south to
reinforce garrisons in occupied Hungary.

Yet Croat

support was an ambiguous weapon, and Kossuth's moves were
disavowed by many of his fellow leaders.

Croat support

for the coalition had been conditional on a revision of
the Croat-Hungarian agreements of 1868, and the Croats
demanded greater local autonomy, economic concessions,
incorporation of Dalmatia into an enlarged CroatiaSlavonia, and a widened role for the Croatian language in
HonvSd units.133

The language of military regiments, the

coalition leaders suddenly discovered, was not just a
Magyar issue.

The South Slavs presented problems for any

imperial military moves in Hungary, but they offered
problems to the coalition as well.

The Party of

Independence and its allies were brought face to face with
the spectre of an enlarged and autonomous South Slav bloc.
On 4 October Kristoffy met with Franz Joseph.

The

interior minister offered the emperor two alternatives:
universal suffrage or civil war.

Two days later the

Reichsrat issued a call for universal suffrage in
Cisleithania.

There was unrest growing in the Austrian

lands as well, demands for electoral reform based both on
rumors from Hungary and press reports of the revolution in
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Russia.

From 4 to 6 October the emperor weighed the costs

of a military solution.

Croatia could not be stripped of

garrisons, order could not be guaranteed in the Austrian
lands, and full-scale civil war seemed unavoidable.

Yet

on 6 October134 Franz Joseph finally decided against
military intervention.

The general staff was still

preparing the corps commands for Fall U ., and transport
officers were preparing to take over the Vienna docks to
embark troops.

But by 12 October, four days after the

corps commanders had been sent their sealed orders, the
political decision had been communicated to the military.
Cipher telegrams were sent out to the commanders of IV.,
V., VII., XII., and XIII. Korps, ordering the immediate
return of the sealed packets.135 On 7 November staff
officers of the war ministry's Prasidial-Biiro burned the
packets in the courtyard of the ministry, their seals
still unbroken.13* The text of Fall U., although not its
reputation, vanished into the depths of the Kriegsarchiv.
Kristoffy's plan for using universal suffrage as a
political weapon was less dramatic and less thorough than
Auffenberg's or Mecenseffy's, but it had the advantage of
not making Hungary into a battlefield. A purely political
program undercut national resistance in a way that the
bayonets of the army could not.

The administrators who

ran the counties of Hungary were not, as they had been in
1848, gentlemen doing a part-time job out of noblesse
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oblige; they were professional bureaucrats who owed their
jobs to the lords-lieutenant appointed by Fejervary.

The

bulk of Hungarian officialdom might have resisted Austrian
troops; they would not hazard their jobs in a fight
between Fejervary and the coalition.

Resistance in

theatrical forms continued— the prefect of police in
Budapest found his office looted, supporters of the
government were snubbed in the street and expelled from
gentlemen's clubs, the prefect of Debrecen was mobbed by
students, metal tulips (made, in the finest comic-opera
tradition, in Austria) appeared on Magyar labels as a sign
of a boycott of Austrian goods,117 and the county lordlieutenant at Ungvar found his inaugural ceremony marred
by a mob carrying his effigy to a newly dug grave.
Kristoffy and Fejervary, using Honvdd forces and a
sprinkling of k.-u.-k. units, sent troops to Debrecen and
Ungvar, and those guilty of interfering with the
government found themselves marched off in handcuffs by
imperial infantry

or Honvdd hussars.

Roving royal

commissioners began to tour the counties with escorts of
gendarmes and infantry, making the point that the
government would physically support loyal officials, and,
pour encourager les autres, summarily sacking and
arresting any officials implicated in disorders, too
conciliatory toward the coalition, or known to frequent
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political meetings without the express consent of a lordlieutenant.138
By the end of the year the situation in Hungary's
countryside had stabilized. The government and its
commissioners had achieved a rough measure of control.
Reliable men were sent down from Budapest to fill vacant
posts, and outright defiance was at an end.

the joint

army, the gendarmerie, and the Honvdd had acted with
despatch and discretion to maintain order without resort
to extreme measures.

The role of the Honvdd was a

personal triumph for Fejervary.

In mid-summer the Honvdd

had been written off as a nest of traitors, real or
potential; yet all through the autumn it had been a loyal
instrument of order and royal authority.

Fejervary's

years as Honv4d minister had not been in vain.

Whatever

the officers and enlisted men of the HonvSd might think of
the Dual Monarchy and dynasty, they had been taught to be
loyal servants of state order.
There was,however, one center of disaffection still
to be dealt with, and one more role for the Honvdd to
play.

The Diet was still sitting, though its sessions had

degenerated into a mocking of a parliament.

The Diet had

been a forum for coalition pleas for funds— Kristoffy had
stopped government payments to all areas of "national
resistance"— and exhortations to defy the government.

By

January the Diet knew that it would be dissolved by royal
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order, and the coalition was seriously considering
refusing to accept a rescript of dissolution.139

The

Viennese press had reported as early as 18 December that a
mobile force of k.-u.-k. troops was being readied in case
the Diet refused to disperse.140
Fejervary approached the emperor at the beginning of
February 1906 to urge that the Diet be dissolved by force,
an act of force majeure designed to resolve the impossible
political situation once and for all.

A show of force,

Fejervary insisted, was the key to Sanierung, a clearing
of the air.141

Such an act, however, could not be

entrusted to joint army troops.

Fejervary had once said

that the club he would need to beat his fellow countrymen
into submission had to be painted in national colors.
Therefore, there could be no doubt in any observer's mind
that it was the king of Hungary and not the emperor of
Austria who had acted.142
On 19 February the assembled Diet discovered the huge
neo-Gothic Parliament House cordoned off by police and
several squadrons of Honvdd hussars backed by a strong
force of HonvSd infantry.

The operation had been

entrusted to GM Sandor Nyiri, who had been appointed royal
commissioner in Hungary.

Nyiri at fifty-two was one of

the Monarchy's youngest generals, and he had been Honvdd
minister under Tisza in 1903.

He was talented, energetic,

and proudly Magyar— the proper colors to be Fejervary's
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cudgel.

The emperor had expressed his fear that things

might become "a bit lively" in Budapest, and he was
convinced that trouble lay ahead.143

Nyiri, however, was

firmly convinced that rapid and self-confident action
would carry the day.

He had already obtained royal assent

for removing the lord mayor of Budapest and appointing
Kristoffy's hand-picked prefect of police as acting major
with full local powers.144

It remained only to deal with

the deputies.
Late in the morning of 19 February a group of Honvdd
military police escorted Colonel Viktor Fabrizius into the
Diet chambers.

The Speaker refused outright to read a

royal rescript of dissolution, and Fabrizius mounted the
podium and began to read.

A substantial bloc of deputies,

joined by coalition supporters in the galleries, attempted
to shout him down.

At that point Fabrizius ordered in his

men, and Honvdd infantry with fixed bayonets cleared the
chamber.145 Later historians— among them A. J. May and
Norman Stone146— claimed that Romanian troops had been
employed, and that "foreign" troops had been sent to crush
parliamentary freedom in Hungary.

The story seems to go

back no farther than 1910, to a Pan-Germanic polemic
against the supranational position of the dynasty.147
The troops involved were Fabrizius's own regiment, the 1.
Honvdd Infantry, raised in Budapest.
Honvdd had simply obeyed orders.

In the end, the

Its men acted

268
unquestioningly against the pretensions of the coalition
politicians.

The coup of 19 February generated no popular

outrage on any scale.

There were demonstrations in

Budapest for the next few nights, but Kristoffy's police
contained them with a minimum of violence.

A call by

coalition leaders for a nationwide protest on 25 February
failed utterly.

Kristoffy banned all outdoor political

meetings, and the day passed without incident.148

The

Hungarian military had been loyal to the king, and
in the weeks following the dissolution of
Parliament on February 19, national resistance ground
to a halt. . . . By the first of April the government
was in control of local organs of administration
almost everywhere. What is perhaps more important .
. . the Hungarian people took the authoritarian
actions of the government calmly. . . . The spirit of
revolution . . . had burned itself out by spring.149
There was a final anticlimactic act.

In mid-March

Fejervary summoned the coalition leadership to his offices
and laid down an ultimatum: they had brought Hungary to
the edge of civil war, and, since they were likely to win
any new elections, they were now required to accept
responsibility.

They had to decide between cooperation

with the crown and accepting ministerial posts or arrest
and imprisonment for sedition.150

The coalition,

outplayed and outfought, collapsed.

Its leaders repaired

to the Hotel Bristol in Vienna to receive terms from the
crown.

The coalition leaders could administer the coming

of universal suffrage to suit themselves— Fejervary was in
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the end no real friend of the nationalities— but demands
for a separate army and for Magyar Kommandosprache had to
be abandoned, retroactive conscription had to be enacted,
enlarged recruit quotas had to be accepted, and economic
unity maintained.151
officially named.

On 8 April a coalition cabinet was

The moderate Sandor Wekerle was named

premier, Andrassy minister of interior, Apponyi minister
of education, and Ferenc Kossuth minister for commerce.
The nationalities were left to the mercies of the Magyars,
but the coalition leadership had assumed power with the
offhand contempt of the crown and the knowledge of their
own humiliation.
On 23 April, in the immediate aftermath of elections
which confirmed the coalition in power, annual maneuvers
were held in Hungary.
without incident.

Reservists reported to their units

The men standing in line on Honvdd

barracks squares never knew that they had been considered
potential traitors and rebels by the Operations-Biiro of
the general staff.

In almost thirty years of crisis on

both sides of the Leitha the army command had learned to
distrust the peoples of the Monarchy and to distrust
openly the Hungarian units.
Kaisertreu after all.
own.

Yet the Honvdd had been

The army could have relied on its

In later days, Franz Joseph told Conrad von

Hotzendorf that whatever others, including many of his own
advisors and generals, might say, his Magyar soldiers had
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been, after all, a reliable element in defense of the
Monarchy.152
Three years later to the day, Fejervary rode at the
head of the Royal Hungarian Life Guard at the Solferino
memorial and received the Knight's Cross of Maria Theresa
with Brilliants from his emperor.151

The old general was

resplendent in his uniform and awards, and he was still
straight-backed and thick-chested in his 70s, with a full
hussar's moustache.

The day was a triumph for him, a

capstone to fifty-eight years of service to the dynasty.
He had fought for his sovereign in war and served him in
peace.

His government had restored order in Hungary and

presided over an arrangement between the crown and the
Magyar oligarchy that kept the army unified and gave the
high command its enlarged troop quotas.
The habitually dour face of the emperor, however,
told the other side of the story. Like all victories in
Hungary, this one was inconclusive and at best only
tactical.

The humiliated coalition was free to avenge

itself on the nationalities and the workers, and the army
had suffered from year after year of budgetary neglect and
a dearth of Hungarian recruits.

Fejervary was there to

receive the rewards due a loyal and faithful servant, but
the fatalism of the emperor told the larger story.

The

Monarchy and its army had gone through thirty years of
crisis.

Some threats, such as anarchists in the Austrian
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lands, had been easily contained, but in Bohemia and
Hungary rebellion had come very near.

There had been

victories at the brink, but they had bought only a little
time.

The army was no longer sure of the peoples of the

Monarchy, even the Alpine Germans, and it was beginning to
doubt itself.
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CHAPTER 5
ARMY AND NATIONALITIES:

THE COUNSELS OF DESPAIR

On an August afternoon in 1900 Franz Joseph and his
entourage rode up Mariahilferstrasse from the Hofburg
toward Schloss Schonbrunn through crowds of Viennese
assembled to celebrate the emperor's birthday.

Franz

Joseph was still a magnificent horseman, and he rode with
the straight-backed classic form he had learned in the
vanished age of Metternich.

The old emperor possessed an

effortless majesty, and to the young soldiers mounting
guard at the imperial residences— the grandsons and greatgrandsons of the sentries standing watch in the year of
his accession— he had become a figure of legend.

To the

crowds assembled outside the Michaelertor on that day in
1900 he was the embodiment of the Monarchy itself, and by
1900 it required a serious act of will to imagine the
Monarchy without him.

The birthday procession of 1900

could not match the Jubilee celebrations of 1888, when the
emperor had been trailed by sixty-seven archdukes, but in
a Catholic state the afternoon's cavalcade was bound to
make a deep and disquieting impression.

Today was the

emperor's seventieth birthday, and the Biblical span was
threescore and ten.
No one in Vienna— not the crowds on the Ring or the
emperor's ministers in their offices— could doubt that the
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new century brought with it the waning days of Franz
Joseph's reign.

Each Austrian minister-president in his

turn— Ernst von Koerber, Karl von Gautsch, Max-Vladimir
von Beck, Karl von Sttlrgkh— knew that he might well be the
emperor's last chief minister, and each saw it as a point
of honor not to give Franz Joseph any political disaster
to blight his last years.

The emperor's age was known in

Budapest, too, and there it was an incentive to extract a
maximum of advantage from the ruler who had signed the
Auagleich.

Franz Joseph's reign had been characterized by

a rigid adherence to form and to the letter of
constitutional law, along with a pragmatic flexibility in
daily politics.

He had been both emperor and king,

insisting on the unity of the Monarchy and yet still
standing by Hungarian interpretations of the Auagleich.
In both Vienna and Budapest political observers predicted
that such an attitude, such a sense of equipoise and
attention to constitutional obligation, would not survive
the passing of the old emperor.1 The Viennese literati
assembled at the Cafe Central might listen to what Hugo
von Hofmannsthal called "distant planets falling” in
expectation of an age of new forms of painting and poetry,
but in the ministerial offices throughout the Innere
Stadt, fin-de-siecle had a concrete and ominous meaning.
The age of the emperor provided a focus for the
problems facing the Monarchy in the decade and a half

between the imperial birthday that opened the new century
and the outbreak of the Great War.

The protracted

constitutional struggle with the Hungarian Diet, the
growth of virulent nationalism in Hungary and Bohemia, the
annexation of Bosnia and the growing menace of Russia and
Serbia— all the crises of the pre-war years— pointed to a
reckoning facing any new regime.

The Monarchy had to be

remade; the days of Fortwiirsteln were drawing to a close.
That much was clear in both Vienna and Budapest.

It was

clear, too, that the army— the symbol of the joint
Monarchy, of the dynastic ideal— would bear the shock of
the new age, the pressures from both within and without
the Monarchy.

One chief of the general staff put it

simply enough: the Monarchy was.like no other state, and
all other questions were dissolved in the question of the
army.2
The army had its own fears for the new century.

The

emperor's soldiers had last gone to war in 1878, but as
the new century began, it seemed all too likely that the
long years of peace were drawing to an end.

The Monarchy

appeared to be surrounded by waiting predators, and the
Monarchy's military planners came to believe that war with
Russia, Serbia, and Italy— singly or in combination— was
inevitable.3 The Monarchy's military spending had not kept
pace with its rivals, and A.J.P. Taylor's judgment that
the Monarchy "found it difficult to be even in the second

rank" of European powers4 had been shared by the
Monarchy's military leadership since the mid-1880'

Table 5.1
Defense Budgets:

European Powers 1890 - 1914s

(in 10s £)
1890

1900

1910

1914

Germany

28.8

41.0

64.0

110.8

AustriaHungary

12.8

13.6

17.4

36.4

France

37.4

42.1

52.4

57.4

England

31.4

116.0

68.0

76.8

Italy

14.8

14.6

24.4

28.2

Russia

29.0

40.8

63.4

88.2

The Monarchy's defense budget rose by seventeen
percent— from 262 million crowns to 306 million— between
1895 and 1906, but much of the increase had been devoured
by hasty attempts to strengthen fortifications on the
Italian frontier and to replace the grossly obsolete guns

of the field artillery.6

The size of the army had been

fixed in 1889, and the Hungarian crisis had been sparked
by attempts to increase its size.

The gains finally won

in 1906— an increase of 22,000 men, from 103,000 to
125,000, in the joint army's annual intake— were modest
enough, and Hungarian intransigence prevented any actual
growth, any rise in the number of conscripts actually
processed, until 1912.7

Yet in the last decade of the

nineteenth century, the forces raised in European Russia
had grown from 639,000 men to 1,000,000, and the Italian
army— a particular fixation of Conrad von Hotzendorf,
Beck's successor as chief of the general staff— had grown
from 190,000 to 266,000 men.8
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Table 5.2
Defense Budgets and Population
1906

Defense
as % budget

Recruit
% pop.

Peacetime Army
as % pop.

Austria*
Hungary

14.6

0.29

0.80

Germany

50

0.47

1.0

Russia

20

0.35

0.95

Italy

25

0.37

0.85

France

28

0.75

1.4

England

29

0.18

0.65

Serbia

23

0.65

1.05

Table 5.3
Wartime Field Formations 19069
Batallions

Squadrons

Batteries

AustriaHungary

676

352

254

Germany

628

490

583

Russia

985

539

622

Italy

346

144

210

France

711

445

569

England

162

111

122

61

17

57

Serbia

The enemies of the Monarchy were able to outspend it, to
recruit and to train more of their young men, and to

maintain a greater percentage of the population as
soldiers.

The slide into second-rank status had been

obvious to Albrecht and Beck by the end of the 1880s, and
in the new century it would seem to much of the Monarchy's
military leadership to lead downward into the abyss.
The Monarchy's military leadership, distracted by
events in Budapest, had been taken unaware by the 1903
military coup that had transformed a docile Obrenovid
Serbia into the aggressive and militarized Karadjordjevid
Serbia of the Balkan Wars.10 As late as the Second Balkan
War, k.-u.-k. military intelligence believed that the
Serbs were still lacking in discipline and were not yet
fully trained with their new Russian and French weapons,
but there was no doubt that the 450,000 men Serbia could
field were both physically hard and highly motivated.11
By August 1914 the Serbian field armies were fully the
equal of the southeastern k.-u.-k. forces in both numbers
and equipment, and far superior in combat experience and leadership.
To the 450,000 Serbs the Monarchy would face had to
be added the Italian army.

Whatever its adventures (or

misadventures) in Libya and Abyssinia, whatever facile
assurances the diplomats at the Ballhausplatz might
extract from their opposite numbers in Rome, the planners
of the lc.-u.-k. general staff held fast to the belief that
Italy would take the opportunity of an Austro-Serbian or
Austro-Russian war to fall upon Dalmatia and the
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Siidtirol.13 And behind Italy and Serbia was the spectre
of Russian might, of limitless reserves of manpower— the
nightmare of Cossack hordes swarming across Galicia into
Moravia or pouring out of the Carpathian passes onto the
Hungarian plain.

When plans for a multifront war—

Kriegsfall R + I + B(S)— were drawn up in 1907/08, the
underlying assumption had to be, as the Archduke Albrecht
had noted in despair twenty years before, that the
Monarchy had to rely on German support, that it could no
longer fight a major war on its own.14
The alternative to a hopeless war against
overwhelming odds seemed to be increasing reliance on, and
subordination to, German strength.

The military security

of the Monarchy could not be tied to German promises, but
the concrete steps the k.-u.-k. high command could take
were limited.

No additional conscripts arrived at recruit

depots until 1912, and the demands of pursuing a policy of
maritime dominance in the Adriatic put additional strains
on an already limited manpower pool.

The k.-u.-k. fleet,

headed by the aggressive and highly competent admirals
Anton Haus and Rudolf Montecuccoli, grew into a compact
but technically excellent fighting force.

Nonetheless,

the growth of the fleet meant a diversion of funds from
rifles and field artillery to dreadnoughts, from the
instruments of survival to the instruments of prestige.
By 1912 the fleet had more warships than it could find
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crews for, and the army was called upon to provide an
additional 3000 men a year for the fleet.15

The army cut

back individual battalion strength to create new
formations— a purely phantom force increase— and stripped
men from service units, replacing soldiers with civilian
contract workers wherever possible, and incurring the
wrath of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand by pulling musicians
from military bands and returning them to line duty.16
Yet there were only so many flautists to be made into
riflemen.

Any concerted attempt to improve the condition

of the army ran headlong into Magyar obstructionism and,
behind that, the question of nationalism throughout the
Monarchy.
The number of new conscripts entering the army from
the Hungarian lands showed no growth until 1912 despite
the promises made in 1906.

The "Hungarian crisis” had

been resolved, but the problem of Hungary remained.

Franz

Joseph had refused to sanction a violent solution to the
Hungarian crisis of 1905, but the possibility of violence,
of a new deadlock at the next Ausgleich negotiations, of a
nationalist outbreak in Hungary remained.

Fall U.

remained on file at the war ministry. The military
leadership could not believe it would never be needed, and
the plans were updated at least once.

In the spring of

1907, FML Conrad von Hotzendorf, successor to the aged
Beck as chief of the general staff, had the plan reviewed
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and ordered changes drawn up in the order of battle,
shifting larger cavalry contingents to the northern
front.17

There would be other crises, other deadlocks.

The generals knew that Hungarian intransigence had not
ended and that the demands of the Magyar oligarchy would
continue to call for a separate Hungarian army and perhaps
for Hungarian secession.

Fall V. remained in the vaults

of the war ministry, a temptation to believe that the army
must one day save the unity of the Monarchy and a reminder
that, however loyal and professional the performance of
Honvdd units in dispersing the Hungarian Diet had been,
there were still lists of "questionable" and "unreliable"
units that had to be borne in mind.
Fall U. remained as the sole fully-elaborated plan
for a military solution to the Monarchy's internal
problems.

Yet, if the Hungarian crisis had dominated

political life in the Monarchy in the first years of the
century, Hungary was not the only locus of nationalist
discontent, nor was the "Hungarian problem" the most
intractable of the Monarchy's problems— or even the only
one with a potential for violence.

The command at VIII.

Korps in Prague had been sufficiently disturbed by
nationalist sentiments in Bohemia— and inside some of its
own regiments— to begin discussing plans for dealing with
a nationalist revolt.18

In 1908 the garrison command at

Trieste warned III. Korps HQ in Graz that it feared that
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the Italians of the Kiistenland would take advantage of any
war with Serbia to revolt against the Monarchy and
requested that plans for occupying the Littoral with loyal
troops be drawn up.19 Neither plan found its Auffenberg,
and no sealed folders for a "Fall Bohmen” or "Fall
Kiistenland” found their way into the war ministry
archives.

But the war ministry could not ignore the

potential for violent upheavals in those regions, nor
could it ignore the fact that, using the criteria
Auffenberg had applied to Magyar regiments, eleven
Bohemian regiments could be defined as potentially
unreliable (70+% Czech) and ten more could be defined as
"questionable" (20-70% Czech).20
The list of potential catastrophes— a multi-front
war, the festering German-Czech quarrel in Bohemia, fear
of Hungarian secession, and the hovering question of what
would happen when Franz Joseph died— continued to grow.
Yet the amount of actual disloyalty simmering within the
Monarchy should not be overdrawn.

Joachim Remak once

pointed out that, while "happy cooperation" might not have
been the mood of many of the nationalities, there were few
who did not feel at least "passive acceptance."21

It was

after all a Budapest Honved unit that dispersed the
Hungarian Diet in 1906.

In July and August 1914 the

nationalities— even the Czechs— responded loyally to the
declarations of war against Serbia and Russia.

There
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existed in the Monarchy in the last years before the Great
War far deeper reserves of popular loyalty than many
postwar historians, knowing the events of October/November
1918 (and, in some cases, seeking to construct nationalist
hagiographies) were willing to see.

The political aims of

the nationalities— Czech, Croat, Magyar, Serb— in the last
decade before the war were still based on demands for
national privilege and not the destruction of the state
that could ensure those privileges.

Only the Italian

unrest in the Littoral and the SUdtirol was insoluble as
an internal problem— only the Italians sought an outright
departure from the Monarchy.23
The amount of actual disloyalty within the Monarchy
was not a question that seemed to interest the k.-u.-k.
military leadership.

By 1914 much of the imperial-and-

royal high command saw itself as beset by impending doom.
Conrad expected that war with Russia would be "a hopeless
struggle," one which, though fatal, could not be avoided
if the Monarchy was to be true to its sense of honour.22
Their predecessors had been blithely complacent before
1848 and 1866; the officers of Conrad's generation wrote
and spoke in an atmosphere of near-hysteria.

In some

measure this was only a pessimism born of professionalism.
They had been taught to judge the capabilities of an enemy
rather than his intentions, and the k.-u.-k. generals were
well aware of the Monarchy's weaknesses in the face of a
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seemingly inevitable war on multiple fronts, and they were
no less aware of the truism (so recently borne out in
Russia) that external defeat breeds internal discontent.
On a deeper level, their unease ("needless panic" in
Norman Stone's phrase34) was a response driven by
frustration, by the inability of an increasingly isolated
military class to obtain the reforms— financial and
structural— that might give the Monarchy the strength to
survive in a world of predatory neighbors and national
discontents.
Corelli Barnett put forth the formula that "military
disaster is...national decline exposed by violence."25
Conrad or Auffenberg would have agreed absolutely.

And

the military leadership, so painfully aware of the costs
of years of struggle over the military provisions of the
Ausgleich, saw in the weaknesses of the k.-u.-k. army the
decay of the Monarchy itself.

The officers of the

Monarchy had always been certain that theirs was an
honorable and honored calling.

Even in the years of

defeat, of Solferino and KoniggrStz, it had been no mean
thing to wear the emperor's coat and serve the dynasty.
Yet in the new century the officer corps, trained to an
ethic of service and dynastic loyalty, saw itself as
increasingly isolated and unheeded, its ideals held to be
irrelevant if not faintly laughable.

Its claim to be the

key unifying element in the Monarchy was highlighted by
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nationalist and socialist attacks on the army, but there
was little solace to be had in a pose of beleaguered
nobility.

An old world was ending, a new reign was

looming, and the ability of the army to defend the
Monarchy it claimed to hold together was withering away.
That professional soldiers should feel alienated from
their nation's political leadership is perhaps not
surprising; in the latter half of the twentieth century
such alienation has become a given in Western journalism.
The k.-u.-k. military leadership was not alone in its
feelings of isolation.
politically

The French army had been swept by

directed purges in the last two decades of

the century; each change in parliamentary complexion had
swept a new class of officers into forced retirement or
professional oblivion.

The Russian army had undergone

disaster in Manchuria and revolution at home in 1904-07;
throughout the first months of 1906 mutinous units had
exchanged artillery and gunfire with loyal troops in a
series of bitter firefights.

By 1912 the tsarist police

were convinced that the Russian army was riddled with
networks of officers whose zeal for military
professionalism and modernization was only a mask for
radicalism and— with an eye on the officers' coups in
Lisbon and Constantinople— seditious views on the role of
the army in leading the state into modernity.26

The

tsarist police had already aroused the wrath of the army
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by openly questioning the loyalty of Polish officers (and
Russian officers with Polish wives) serving in the tsar's
forces.27

Nor was the k.-u.-k. leadership alone in its

pessimism.

The staff planners of the British army spent

the last years before the Great War preparing for an
inevitable and savage civil war in Ireland.

The last week

of July 1914 saw an ironic coup de theatre at Whitehall:
the British leadership, poring over maps of Ireland,
convinced that the fate of Britain hinged on a handful of
parishes in county Fermanagh and county Tyrone, was
suddenly confronted with an ultimatum in Belgrade and
panicky calls for maps of Flanders and France.28
Yet the Austrian case remained unique.

Conrad's

insistence that in the Monarchy all other questions were
dissolved in the question of the army had a subtle edge to
it.

The joint army, the imperial-and-royal as opposed to

the Royal Hungarian units, was based on a denial of
national feeling.

The k.-u.-k. army was required not

simply to repress nationalism but to resolve it, to create
a loyalty not based on race or language.

The civil

administration had no such sense of mission, and the
military grew increasingly disenchanted with the
bureaucracy.

In Bohemia the civil service had become a

prize to be captured and wielded for national aims by
Germans or Czechs.

In Hungary the administration was

openly a tool of Magyarisation.

In Galicia the army was
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treated by the administration as vaguely irrelevant.
Auffenberg claimed that the governors from Goluchowski on
had seen themselves as "more imperial satrap than
governor— more an assistant king than a high official" and
simply excluded anyone not of the Polish nobility from
influence.29 An officer of k.-u.-k. military intelligence
complained that in Lemberg
the Commanding General tried to eliminate the
latent tension between civil and military authority.
He found no support from the Governor... who as
direct representative of the Monarch believed himself
superior to everyone, and this conceit carried over
to his exclusively Polish staff... [The] off-duty
activities of officers were confined solely to
military circles, especially since the Polish
nobility would not on principle speak German and
visibly exerted themselves to have no contact with
the Officer Corps. One had the feeling of being not
in Austria, but in some enemy land.30
The generals could find no allies in the chanceries.
Conrad pointed out that, while the army was starved for
manpower, the civil service held 150,000 more men— a dozen
divisions' worth— than served in the peacetime army.31
The upper ranks of the k.-u.-k. army saw themselves
as very nearly alone— alone in understanding the threat of
a multi-front war with Russia, Serbia, and Italy and alone
in offering unconditional loyalty to the dynasty.

"We

cannot count," Conrad wrote, "on our populace expressing a
unified patriotic desire to improve the conditions of our
armed forces."32 What applied to the "public" applied no
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less to the civil administration.

The civil service,

wrote General Alfred Krauss,
stood in utter opposition to the army. Austria
was a Beamtenataat. Every fifth or sixth man was a
civil servant. Half the revenues of Austria went for
the support of the civil service. The bureaucrats
saw in the army the most dangerous opponent of their
dominance...Although the army cost not a third of the
army of bureaucrats, all the bureaucracy clamoured
about the unbearable costs of the army. 3
Worse yet, Krauss insisted that the access of seasoned
soldiers to the emperor and his ministers was thwarted by
the host of young, often aristocratic, bureaucrats that
filled the Hofburg and, jealous of their own dominance and
ignorant of the condition and role of the army, kept the
emperor's soldiers at arm's length.34

Krauss wrote with a

great dose of professional envy and postwar bitterness,
and his descriptions must be treated with caution.

Yet he

expressed the attitudes of many officers in the last years
of peace.

Fearful of the nationalities, utterly cynical

about the "public," disenchanted with their civilian
counterparts, the military leadership of the Monarchy grew
increasingly pessimistic about the future of the Monarchy
itself.
For five days in October .1905 it had been possible
that the Hungarian crisis would be resolved by force.

The

corps commanders of the Monarchy had been in possession of
sealed warning orders for Fall U.— for military
intervention in Hungary.

Officers of the k.-u.-k. general
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staff had been on hand at the docks in Vienna and
Fressburg to note how much shipping could be requisitioned
to move troops downriver to Budapest.

Civil war, the

staff planners at the Reichakriegaminiaterium knew, was
only a telegram away.
had passed.

By 12 October, though, the moment

Special couriers retrieved the sealed orders,

and the plans for Fall U . were locked away in the staff
archives.

The moment for civil war had passed in secret,

but its first anniversary produced an unsettling literary
echo— a vision of what might have been, and what many k.u.-k. officers feared might still come to pass.
In late October 1906 copies of a small, anonymous
novel called Unaer Letzter Kampf were presented to the
Kriegaarchiv-Bibliothek in Vienna.

The book was subtitled

"The Testament of an Old Imperial Soldier" and, while its
title page announced that it had been printed in Vienna
and Leipzig in 1907, the Kriegaarchiv staff noted on the
introductory page of copy #3 that it had been checked into
the library holdings on 25 October 1906.35

The anonymous

author, the "old imperial soldier" of the title, was no
stranger to either the Kriegaarchiv-Bibliothek or the
halls of the Reichakriegaminiaterium.

He was in fact a

general staff officer named Hugo Kerchnawe, a future k.u.-k. general and, after the war, the author of numerous
German-nationalist and stridently right-wing histories of
Europe since 1789.36

The book itself was a Zukunftroman, a genre falling
somewhere between the political tract and what a later age
would call "speculative fiction."

Despite the promise

inherent in its title— a military history of the
Monarchy's next and final war— Unser Letzter Kampf is
neither schoarly analysis nor a fleshed-out wargame
scenario.

It has nothing in common with the theoretical

exploration of future conflicts found in works such as
Bernhardi's Germany and the Next War
or the work of Feldmarschalleutnant Adolf von Sacken of
the Vienna Kriegaarchiv,37 and it should not be taken as a
forerunner of the "techno-thriller" genre pioneered by Sir
John Hackett and Tom Clancy in the 1970s and 1980s.

Unaer

Letzter Kampf has more in common with the spate of callto-arms novels that appeared in the United States in the
years before 1917, warning of the evil intentions of
Europeans (usually Germans, but occasionally British) and
urging an aroused populace to arm for war.

Yet

Kerchnawe's work is less a clarion call than a nightmare.
Its English-language equivalent might be Thomas Dixon's
The Fall of a Nation (1916), in which the Pope incites
Imperial Germany to invade an America weakened by Jews,
immigrants, and suffragettes.38 The mood here is not one
of military plausibility; it is one of manic despair,
where disaster is absolute and ineluctable.

The book was, Gunther Rothenberg claims, "widely
read" in military circles39, and, given its author— a
general staff officer with aspirations to historical
scholarship— its readers would have found it disquietingly
plausible.

Kerchnawe would certainly have been familiar

with the overall state of the k.-u.-k. army, with the
desperate improvisations by which the army sought to
maintain itself during the long Hungarian crisis, and with
the political furor of 1905/06.

He may even have been

aware of the existence of Fall I/..

That secret, as the

Auffenberg scandal of 1912 will show, was never airtight.
In any case, Kerchnawe's military audience, well aware of
how the army had suffered since 1900, of how dangerous a
year 1905 had been, and of how bleak the future seemed,
would have come to the story all-too-ready to believe.
The novel opens in a windswept Viennese February on a
scene any k.-u.-k. officer would have found familiar in
1906.

The imperial capital is paralyzed by strikes and

mobs demanding universal suffrage and socialism; the
Monarchy itself is paralyzed by Magyar obstructionism and
separatist demands.

The government vacillates; the

ministers cannot bring themselves to order the streets
cleared with deadly force.

There could be no doubt in a

military reader's mind that Kerchnawe was drawing on
memories of 1905, of the huge Vienna demonstrations
attendant upon the revolution in St. Petersburg.
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The novel'8 heroes are gathered in the Arsenal, where
the Vienna city garrison has been withdrawn in the face of
the mobs.
Monarchy,

As they lament the state of affairs inside the
a young captain of artillery sums up the

condition of the k.-u.-k. army:
Ancient cannon, no men, no horses, no recruits
for half the army, no maneuvers, badly-trained
reservists, everything you see just patched together,
no ships— nothing. If the Prince of Monaco declared
war on us we'd have to pack it in. Tough luckfor
him,
that his princedom doesn't border on us.40
And behind the weakness of the army Kerchnawe placed not
just the "hypertrophied" bureaucracy and the "decayed men
of 'culture'"41 who filled the Reichsrat, but specific
political figures as well— "[Viktor] Adler, [Heinrich]
Ellenbogen, [Engelbert] Pernerstorfer and company" of the
Social Democrats, the traitorous "[Count Albert] Apponyi
and consorts" in Budapest.

Kerchnawe expected nothing but

sedition in the Hungarian Diet, where only the most
blindly naive could fail to see that government and
opposition were both part of the same Magyar oligarchy and
sought the same ultimate ends.42

In Vienna he found sure

signs of degeneracy inside the Greek temples on the
Burgring: "Speeches, speeches, speeches, and rabblerousing, but never deeds.”43
The late winter of Kerchnawe's mythical 1908 sees
disaster piled upon disaster.

While riots rage in Vienna

and the major provincial cities of the Monarchy, a secret

coalition of Italy, Serbia, and Montenegro launches a
sudden attack across the Monarchy's southern borders.

The

k.-u.-k. army, weakened by years of neglect and by the
long Hungarian crisis, its ranks already stretched thin to
contain internal disorder, is hard-pressed to deal with
the invaders, and Serbs and Montenegrins stream into
Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Count Apponyi, speaking at a plenary

session of the Hungarian Diet, announces that the Magyar
leadership will not vote for the mobilization of Hungarian
units.

Troops are sent in to clear the Diet, but unlike

the straightforward mission carried out by Colonel
Fabrizius and the Honvdd military police in the real
world, the attempt miscarries.

The doors of the great

parliament building are closed and barricaded, and the
Diet is defended by an armed mob.

The troops— unsure of

themselves, without orders to open fire— are driven off by
the crowd.

Hungarian reservists, corrupted by nationalist

emissaries, begin to melt away from their depots.

The

Kingdom of Hungary begins a headlong descent into
revolution and chaos.
Kerchnawe's account of events in Budapest is in sharp
and strident counterpoint to the real events of February
1906.

In reality, the Diet had been cleared by a

detachment of local troops who had obeyed orders without
question.

Protestors had filled the boulevards of

Budapest for the next few nights, but there had been no
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attempt to defend the Diet or defy the military.

A show

of force had not defused nationalist sentiment, but it had
trumped the Magyar oligarchy.

Mo one had been willing to

raise the stakes once force had been admitted as an overt
factor.

Still, for any k.-u.-k. officer who followed the

events in Budapest, for anyone aware of the e x i s t e n c e even if not the substance— of a Fall U., there would have
been a terrible kind of plausibility in Kerchnawe's
depiction.

Fabrizius's brief Sanierung of February 1906

might all-too-easily have turned into insurrection.
Unaer Letzer Kampf moves forward at a nightmarish
pace.

The k.-u.-k. fleet is annihilated by the Italians

in a savage battle off Pola.

The Russians descend upon

Galicia and, fittingly enough, Hungary.

The perfidious

German Reich offers no aid to its sometime ally and
instead moves its own forces into Bohemia and the Alpine
provinces to "protect" the German population and complete
the work of 1866.

The story ends in midsummer, with the

last k.-u.-k. forces drawn up on the plains of Lower
Austria, facing a final battle against overwhelming
Italian forces.
The book is a strident and hysterical little tract,
and it outruns the avowed intentions of its author.
Kerchnawe took as the text for his sermon a saying of
Prince Eugene'st "An army of 300,000 men is worth more
than any treaty of alliance."44

The novel was intended to
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be a call for rearmament, but Kerchnawe seemed unable to
decide whether the destruction of the Monarchy was due to
the superior firepower and numbers of the Italians, Serbs,
and Russians or to disaffection and treason within.

The

Monarchy's final defeat in the field was made possible by
its internal enemies— by Social Democrats and Magyar
oligarchs; by the mobs in Vienna, Prague, Zagreb, and
Lemberg who choose chaos over loyalty; by the weakness and
indecision of the Monarchy's political leadership, who
will not face the need for strong measures.

In the face

* of all this, Kerchnawe's (or, on another level, Conrad's)
call for a strong army has a hollow ring.

The extent of

disaffection portrayed in the novel renders its author's
call for rearmament irrelevant.

Empires are won by

armies; they are maintained by faith.

An army can take

and hold territory, it can control lines of communication,
it can confront an enemy army in the field.
provide a basis of belief for a society.
obey, but it cannot make them believe.

It cannot

It can make men
That fact

underlies the whole of Unaer Letzter Kampf and gives it
its air of hysteria and despair.

In the aftermath of

1905/06, that fear would have intruded upon any military
reader.

A weapon, whether an army in the hands of a state

or a rifle in the hands of a soldier, is worse than
useless if there is no belief in its use.
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The fears expressed in Unser Letzter Kampf did not
fade away after 1907, and other Zukunftromanen emerged
from within the k.-u.-k. world to capitalize on them.

In

1909 Kerchnawe published a second, and more widely
distributed, anonymous work, Die Vorgeschichte von 1866
und 19-?*5 This second work showed off Kerchnawe's
academic bent in a first half devoted to a history of the
catastrophe of 1866, an historical exposition that
attacked Prussian perfidy and Hungarian disloyalty with
equal venom.

The second half reworked the ground of his

earlier book: no loyalty could be expected from the
Magyars or Czechs, the Monarchy was surrounded by jackals
waiting to spring, and only within the shrinking circle of
the k.-u.-k. ranks could loyalty be found.

Kerchnawe

stressed that the Magyar oligarchy's obstructionism had
prevented Albrecht from fighting on against the Prussians
in 1866; he was equally certain that Germany would abandon
the Monarchy to its enemies in any future war.

Kerchnawe

could find hope only in the vision of a stronglycentralized and re-armed Monarchy with German as the
language of state— since presumably only by re-Germanizing
the state apparatus could cultural fragmentation be halted
and the loyalty of the Monarchy's German subjects be
protected from pan-German sentiment.
Lass strident, but perhaps more distressing, was a
small novel called Quo vadis Austria?, published in Berlin

late in 1913.48

The novel lacks the fevered violence of

Kerchnawe's books, and its depiction of the ruin of the
Monarchy is distinctly low-key, a matter more of belief
than of Russian or Italian bayonets.

The disturbing

feature of the novel was its subtitle: "A Novel of
Resignation."

Resignieren carries the same possibility

for wordplay in both English and German, and the book was
at once a yielding to History and Fate and an act of
renunciation by the "Austrian Officer" who had anonymously
published it.
54.(01miitz)

Its author was Gustav Sieber, late of the
k.-u.-k. Infantry.

Sieber had been born in

Moravia in 1885, the son of a k.-k. major, and
commissioned into k.-u.-k. service in 1908.

He served

with line infantry companies in Bosnia at Plevlje and
Sarajevo before being posted back to the regimental depot
at Olmiitz.

His resignation from active service in

December 1913 had not been caused by the publication of
Quo vadia Austria?; the novel had given concrete form to
his decision to leave k.-u.-k. service.47
Quo vadia Austria? raises quite pointedly the issue
of faith: who still believes in Austria?

Sieber was not

concerned with battlefleets clashing in the Adriatic or
fortresses in the Alps or even sedition in Budapest or
Prague.

His concern was with how many people in and out

of k.-u.-k. service still found the Monarchy worth
devoting their lives to.

His answer was simple enough:

307
too few.

If general war loomed, there would be Germans or

Magyars or Czechs, but too few Auatrians.

Sieber had no

animus against the dynasty and no belief in the need for
any sort of Pan-German solution to the Monarchy's future.
His concern was that the Monarchy could offer its soldiers
a sense of professionalism and duty, but nothing else.
There was, Sieber insisted, no underpinning of faith left,
no overriding belief that the Monarchy was not merely
convenient, but necessary.

How many men would offer up

their lives or their devotion for something that was
simply faute de mieux?

That question— that sense of

aimlessness— carried beyond Sieber's novel to even the
most Monarchietreu of Vienna's intellectuals, to those not
given to assuming despair as a fashionable pose.

In 1912

Hoffmansthal wrote a friend:
And the domestic scene? Half indolence, half
heedlessness. The problems too intricate, too
Gordian-entwined. Decency, courage here and there—
as in Conrad's case— but these men, too, without any
real faith.48
The generals in the ministerial complex on the
Dominikanerbastei and in the high command offices at
Wiener Neustadt were no less attuned than the literati at
the Cafe Central to the sound of "distant planets
falling."

The fears articulated by Kerchnawe and Sieber—

the decay of the Monarchy's military standing, separatist
movements in Budapest and Prague, the unwillingness of the
Reichsrat to take remedial action and the failure of
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society to demand action— were echoed from the
Reichskriegsministeriim to the corps headquarters in
Budapest and Prague and Lemberg and on to the garrison
commands in Trieste and Sarajevo.

Yet Conrad and his

colleagues on the general staff were also aware that the
army was in danger of losing both the political standing
and physical means to act even if the moment for action
arrived.49
It was still possible for the army to present itself
as the beloved servant of the dynasty and for its officers
to tell one another that they belonged to an honoured and
honourable estate.

If one looked at the works of the

army's favoured painters, such as Ludwig Koch, one could
see the army's official and desparately-held view of
itself.

Koch's "Gala-Dinner der Angehdrigen der Arcieren

Leibgarde in Schonbrunn" (1913)*°, with its glittering
array of officers dining with their sovereign, might have
come from the days of GrUnne and Hess, the days when
liberal critics and conservative officials alike had
declared that the Monarchy was being run by the army.

Yet

all the vast watercolour portrayals of court balls (Balls
bei Hof) could not hide the fact that since the death of
the Archduke Albrecht no military figure been able to make
policy.

The reality of military life was less the Balls

bei Hof than Franz von Myrbach's "Auf Vergessenem
Posten"51— the forlorn officer riding across a desolate
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Ruthenian landscape on his way to a forgotten little
fortress.
The Jt.-u.-Jt. army over which Conrad assumed
operational command in 1906 found itself increasingly
isolated within society.

In part this was the army's own

doing: a narrowly professonal education and a belief in
the officer's direct loyalty to the dynasty left little
room for interest in those social or historical questions
derided at the military schools as reflektierende—
"thought-provoking."52

But it was also an isolation that

the outside world inflicted on the Monarchy's affairs.

In

areas where 'national' feeling ran high, officers found
the homes and company of the local elites increasingly
closed to them.

Outside Budapest itself, Hungarian

traditions of hospitality often overcame separatist
distaste for the joint army, but in Prague both Czech and
German nationalists openly despised the army, leaving its
officers only the company of the local Jews, who were
equally disdained by the two factions.

Galicia, where the

bulk of the cavalry and an increasing percentage of the
infantry were stationed, was seen by the officers posted
there as a kind of minor hell: alongside the legendary
physical discomforts, the Polish nobility behaved as if
the garrison officers were simply not there.53

It was a

rare thing in a Galician town for a HabBburg officer to be
asked to a Polish gentleman's home, even, some officers
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said, if the officer were a general and the Pole the
province's viceroy.*4 Vienna of course never lacked in
social calls, but the Haupt-und-Reaidenz-Stadt itself had
its dangers.

In the German cities of the Monarchy

including Vienna, Graz, and Innsbruck, the student
duelling societies had so made a sport of insulting
officers in cafes or on the street that the army found it
necessary to set up special courses in the sabre in order
to give its officers any chance at all of remaining, if
not unscarred, then at least free of public humiliation.
The problem was only solved by a decree from the war
ministry authorising challenged officers to use the pistol
rather than the sabre.55
The officer's uniform guaranteed him special seating
at a purely nominal cost to the Hofoper or the Burgtheater
and gave him the right to attend the annual Hofball.
did not, however, guarantee his economic security.

It
The

officers of the dynasty had long been given only minimal
salaries.

In the 1850s a junior officer was paid no more

and often less than a senior journeyman in a craft guild.
Sixty years later in an age when he would be far less
likely to have a private income, an officer in k.-u.-k.
service would still be paid on average two-thirds of what
his French or German counterpart would make.

A more

bitter comparison would be with the members of the
Monarchy's civil service, where the same ratios applied.56
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Chronic underpayment might have been acceptable if one
fully subscribed to the vision of the officer corps as a
special caste of vassals bound directly to their prince,
but by the last decade before the War, such a vision was
eroded by the growing economic differences between
officers and civil servants.

Not the least of Conrad's

achievements in the eyes of his contemporaries was the
supplementary pay for k.-u.-k. officers that he extracted
from the Reichsrat at the height of the Bosnian crisis of
1908.
Yet it was still true that civil servants enjoyed
higher pensions than officers, higher per diem allowances,
more extensive subsidies for moving between assigned
posts, and higher tuition subsidies for their children.

A

district judge could afford to send his sons to a "good"
Gymnasium, but an infantry captain— his equivalent in
rank— could not.

An officer's son had first claim on

admission to military schools, where tuition costs would
be borne by the state.

The military academy at Wiener-

Neustadt noted in its annual report for 1912/13 that 67.1%
of its students (294 of 438 total) had come up from
military preparatory or cadet schools.

The Theresianum

itself was largely tuition-free; over ninety percent of
its students paid nothing at all, and many of its future
officers were there for exactly that reason, just as their
fathers had placed them in state-subsidized military
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schools as boys.57

Behind Alfred Krauss's disdain for the

bureaucrats who allegedly monopolised influence at court55
was a hostility based on very real economic pressures that
drove the officer corps in upon itself.
Cartoons in the military press had long played on the
theme of the enclosed military family— types satirized in
such pieces as Franz Schdnpflug's "An Army Family
Idyll"59* the choleric colonel, the massive and pokerfaced Frau Oberst, the dandified older son in his uhlan's
helmet, the rowdy younger son in cadet's uniform, all
pbering through monocles around the breakfast table.

It

was still possible for k.-u.-k. officers to laugh at
themselves, but such cartoons made a point: the number of
"outside" applicants to the regular officer corps was
declining; reasons both economic and ideological had begun
to keep the middle and upper classes of the Monarchy from
aspiring to wear the emperor's coat.
Gunther Rothenberg noted that after 1905 in the
officer corps of the Monarchy, "a strong hereditary
element of sons following in their fathers' footsteps
became evident."60

Rothenberg saw this as a positive

factor, but this attitude, based on the images of Prussian
or British "regimental families," neglects the other side
of the coin: a growing separation between a world of
professional officers and the larger world of the Monarchy
as a whole.

The military itself was not unaware that it

was losing its appeal for officers from the upper
classes61 and that its own social and political horzons
were narrowing.

One internal study of 757 junior officers

showed that seventy-one percent came from the families of
officers (fifteen percent), NCOs or provosts (ten
percent), higher civil or military officials (twelve
percent) or the lower ranks of state service (thirty-four
percent).62
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Table 5.4
Junior Officers (1908)*

Percent

Fathers' Professions

Profession

113

15

Officer

89

12

Higher civil or military
official

25

3

Free professions (academics,
phys icians, advocates)

11

1

Landowners

20

3

Higher trades (apothecaries, book
dealers, wholesalers,
businessmen)

263

34

Lower civil or military

official

37

5

32

4

79

11

Lower trades (salesman, clerk,
craftsman)

71

10

Underofficer or provost

17

2

757

100

Private income (rentier)
“

Farmer (small holder or

"Non-independent"

tenant)

professionals

Istvan Deak pointed out that the Theresianum's class
of 1913, with 99 of 133 graduates drawn from military or
state service families (74.4%) was "clearly...less
representative of the officer corps and of state service"
than the class of 1874, when ninety percent of the
graduates had come from families who wore the dynasty's
colours.63

Yet the one-quarter of the class not from state-

or military-service families was almost wholly drawn from
the lower middle classes, from families which had "lost" a
son in offering him the chance of social advancement.
Indeed, by 1913 the representatives of the nobility at the
Monarchy's premier military academy— one Baron, two
Ritters, and twenty-nine lesser nobles— were almost
completely drawn from the service nobility, from families
newly ennobled by personal distinction in the service of
the monarch.
By the end of the first decade of the new century, a
pattern was evident:

the officer corps replenished itself

from its own sons and the sons of k.-u,-k. officials plus
a growing number of young men from the lower middle
classes who had separated themselves from their families
and class background in taking the emperor's commission.
The army's efforts to extend itself into the Monarchy's
educated classes by offering reserve commissions after a
single year of service to conscripts who had completed
their secondary education were largely unsuccessful.

The
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reserve officers were suspected by their career
counterparts of harbouring nationalist sentiments, and far
too few "one-year” men availed themselves of the
opportunity to turn the privileged status of their
conscript days into an officer's career.

Of 16,000 career

infantry and J&ger lieutenants commissioned into k.-u.-k.
service between 1883 and mid-1914, only 2300 (14.4%) came
from the ranks of the reserve.64
As the officers' world narrowed, the military
authorities tried to come to grips with the idea of an
officer corps cut off from the nobility and the educated
middle classes.

The officer corps had long envisioned

itself as the "mute instrument" of the dynasty, but there
now occured a shift of emphasis in the meaning of the
phrase, from implying a non-national, non-political
professionalism to implying a beleaguered, anti-political
caste sealed off from society.65 The ubiquitous
Auffenberg was once more at hand to explain the problems
facing the officer corps.

Early in May 1908 he submitted

to the war ministry, and to his patron, Archduke Franz
Ferdinand, a memorandum "On the Composition of the Officer
Corps” wherein he lamented that the k.-u.-k. professional
officer of the future would be drawn (at best) from the
lower middle classes and that historical experience in
"all eras and all lands" showed that
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extraordinary losses in battle were, throughout
history, accepted only by those military units led by
a homogeneous and socially well-established officer
corps with an especially well-developed sense of
honour...One must therefore realise that....our
officer corps and, quite probably the army as a whole
cannot be expected to offer a better-than-average
performance...66
The social background of the officers would make them
unlikely to produce any automatic deference or admiration
on the part of society as a whole.

The solution,

Auffenberg believed, was to "educate, educate, educate"—
though what he had in mind was not at all an education in
the liberal spirit which the reserve officers were
supposed by the Liberal politicians of the 1870s to
provide to the army, but a kind of indoctrination in
deracination.
Education, Auffenberg proclaimed, gave its recipients
both self-confidence and a sense of self-worth.

More to

the point, education would raise a young officer candidate
out of the social milieu of his birth.

The "bonds of

heart and family" which might become a hindrance to an
officer confronted with upheavals in the larger world of
the Monarchy would doubtless weaken.

Auffenberg was

willing to concede that, in separating k.-u.-k. officers
from the worlds into which they had been born, there was
the risk of the officer corps becoming an exclusive caste.
Yet while such exclusivity was "no advantage in the
cultural and intellectual development of an officer, it
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is, in a strictly military sense, no disadvantage
either... ”67
Auffenberg's second point is of course arguable.

One

analyst has claimed that the greatest source of
instability in the k.-u.-k. army was a lack of "basic
trust" between private soldiers and officers, a lack based
on a mutual incomprehension that was far more a product of
the officers' isolated social caste than of language or
rank.68

Exclusivity severed the army leadership from a

sense of the political and social life of the Monarchy.
There was no k.-u.-k. equivalent of the Victorian officer
who could expect as a matter of course to be a local
magistrate or member of Parliament once he had left active
service.

Imperial-and-royal officers, both in

Auffenberg's prescription and in fact, formed a caste
whose education was narrowly technical, who were trained
to believe absolutely in the Monarchy and the dynasty, and
who were shielded from any discussion of the political and
social factors shaping the military and its future.69

The

"mute instrument" of the dynasty was also deaf, and
Auffenberg's vision of itB leaders' education was intended
to keep it so.
In the long-ago world of Franz Joseph's youth, in the
days before Solferino, the young emperor's adjutant had
declared that "the Army does not discuss.
not reason.”

Yet of course it did both.

The Army does
The k.-u.-k.
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army was expected to be a world unto itself, to be the
silent instrument of the dynasty's will.

Nonetheless,

however mute the army was expected to be in the face of
the outside world, however deaf to external voices its
officers were trained to be, it possessed its own inner,
institutionalised voice.

At the end of each year, the

chief of the general staff was expected to produce a
Militar-Politiache Denkschrift, an overview of the state
of both the army and the Monarchy as a whole for the eyes
of the emperor and the war minister.

Conrad's annual

reports had been the work of a mind focused on
quantitative matters; his view of the Monarchy's condition
had been embodied in his constant pleas for more recruits,
for the Hungarian agreements of 1906/07 to be implemented
at long last, for money to repair the "desolate condition"
of the army.70

Conrad's reports had been pessimistic

enough, but they had been relentlessly technical.

It was

only in 1912, when Conrad's incessant quarrels with the
foreign ministry had briefly driven him from favour, that
the army's views were given a more emotional expression.
The author of the Militar-Politiache Denkschrift for
1912 was General der Infanterie Blasius von Schemua, who
temporarily replaced Conrad as chief of the general staff
at the end of 1911.

Schemua's appointment seems never to

have been intended as permanent.

Schemua was a man of

some personal charm and he was well-regarded at court; his
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appointment served to provide a respite after Conrad's
long-standing quarrels with Count Aerenthal, the
Monarchy's foreign minister, over Balkan policy.71
Schemua's term in office served to allow the temporarilydisgraced Conrad time to reflect that the chief of the
general staff did not make diplomatic policy as well as
run the army.

Gerhard Ritter was correct in describing

Schemua as "evidently no more than a caretaker."72
Schemua lacked Conrad's drive, ambitions, and technical
expertise; he devoted his free time to theosophical and
occult societies.

Yet, ouija boards aside, he was a

competent administrator who ably handled the large-scale
mobilisation of k.-u.-k. forces in late 1912, when it
appeared that the Balkan crisis might lead to war against
Serbia and Russia.

Schemua was a solid and steady, if

obscure, officer, and his 1912 surveys spoke for the mass
of k.-u.-k. officers who lacked the aggressive visibility
of Conrad or Auffenberg, but who nonetheless shared their
fears.
The characteristics of the modern age, wrote Schemua,
were "dissolution and disintegration.”

One had only to

look around oneself to see "ferment, flux, unrest..."
Society had lost any sense of its aims, of its goals.
"social, economic, and political" tensions demanded
solutions.

Yet
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Such solutions could not come from the civil
administration.

The civil service of the Monarchy no

longer served the needs of the population.
bloated and ineffective.

It had become

Unable to recruit conscientious

staff, it relied on no more than appearances and
capricious authority.

In consequence, internal policy was

shaped not by the plans of the government, but by
"impulses from below," and internal policy was
increasingly marked by corruption, weakness, and
impotence.73
Schemua, like Conrad and Albrecht before him,
recognized that the Monarchy's peoples had been brought
together by force of circumstance.

"Austria-Hungary," he

wrote, "is not a temporary assemblage of states, no, the
peoples have grown together because they, whether they
wish to see it or not, are joined by common interests.1,74
Yet it was only the Monarchy's soldiers who were willing
to serve and defend those common interests:

"The soldier

will soon be the only one who does not make a business of
his profession, who serves selflessly the common idea, and
for whom there exists a common fatherland.”75
Schemua was as well aware as Conrad of the material
failings of the army— the lack of recruits, of artillery,
of funding.

Yet underlying all that was a far graver

lack, a lack of belief.

The two parliaments, he told

Franz Ferdinand, were corrupt in the most basic sense:
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They lacked the will to act for the good of the Monarchy
as a whole, they lacked any sense of the Monarchy as a
whole.76

Istvan Deak, titled his study of the Habsburg

officer corps Beyond Nationalism, but as R.J.W. Evans
pointed out, the k.-u.-k. officer corps in the last years
before 1914 was not so much "beyond" nationalism as "still
on the threshold" of a "largely uncomprehending Austrian
patriotism."77

Penned within narrowing horizons, the k.-

u.-k. officer corps sought some sign that the Monarchy
possessed a belief in itself, in its own future.

The

increasing air of desperation and hopelessness seen in the
memoranda of Conrad, of Schemua

and of Auffenberg was

based on the need to believe, to see a belief in the
Monarchy held by groups outside the tight circle of those
who wore the emperor's coat.

Increasingly desperate to

see concrete signs of belief, the military leadership of
the Monarchy began to cast about for the possibilities of
action.
Action did not necessarily mean a demand for military
action.

Conrad's much-heralded and obsessive demands for

war with Italy and Serbia were not shared by the foreign
ministry, by the heir-apparent, by the emperor, or by
many, perhaps most, of his colleagues.

Military

intelligence was well aware of the strength of the Serbian
forces and understood that a war against even Serbia alone
would absorb all the Monarchy's energy.78

Schemua's
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Denkschrift for the beginning of 1912 had emphasized the
danger of any multi-front war and called for
circumspection in the Balkans and improved relations with
Russia.79

Schemua and his staff were under no illusions

about the costs of military action.

The next war, he

wrote in February 1912
will be in the fullest sense of the word a
people's war, in which armies will battle until
annihilation, until the enemy army is powerless the
national strength of the enemy is broken, his centres
of industry, trade and commerce overrun and
occupied.. .As Bismarck saidt seigner it blanc,80
Action need not have meant a call for war.

Yet a call for

action, action for its own sake, marked a total failure of
political thinking.
The historian Josef Redlich once described Conrad as
"exclusively a technician.

In politics he recognises only

quantifiable and measureable factors, corps, guns,
fortresses, etc... He lacks the ability and understanding,
in short, everything essential for the great concept of a
state based on the nationalities."B1

Conrad's limitations

were those of his profession and class; as Rothenberg
pointed out, "Conrad's sentiments were shared by the vast
majority of senior soldiers and by the regular officer
corps."82

The "mute instrument" of the dynasty had been

rendered unable to comprehend the political life of the
Monarchy or envision any real changes in either the
composition of the Monarchy or the role and place of the
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army.

Conrad himself was able to entertain briefly

visions of some form of tripartite structure, of playing a
South Slav card against the Magyars,83 but in the end he,
like his colleagues, was unable to accept the "chaos," the
loss of control, both political and psychological,
implicit in politics.

The officers of the Monarchy knew

that for a unit under fire only discipline and a firm hand
would permit survival, and what was true for a regiment
was true for the Monarchy as a whole.
In the last decade before 1914, there was no doubt in
staff circles that the Monarchy's next war would be a
multi-front struggle against enemies possessed of superior
numbers and equipment.

That catastrophe— embodied in a

Kriegsfall R + I + B(S) (1908)64— weighed with increasing
urgency on the k.-u.-k. leadership.
army was no secret.

The weakness of the

The army, lamented Baron Franz von

Schonaich, the Monarchy's war minister, was "withering
away."

Yet nothing could be done to rebuild the military

until the internal situation was resolved, and the
military leadership could think of no solution other than
the traditional evocations of dynastic loyalty and a call
for a firm hand.
Conrad had come to office in 1907 convinced that "all
our preparations and planning for external war are useless
so long as our internal situation is not resolved."85
the consummate technician could find no solutions.

But
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Unable, as he later admitted, to accept a "policy of
patience"86 he began to demand "energetic"— violent—
measures: abrogation of the Ausgleich, suspension of the
constitution.87
Conrad's obsession with finding a war, with war as a
"magic potion to master a situation which was really
without remedy"88 might have been predicted from his
techical works. His 1903 survey of the Boer War concluded
that the new age of firepower had completely altered the
face of warfare. Yet the Monarchy lacked the financial
base and the trained reserves of manpower necessary to
exploit the technology and tactics of modern war, and
Conrad lacked the vision to imagine a thoroughgoing
reconstruction of the Monarchy and its army.

Josef

Redlich found him to be "a true Austrian of our time: full
of doubts concerning everything Austrian.”89 Convinced
that the army could not take advantage of the new
techniques of warfare, unable to imagine political changes
that might lessen the danger of a major war, Conrad
yielded to his own sense of despair.

The army would have

to rely on offensive spirit, to charge on and hope that
determination alone might overcome the inevitable
losses.90
Conrad's insistence on a war with Italy or Serbia was
not finally based on a linkage between success abroad and
an end to the stalemate at home.

Unlike key members of
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Louis Napoleon's regime before the Franco-Prussian War or
the Argentine junta in 1982, Conrad offered no promises of
domestic renewal as the fruits of victory.

He could not,

by 1912, offer more than even odds that any war would be
successful, nor did he have any clear sense of what
further complications— foreign or domestic— such a war
might entail.91
By 1914 Conrad had reached a state of complete
intellectual bankruptcy.

All he could offer was action

for its own sake— a demonstration that the Monarchy and
its army could still act. When in the summer of 1914 he
finally got his war, no one could have been more
pessimistic about what he lamented would be "a hopeless
struggle" made inevitable by the Monarchy's need to save
its last asset, its honour.92 Yet while Conrad in his
office on the Stubenring was spinning out ever more
desperate and desperately pessimistic fantasies, south and
east across Vienna in the Belvedere were men who
understood exactly what the army could do to save itself
and the Monarchy.
The Belvedere— the twin palace complex built for
Prince Eugene— had been Archduke Franz Ferdinand's
official residence since 1898.

It had been given him

along with a roving commission zur Disposition, at the
pleasure of the emperor, as inspector-general of the armed
forces.

The Belvedere had been a symbol that the
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archduke, so recently seriously ill with tuberculosis and
usually regarded with little interest or favour by the
emperor, had at long last— a decade after the suicide of
Crown Prince Rudolf, three years after the death of his
father, the emperor's younger brother Karl Ludwig— been
acknowledged as heir-apparent.

By the time of the

Hungarian crisis of 1905, the Belvedere had become a
symbol of Franz Ferdinand's opposition to the whole
political atmosphere of the Monarchy.

The Belvedere had

become what its occupant saw as the seat of a shadow
government, and the archduke's military chancellery had
become the center of planning for the role of the army in
Franz Ferdinand's reign and his proposed new order.
Franz Ferdinand had been commissioned at fourteen; he
had been made a colonel at twenty-seven and a general at
thirty-one.

By 1905 he had worn the Monarchy's uniform

for twenty-eight years and had been expecting for over a
decade to be named titular commander in chief in case of
war.”

His promotions were of course dynastic; it was

considered essential that a Habsburg archduke be a soldier
and equally essential that an archduke have sufficient
military rank to be presentable at court and diplomatic
functions.

Franz Ferdinand had never received formal

staff training or attended any of the higher military
schools, and he lacked the consuming military interests of
the late Archduke Albrecht or his own brother Otto.

Yet
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the army was the focus of much of his attention, and it
was the army that he planned to use to save the Monarchy
he would inherit.
Franz Ferdinand had been known to disparage publicly
the Aasgleich arrangements as a "typical product" of Franz
Joseph's "love of compromise"99

His own opinions had

formed early in life, and he saw no reason to change them.
In 1896 he wrote FeldzeugmeiBter Beck that
in the difficult times which face the Monarchy,
one must ask, who and what supports the Throne and
the Dynasty? To this question there is only one
answer— the Army. The Army does not serve only to
defend the fatherland against foreign foes; its chief
role is the defense and maintenance of the throne and
the struggle against the enemies within.95
The enemies within were easily identified.

In 1908 he

wrote Conrad that the Monarchy was "totally in the hands
of Jews, Freemasons, Socialists, and Hungary," and "those
elements" sought to ruin the army and the officer corps so
that "when the time comes that I need it, I can no longer
rely on the army!"9*
Frederic Morton has recently pictured Franz Ferdinand
as the leader of a

"peace" faction— a "dove," and one "all

themore ferocious

because there was hardly any other in

the Empire's highest council.”97 And the archduke indeed
had no use for Conrad's war plans and argued in favour of
conciliating Russia and moving with caution in the
Balkans.

Yet if he had no wish to march on Belgrade or

Cetinje or Milan it was not out of any attachment to peace
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as an ideal.

What drove the archduke apart from his

erstwhile protege Conrad was that Franz Ferdinand needed
the army for something other than wars in the Balkans or
Italy. Franz Ferdinand needed the army to establish his
new reign by marching on Budapest.
Conrad wrote that the future of the Monarchy required
"a strong central state administration supported by a
unified Army, with a centralized parliament... If the
nationalities cannot fit themselves into this order of
things, then catastrophe is unavoidable."*B

If in the end

Conrad came to believe that catastrophe could not be
avoided, it was because he saw no way to force the
nationalities to believe in the Monarchy.

Like Beck

before him, he realised that 1849 could not be repeated,
that Hungarian obstructionism could not be solved by
force.

Conrad was prepared to rage against concessions to

the Magyars on military questions, but though at the
beginning of his tenure as chief of staff he had had Fall
U, updated, he was never prepared to urge its
implementation.

It seemed far easier to dream of

conquests in Serbia or the Veneto" than to risk civil
war.

Conrad may indeed have found, as Redlich said, "all

the non-material problems of modern politics— public
opinion, national ideas" to be Unknown territory,100 but
he was well able to weigh up the risks of an internal
solution by force.

There would be at least "honour" and
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"prestige" to be gained abroad; there would be nothing to
be won by an attempted conquest of Hungary.

Franz

Ferdinand, like his seventeenth-century Styrian namesake,
knew that his future subjects could— should— be forced to
believe.
Franz Ferdinand was far closer in temperament to the
second of his namesakes than the first, and contemporary
observers continually described him as a figure of the
High Baroque.

An Italian journalist envisioned him "among

the grey granite of the Escorial,"101 but there was more
of Ferdinand II than of Philip II in him.

He lacked

Philip's concept of prudence, of endlessly weighing
alternatives.

His two deepest beliefs— in dynastic

absolutism and in the presumed treason of all the Magyar
oligarchy— were openly and energetically held.

He wrote

to Kaiser Wilhelm that "the so-called noble, knightly
Magyar is the most infamous, anti-dynastic, unreliable and
lying wretch, and all the difficulties which we have in
the Monarchy have their ultimate source in Hungary."102
During his unhappy tenure as colonel of the 25. (Odenburg)
Hussars he had had no qualms about expressing the same
views to his Magyar officers; as inspector-general he
refused outright to review any Hungarian unit.103
The key to all of Franz Ferdinand's ideas was the
destruction of the Magyar oligarchy and its dominance in
Hungary.

As early as 1895 he had shown interest in an
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"American" federalism— a strong central regime that would
permit domestic autonomy in a new set of crownlands, where
Slovak and Croat autonomy would undercut Magyar
strength.104

By 1903 he had moved to consider trialist

ideas, adding a Kingdom of Croatia as a third unit of the
Monarchy, and in 1906 he expressed great interest in the
federal plans of Aurel Popovic, whose Die Vereinigten
Staaten Grossosterreichs called for twenty ethnicallybased crownlands with their own courts and internal
administrations.105 But by 1907 he had abandoned
trialist and federal ideas.

The willingness of Serbs and

Croats to combine in the Fiume Resolutions convinced the
archduke that any Slav bloc would be as dangerous to the
unity of the Monarchy as a Magyar one.

In the end,

trialism would only give the South Slavs and the Czechs a
chance to copy the Magyars.

The only hope of maintaining

order in the Monarchy was "To break this preponderance of
Hungary/ Otherwise we will with absolute certainty become
a Slavic empire, and trialism, which would be a disaster,
is inevitable."106
The mechanism through which the archduke developed
his plans for his new regime and the breaking of Magyar
dominance was the military staff granted him by the
emperor in 1898.

As part of the archduke's position as

inspector-general he was entitled to copies of all major
papers from the Reichskriegsministerium and the Austrian
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and Hungarian defense ministries, and a staff of two
military aides was assigned to deal with the documents.
Its initial head was Heinrich von Krauss-Elislago, later
chief of the Operations-Biiro and one of the architects of
Fall U.

The role of the archduke's staff had at first

been largely limited to preparing digests of ministerial
reports.

After 1906, with the arrival of a new adjutant,

Captain Alexander von Brosch of the KaiserjMgers, the
staff became the centre of the archduke's plans and, in
the eyes of many observers, something of a shadow cabinet.
Allmayer-Beck described Brosch rather disingenuously
as an "outspokenly political but not politicised
officer."107

He was a fine staff officer and a fine

light infantry officer as well.

He had attracted the

archduke's attention while commanding a Kaiserjager unit
on maneuvers in the Tirol in the late summer of 1905; he
was appointed the archduke's adjutant in February 1906 and
promoted to major three months later.108 Brosch's
portrait in the Kriegsmuseum shows him as a combat
soldier, leading his encircled Jagers in a last, doomed
charge in August 1914, but he was a born courtier, a
political soldier who very deftly interpreted his master's
wishes and who expanded the small staff he inherited-formally designated the archduke's military chancellery in
November 1908— into an intelligence and advisory body only
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marginally smaller than the emperor's own military
staff.109
Franz Ferdinand had long felt himself blocked from
any access to real authority in the Monarchy, from the co
regency {Mitregentachaft) he felt was his due from the old
emperor, and he was given to saying that he knew less
about policy than the lowest servant at Schonbrunn.110
Brosch saw his job as establishing the role of the
Belvedere in all affairs of state.

To that end he

expanded the Belvedere's intake of ministerial documents
and began to submit questions to local commands.

The

story ran in the army that if a rifle fell from its rack
in some forgotten Galician garrison, the archduke— always
fascinated with military detail— would know its serial
number the next day.111

Behind the joke lay the

information net that Brosch spread throughout the army,
seeking details about events and, more importantly,
personnel changes and appointments.112

It became the

business of Brosch's staff to know when any officer
suspected of being "soft" on Hungarian matters or not
sufficiently in tune with the archduke's views or, as in
the case of Baron Holzhausen, head of the Theresianum and
later commander of the 4 .(Hoch-und-DeutBChmeister)
Infantry, too Protestant for the archduke's taste,
received a new posting.113

At the very beginning of his tenure as adjutant
Brosch had established contacts between the Belvedere and
the Christian Social journal Reichspost, which had been
strongly critical of any concessions to Hungary in
military affairs.

In short order Reichspost became the

"official", and financially-supported, newspaper of the
Belvedere.

Friedrich Funder, From Empire to Republic, the

young editor of Reichspost, was summoned to the Belvedere
several times a week and given direct telephone access to
Brosch, who also provided him with copies of confidential
documents that Brosch or the archduke wished to have
publicised.114

It was through Funder that Brosch began

to assemble a group of intellectuals— Aurel Popovici, the
Croat Ivo Frank, the Slovak Milan Hodza, the Romanians
Iuliu Maniu and Alexander Vajda— who, along with the
"renegade" Magyar Joszef Kristoffy, minister of the
interior in Fejervary's government, would begin to
formulate plans to use universal suffrage and the
nationality question to attack the dominance of the Magyar
oligarchy in Hungary.115
Brosch's own views on concessions to Hungary— in
uniforms, flags or language of command— was as hard-line
as the archduke's.

Brosch knew

only too well that the unity of an army was not
only in its arms and equipment, but more especially
in its spirit... [which is the] prerequisite for
successful leadership, Every concession to Hungary,
be it over flags or insignia or the language
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question, was in regards to constitutional and also
military affairs a mistake, against which Major von
Brosch immediately opened a front.116
Brosch was willing to go public with attacks on any
concessions to Hungarian aspirations.

Articles, first

using Brosch as deep background, then signed by "a highlyplaced military personality," and finally under Brosch's
own name, began to appear in Reichspost and
Osterreichische Rundschau opposing any and all of the
compromises offered by war ministers Pitreich and
Schdnaich.

"Der Militarische Ausgleich," which ran in

Osterreichische Rundschau for 13 March 1908 and was later
reprinted as a pamphlet under Brosch's name, made the
Belvedere's position clear:

the future of the Monarchy

depended on a unitary, non-national army, commanded in
German, loyal only to the dynasty.117
The position papers issuing from the Belvedere were
quite openly designed to let the army and the public know
that the heir-apparent planned to open his reign by
sweeping aside decades of temporizing and drift.

The

current staff at Schonbrunn was well aware of its symbolic
role in the archduke's eyes and had given Count
Montenuovo, the emperor's chamberlain, signed, undated
resignations as a hedge for their pension rights against
the mass dismissals Franz Ferdinand was known to be
preparing for the first day of his reign.118

The
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archduke's plans included sacking the old emperor's
retinue; they included abandoning the A u agleich as well.
By mid-1911 Brosch had prepared a complete program
for Franz Ferdinand's accession.

The

Thronwechselprogramm, including updated lists of
appointments to be made to the new emperor's government
and army, was complete by September 1911, two months
before Brosch's term as adjutant expired.119

Friedrich

Funder and Joszef Kristoffy believed that the archduke
"entertained no thoughts of revolutionary plans of action
against Hungary" and planned to proclaim his plans for a
renewed Monarchy during the coronations in Budapest and
Prague.120

Brosch's plans for the change of reigns make

clear that Franz Ferdinand intended from the first to
undertake "revolutionary plans.”
Franz Ferdinand intended to reign as Franz II of
Austria, not of Austria-Hungary.

A manifesto "An unsere

Volker" would be issued in three versions— one for the
Cisleithanian lands, one for Hungary, and one for BosniaHerzegovina— proclaiming the new reign and explaining that
the time had come for a firm hand to restore unity.121
The vision of the new regime was not unlike that found in
the October Diploma of 1860— the crownlands to be given
local administrative autonomy, the imperial government
above them absolute control of army and finances.

The

Dual Monarchy would be at an end; Franz II would refuse to
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swear a coronation oath to the Crown of St. Stephen, and
the Hungarian constitution could be immediately abolished.
All concessions on issues of military insignia or language
of service and command would be immediately retracted.
The new emperor's first general order to the soldiers of
the imperial (no longer imperial-and-royal) army
proclaimed that
under old and honourable banners and insignia,
hallowed by the centuries, should the Army and Navy—
when God so wills— fight for Emperor and Fatherland
and, undisturbed by any and all social and national
tensions under unified leadership and command, be but
an instrument of its supreme commander for the
welfare of Our fatherland.122
There would immediately be a new and enlarged
military budget and on expanded intake of conscripts.
Those sections of the Ausgleich (sec. 11, 12: 1867)
dealing with military affairs would be revoked.

All

rights of command and organisation would be absolutely
reserved to the Crown; there would be no more control of
the army by "parliamentary clique."

The army's needs

would be supplied without reference to the Reichsrat or
the Hungarian Diet— perhaps on the model of Bismarck's
handling of the Prussian military budget in the 1860s.
There could be no more pressing task, the archduke told
Joszef Kristoffy, than removing the army from the whims of
parliamentary control.123
The program drafted by Brosch fit perfectly with the
archduke's personality.

Franz Ferdinand thrived on the
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thought of "decisive" action.

In 1908 he had told Conrad

that if he were emperor he would summon the two prime
ministers and the war minister for an ultimatum:
do you know what I would do if I were the
emperor? I'd summon Wekerle, Beck...and Schonaich
and I'd say to them: "I'll send you all to the Devil
if I don't get more recruits and higher officers' pay
for my army in eight days," and I'll tell you right
now, in 24 hours I'd have it alll124
Franz Ferdinand was fond of proclaiming that "When I
become supreme commander, then I'll do what I want.
if anyone does anything else!
shot!"125

Woe,

I'll have them all

The bellicose rhetoric, though, masked the

fact that the archduke had no long-term view of how to
handle a defiant Hungary, and that the needs of the army
itself, the need to mount a credible force against foreign
threats, made the army less likely to be a mute instrument
to be used against the Magyars.
The archduke himself believed that there would be
little resistance to the new regime.

He counted on

support in Hungary from the nationalities— especially the
Romanians, whose cause he publicly championed— and indeed
from the "ever-loyal" Hungarian peasantry, on whom he
counted for support against not just the gentry but
against all his other enemies— "the dominance of
Freemasons, Socialists, Anarchists, Jews, radical Slavs,
irredentists"124— as well.

The archduke seems to have

assumed that the proclamation of a new order would rally
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the bulk of the Monarchy's population behind him.

Brosch

had held discussions in the summer of 1910 with the jurist
Heinrich Lammasch on revising Hungarian constitutional
law, but he had done nothing to build political support
for the archduke in Hungary,127 and neither Brosch nor
Franz Ferdinand had been able to attract German support
for the proposed new order.

By 1911 the German government

had in fact made it clear to both the archduke and to the
diplomats at the Ballhausplatz that no German support
would be offered for any kind of coup in Hungary.128
The initial assumption about a coup de main in
Budapest seems to have been that no real resistance would
be offered.

Fall U, was still on file with the

Operations-Btiro of the general staff and remained
available to the new Franz II.

Yet Brosch showed no

interest in any detailed plans for military intervention—
neither in presenting them to the archduke nor even in
obtaining information for his own files.

Action against

the Hungarian parliament was seen as being much along the
lines of the Sanierung undertaken by Fejervary and
Fabrizius— a limited number of troops deployed to occupy
the Diet and disperse the deputies.

Brosch did, however,

propose to garrison key points on the Hungarian rail and
telegraph nets with "reliable" detachments of infantry and
engineering units.129

Hungary would then receive a

military governor, whose role would be modeled on that of
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Archduke Albrecht, in the 1850s.

Franz Ferdinand, in what

Norman Stone described as a gesture of "characteristic
futility"130, planned to give that post to a suitablypromoted Brosch.
It was only with the approach of the 1912 army bill
negotiations that Brosch and the Militarkanzlei staff
began to consider the larger problems of a coup in
Budapest.

Brosch had long since prepared lists of civil

officials to be dismissed and replaced with "loyal"
Magyars; by 1910 he had begun to consider military changes
as well.

Lines of communication would have to be secured;

that much had been obvious from the beginning.

Should any

real resistance develop, Budapest would have to be held,
as would key towns and fortresses in the countryside.

The

archduke remained convinced that "neither the Jewish
businessman, nor the peasant in the Hungarian plains, nor
finally the worker in the industrial centers" would "risk
his own skin" for the likes of the Magyar oligarchy131,
but his staff had to consider the possibility of real
resistance from Hungarian troops.

Brosch began to plan

for strengthening key Hungarian points with Cisleithanian
troops and transferring heavily Magyar regiments out of
Hungary.132
The k.-u.-k. army had been garrisoned on a
territorial basis since the 1880s.

With the exception of

Bosnia-Herzegovina, which was garrisoned by units drawn

from the Monarchy as a whole, regiments were ordinarily
stationed in their recruiting districts.

The system had

been designed to permit rapid mobilization against an
enemy— Russia— possessed of a superior initial strength.
It was of course possible for units to be moved away from
politically sensitive areas.

In 1911 troops of the

70.(Peterwardein) Infantry, a regiment eighty percent of
whose men were Serbs, were withdrawn from the garrison at
Semlin following unrest in Slavonia and replaced by the
all-Magyar 68.(Szolnok) Infantry.

Nonetheless, the army

had long since set rapid mobilization as a top
priority.133

The growth in Russian strength since the

1880s, along with the inability of the k.-u.-k. forces to
substantially increase their manpower levels, made rapid
mobilization all the more vital.
Rothenberg argued that Conrad was prepared by 1911 to
subordinate speed of mobilization to questions of
political loyalty,134 but this seems a misreading of
Conrad's views.

Conrad's concern was, as always, numbers.

He never ceased to press home the fact that a peacetime
k.-u.-k. infantry company contained ninety-three men and
its Russian counterpart held 167, or that by 1913 the
Russian army would have thirty-eight reserve divisions
while the k.-u.-k. forces would have none at all.135
Conrad's plans called for the wartime k.-u.-k. army to
field forty-eight first-line divisions, a number that
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could be reached only be re-assigning the Landwehr and
HonvSd as first-line units.13* Conrad's projections
could offer no hope of creating substantial reserve forces
in less than a decade.137

Only by speed of mobilization

and use of the Landwehr and Honvdd as first-line units
could the Monarchy hope to stop any initial Russian
onslaught.

Conrad might sanction special instances of

moving units for political reasons, but he would not
support any large-scale dismantling of the territorial
system.
Conrad was preparing for war in Galicia; Franz
Ferdinand's plans did not depend on speed of mobilization.
By 1911, at the end of his appointment as adjutant, Brosch
had drafted plans for large-scale garrison transfers to
safeguard the accession of Franz II.

His successor,

Colonel Karl von Bardolff, devoted the first part of his
tenure to drawing up plans for altering the whole
territorial system and ensuring the loyalty of the army in
the face of any political upheavals brought on by the new
regime.

By the spring of 1913 Bardolff's designs had been

submitted to the archduke.136

Territorial garrisoning,

Bardolff wrote, was no longer effective.

In view of

nationalist propaganda and the intensification of national
unrest, one could no longer assume that the army was
unaffected by national tensions.

It was therefore vital
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to "return, at least in part, to the principles which
regulated garrisoning before the '80s."
Bardolff proposed giving special attention to the
twenty-four infantry regiments with sixty percent or more
Magyar personnel.

Five would be left in their home

districts; eight more could be kept inside their corps
areas, but moved outside their home districts; eleven
would be shifted completely away, thus giving an increase
of five regiments with completely "extra-territorial"
stations.

Thirteen regiments of sixty percent plus Magyar

troops would remain inside the lands of the Hungarian
crown.

They would be balanced by sixteen "nationality

regiments," all presumably reliable for use against the
Magyar oligarchy, as well as two Bohemian infantry
regiments and one regiment of Bosniaks.

Five of sixteen

hussar regiments were already serving with the expanded
cavalry forces facing the Russians in Galicia; two more
would be transferred to the Polish frontier.

Of the nine

remaining hussar regiments, five would be at their home
depots and four stationed elsewhere inside Hungary,
possibly as small units of border patrol horse.

The new

governor-general's cavalry forces would be augmented by
two Bohemian dragoon regiments and the Croatian 5. Uhlans.
The same criteria were applied to the Czechs, who
during the crises over the annexation of BosniaHerzegovina in 1908 and the Balkan War in 1912 had showed
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disturbing pro-Serb sympathies.

Of fifteen infantry

regiments with sixty percent or more Czech troops, four
would remain in their home districts, three in their
present corps commands, and eight would be extra
territorial— an increase of four extra-territorial
regiments.

Of ten Bohemian cavalry regiments with fifty

percent or more Czech troops, eight (an increase of two)
would be extra-territorial.

Six largely Czech infantry

regiments would remain in Bohemia— the seventh would be in
its home corps area, but outside Bohemia proper.

The

Magyar 1. Hussars, the Ruthene 7. Uhlans, the German 4.
Dragoons, and the German-Bohemian 14. Dragoons would be
used to augment cavalry forces.
Bardolff also planned to shift garrisons in the South
Slav provinces of the Monarchy.

Of seven Serbo-Croat

regiments in XIII. Korps (Zagreb) and the Dalmatian
command (site of the planned XVI. Korps at Ragusa), one
would be left in its home district, three more would be in
the corps area, and three (an increase of two) would be
extra-territorial.

Of fifteen battalions raised in

Dalmatia, ten— an increase of five— would be extra
territorial.

Only a single k.-u.-k. battalion, drawn from

the 22.(Sinj) Infantry, one battalion of the 37.(Laibach)
HonvSd, and two battalions of the 23.(Zara) Landwehr
Infantry would remain territorialized.
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Bardolff was prepared at least to nod in Conrad's
direction by acknowledging that, bearing in mind the
"gravest misgivings" (schwerwiegendsten Bedenken) of the
chief of the general staff, he had maintained the
territorial system intact in the Galician corps commands
(I. X., XI., Korps) as well as in III Korps (Graz) and XIV
Korps (Innsbruck) covering the Italian frontier.

But he

insisted that any successful overhauling of the garrisons
required that five Magyar infantry and two hussar
regiments, four Czech infantry regiments and two Czech
cavalry regiments, one Croat infantry regiment, and two
Dalmatian regiments be moved out of their present stations
and replaced by "foreign" (fremdnationale) units— in
addition to those units already posted to duty in Bosnia
or Galicia.

Some transfers, Bardolff argued, could not

wait for a general change. Units thought especially
susceptible to bad influences— such as the 18.(Koniggratz)
and 102.(Beneschau), eighty percent and one-hundred
percent Czech respectively— needed to be moved "This year
and as soon as possible ."139
All the plans drawn up at the Belvedere by both
Brosch and Bardolff turned on the question of succession.
Franz Ferdinand's authority as inspector-general had been
expanded by 1913, and he had been formally given the role
of commander-in-chief in wartime.

But he lacked authority

to order any major changes in the territorial system on
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his own, and there was no chance that Franz Joseph and
Conrad would support his plans.

Each month that the old

emperor remained on the throne— and Franz Joseph would
suffer no serious illness until the spring of 1914, when
he contracted pneumonia shortly after Easter--made the
plans drawn up at the Belvedere more difficult to
implement.
Franz Ferdinand hoped to base his foreign policy on
caution in the Balkans and conciliation with Russia.

Yet

the k.-u.-k. military had to face the spectres of Russian
power and the near-certainty of fighting a multi-front
war.

The point of the protracted Hungarian crisis had

after all been an expansion of the army.

The Army Bill of

1912, enacted amidst impending war in the Balkans, gave
the army 42,000 more men annually— 136,000 for k.-u.-k.
forces, 20,175 for the Landwehr, and 17,500 for the
Honvdd1*0— a total of 181,000 men, which would rise to
236,300 (170,000 k.-u.-k., 35,300 Landwehr, 31,000 Honvdd)
over the next six years.

The two second-line forces would

henceforth be treated as first-line units, and both
Landwehr and Honvdd would receive not just more men but
organic artillery and technical units as well.
Honvdd units had been organized at regimental level
since 1890; by 1913 the Honvdd consisted of thirty-two
infantry regiments organised into seven divisions.

Its

ten hussar regiments were at full strength, and plans were

.t*
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underway to double the cavalry establishment.1'
11

The

Army Bill of 1912 gave both the Landwehr and the Honvdd
their own artillery.

Artillery units were of course vital

in moving the Landwehr and Honvdd to first-line status;
artillery also gave the Honvdd the ability to undertake
its own combined-arms operations and resist any k.-u.-k.
coercion with heavy weapons.
The Hungarian Diet was quite willing to vote funds
for its "national" forces, an attitude that meshed exactly
with Conrad's desperate attempts to rebuild the Monarchy's
military strength.

By mid-1913 each of the Honvdd hussar

regiments had been given reinforced machine-gun
detachments.

A field artillery regiment had been formed

at Budapest, and a horse artillery regiment was being
raised.142

By 1917 the Honvdd would possess eight field

artillery regiments143, all integrated into brigade
formations.

Heavy artillery units, including howitzers,

would be based at major strongholds in Budapest, Zagreb,
and along the Szekesfehervar— Pressburg line.

By 1920

HonvSd artillery strength would consist of eight field
artillery regiments, two horse artillery regiments, and
eight heavy artillery regiments based at Budapest,
Debreczen, Lugos, Marosvasarhely, Nyitra, Szekesfehervar,
Zagreb, and Pressburg.144

Had Franz Ferdinand succeeded

to the throne in 1916— in the year of Franz Joseph's
actual death— his plans for a coup in Budapest would have
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had to take into account an expanded, well-armed HonvSd
equipped with heavy artillery.
The Magyar leadership was certainly aware of Franz
Ferdinand's intentions in outline if not full detail.
They were certainly aware of the existence of Fall U., and
of the plan's original author.

By mid-1911 Auffenberg had

become the Belvedere's choice for war minister— a post
now, in deference to Hungarian demands, styled k.-u.-k.
Kriegsminister rather than ReichskriegaminiBter.
Auffenberg had long identified himself as the archduke's
man.

His "The Role and Mission of the Next War Minister,"

sent to the Belvedere from Sarajevo in November 1910,145
was fully in accord with the Belvedere's insistence on
revoking all concessions to Hungary.

He had even written

Bardolff assuring him of his personal loyalty to the
archduke:

"His Highness's intentions are the only

guiding-light which I will follow while I am in this post
and while I am capable of doing my duty."146

However, in

mid-1912 the Hungarian press began reporting that
Auffenberg had prepared plans for military intervention in
Hungary and implied that the new war minister still had
those plans in mind.147 The war minister, already in a
politically exposed position over budgetary debates, was
suddenly seen as a liability in securing the support of
Count Istvan Tisza, the Hungarian premier.

Auffenberg

appealed in panic to his patron for support, but his
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political usefulness was clearly at an end.

His career

was saved— his old classmate Conrad secured an army
inspector's post for him148— but by the end of the year
he had been dismissed by the emperor.148
The Magyar leadership had seen Auffenberg as an
obvious stand-in for the archduke and as an easy target.
Count Istvan Tisza, head of Hungary's ruling party, had
been willing to drive the 1912 Army Bill through the Diet-at one point, in an ironic replay of the days of
Fejervary and Fabrizius, he had had armed guards
physically remove recalcitrant deputies150— but, while he
was willing to expand the army to meet the Russian danger,
he was under no circumstances ready to yield on any
questions of Hungary's rights within the Ausgleich
structure, and his object at all times was to maximise
Hungarian influence.

"I would," Tisza said in rejecting

offers to mediate between himself and the archduke, "fight
even my king if he would violate the Hungarian
constitution."151

Franz Ferdinand regarded Tisza as the

archvillain of all Magyardom and, on Bardolff's advice,
refused to receive him.152

Tisza was secure in his

convictions and his dominance of Hungarian political life,
and he was no less secure in his belief that Franz
Ferdinand's plans would never be realized.

When, over

Easter 1914, the emperor's illness raised the possibility
of a change of reigns, Tisza let it be known in both
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Vienna and Budapest that, should Franz Ferdinand attempt
to use the military against Hungary, it would be Tisza who
would have the last laugh.

It was widely believed in

Vienna that Tisza intended to call out the Honv£d to
thwart the heir-presumptive.1*3
In the last months before the assassination at
Sarajevo rendered all the plans drafted at the Belvedere
meaningless, it became increasingly obvious that any new
reign was likely to begin with violence.

The archduke

still envisioned a new Monarchy, unified and centralised.
Colonel Brosch, who had remained in close touch with Franz
Ferdinand and was still his confidant, was slated to be at
the new emperor's side as military governor of Hungary
and, as the archduke told Frau Brosch, as future imperial
chancellor.154

The new commander of IV. Korps in

Budapest, General der Kavallerie Karl von Tersztyansky,
was the archduke's personal choice, and Tersztyansky was
known to be a frequent visitor to the Belvedere.

It was

widely believed in Vienna that he had been put in place to
act against the Hungarian Diet and to remove Tisza from
power by force.155
Norman Stone argued that the military leadership of
the Monarchy, closed in upon itself and increasingly aware
of its inability to effect real policy changes, now
"required" a "policy of violent conservatism" which would
"restore a Greater Austria where some form of national
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justice might be achieved through a policy of even-handed
repression."156

Yet there was no agreement on exactly

what should— or could— be done.

Conrad believed no less

than the archduke in a unified, centralized Monarchy free
of Magyar obstuction, but he was unwilling to embark upon
civil war or abandon the territorial system.

He preferred

to flee from domestic entanglements to scenarios for war
abroad where, although his estimates of the probability of
success became increasingly pessimistic after 1908, there
was still hope that a show of force could give the peoples
of the Monarchy some reason to believe in the k.-u.-k.
ideal.

The archduke and his circle sought to go to the

heart of the problem, to remove any Magyar interference
with army and state by destroying Hungary's special
position.

Conrad had originally attracted the archduke's

patronage because of his reputation for energetic
measures, but by 1913 his obsession with war against Italy
and Serbia and his failure to view the army as purely an
imperial guard had cost him the Belvedere's confidence.
Franz Ferdinand used his role as inspector-general to
harass Conrad throughout the autumn maneuvers of 1913 in
an atempt to badger him into resigning as chief of the
general staff.

His successor would likely be

Tersztyansky, Conrad's rival for the post in 1906, and now
a firm believer in the archduke's views.157
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There did exist some sympathy for a third
possibility, one that required neither war abroad nor a
coup in Budapest.

Auffenberg had caught Franz Ferdinand's

eye by proposing armed intervention in Hungary, and he
remained outspoken in his opposition to any concessions to
Hungarian demands.138

Yet after 1906 he began to take an

interest in conditions in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina,
and during his tenure as corps commander at XV. Korps in
Sarajevo, he had come to consider trialism, the creation
of a south Slav crownland built around Bosnia-Herzegovina,
a serious and perhaps necessary possibility.159

Brosch

and the archduke viewed trialism with no small amount of
mistrust, but Auffenberg continued to argue in its
favor.150

A South Slav crownland offered the possibility

of forming a counterweight to Hungary, foiling the
attraction of Belgrade on the Monarchy's Serb population,
and ensuring the continued loyalty of the Monarchy's
Croats.

Auffenberg's views on the situation in the

southeast of the Monarchy may not have conformed to the
Belvedere's line, but they did find an echo in the
military's Bosnian policy after 1908.
Bosnia-Herzegovina had been goverened through the k.u.-k. finance ministry during the years (1878-1908) when
it had been an occupied territory still belonging in
theory to the Ottoman Empire.

A civil administration had

been granted the newly-annexed province in 1910, but the

real authority in the area remained with the military.
The area had traditionally been the haunt of komitadji,
brigands whose depredations were often intertwined with
nationalist beliefs, and XV.Korps had long since been
supplying "order."

Fifteen extra battalions were sent in

during the annexation crisis of late 1908 and fifteen more
in early 19091*1 During the Balkan Wars XV. Korps, the
newly formed

XVI. Korps (Ragusa), as well as the

Dalmatian Landwehr were mobilised.

The military held

extraordinary authority throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina, and
the military looked to Bosnia as a province where, free of
parliamentary obstruction, a policy of "even-handed
repression" could be employed to win the population away
from nationalism.1(2
The arrival in 1911 of Feldmarachalleutnant Oskar
Potiorek as governor-general was widely hailed by the
military as a first step in overcoming pro-Serbian
enthusiasm.

Potiorek had come to demonstrate that the

Monarchy was still capable of determined action, that a
policy of strength and fairness carried out by an
administration whose chief was himself a Slovene would
convince the population of the desirablitiy of Habsburg
rule, and that incipient disloyalty could be overcome by a
firm hand in Bosnia— as it could be in Prague or Budapest
as well.

Potiorek's authority was far-reaching, and the

powers granted him would later be used as a basis for the
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extensive control over civil and economic life the k.-u.k. military would acquire during the First World War.
Potiorek came to Bosnia with the intention of making
it a "model" province.

Yet his view of his role— as being

a much needed strongman— suffered from the narrowness of
the officer's conception of the world.

A firm, fair hand

on the parade ground might produce a cohesive and obedient
infantry company, but "discipline" alone could not reach
the causes of dissatisfaction in Bosnia.

Potiorek, one

historian noted, "was basically a gendarme, and not a very
good one at that."163
The imperial authorities had attempted to make the
initial occupation more palatable by leaving the local
social structures alone, and this meant leaving 900,000
largely Orthodox and Serbian peasants enserfed to a
largely Muslim landowning class.

The population of

Bosnia-Herzegovina remained, outside of a few mining
districts, desperately poor and illiterate.164

Military

policy could make no headway against rural poverty, nor
could it implement land reform.

By mid-1914 the

impoverished population of eastern Bosnia, an area long
regarded as bandit country, had become so entangled with
smuggling and Serbian komitadjis that the military had
simply written off the population of the province east of
the Bosna River as hopelessly disloyal.165
"firm hand" was no more successful.

Potiorek's

All Serbian
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organizations were dissolved, the Serb press was regularly
confiscated and the province's schools— regarded as
nurseries of radicalism— were put under strict police
control.

Potiorek himself remained cloistered in his

headquarters, unwilling to admit that his policies had
failed to attract the population to Jc.-u.-k. rule and
might indeed be counterproductive, yet convinced that he
was surrounded by disloyalty.
Auffenberg had at least been willing to understand
the political implications of constructing a South Slav
crownland, a move certain to provoke forceful opposition
from Budapest, especially since it would entail the loss
of Croatia.166

Potoriek in Sarajevo had attempted to

order loyalty into being "by mere administrative routine,”
in Stone's phrase.167

Potoriek's failure and his attempt

to overcome political frustration by violent rhetoric
filled folder after folder sent to the war ministry.168
His situation on a hostile frontier might be extreme, but
his tone was shared by his colleagues in Prague, Budapest,
and the Belvedere.

By 1912/13, the military leadership of

the Monarchy could not contemplate the future without
overtones of desperation and panic.
Brosch had used his office to establish contacts with
potential allies of the archduke.

Bardolff seems to have

seen himself as a collector of information, and he devoted
himself to informing the archduke of any instance of

perceived disloyalty by the populace or weakness on the
part of the government.

Franz Ferdinand was given copies

of all editorials in the Hungarian press attacking the
army or the archduke, though this was very much preaching
to the choir.

When the Balkan Wars and k.-u.-k.

mobilization led to unrest in Bohemia, Bardolff was there
to pass on stacks of memoranda and telegrams.

The tone of

his commentary was unrelentingly shrill: there was
disloyalty and anti-military sentiment everywhere, and the
administration was absolutely passive in the face of
subversion— "totally without initiative" in~Bardolff'b
underlined phrase.169

The information only fed the

belief of the archduke and his supporters that the
Monarchy must be fundamentally restructured and given a
new, firm regime with the army serving as the chief
instrument of the Crown.
There had indeed been unrest in Bohemia.
Demonstrations supporting Serbia's war against the
Ottomans had taken place throughout the autumn of 1912.
In two towns— Prerau and Prossnitz— these had dovetailed
with local arguments to produce clashes between Czech and
German mobs, a pattern that was repeated in Pilsen and
Koniggratz in early December.170 A student mob at
Koniggratz had tried to prevent a column of reservists of
IR 18 (Koniggratz) from boarding troop trains, and a final
total of seventy-eight gendarmes and military police was
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required to disperse the crowd.

The 8. Dragoons at

Pardubitz and IR 35 (Pilsen) had shown symptoms of
disquiet.171
Yet Bardolff's comments portrayed each incident in
the most hysterical light possible.

In July 1913 a

lieutenant Johann Ovcicka of the 11. Uhlans was given a
commendation by the local command for quelling unrest
among a transport of reservists from the 8.Dragoons—
restoring order at the point of a drawn pistol after a
party of reservists had attempted to settle an argument
with the military police by using their sabres.172

None

of the reports in Bardolff's files indicated that there
had been any political overtones or that the unrest had
been likely to spread to the rest of the regiment.

A

similar incident— a fight between mobilized reservists and
military police— on the quay at Portsmouth or Marseilles
would have been treated as a localized (and likely
drunken) quarrel, the young lieutenant who stopped it
praised, and the officers and NCOs of the offending unit
called on the carpet. Guardhouse time, extra drill, and
company officers packed off to other assignments would
have been the result.

Bardolff, and indeed the archduke

and much of the war ministry treated the incident as a
serious mutiny, an incipient rebellion.
The same panic set in when the archduke's staff was
informed by the interior ministry that a planned exchange

of reserve units slated for Bosnia and Dalmatia— an
exchange of older for younger reservists— would likely
produce demonstrations in I.(Krakow), II.(Vienna),
VIII.(Prague), and IX.(Leitmeritz) Korps.

The

mobilization of older classes, of men with jobs and
families, in peacetime, even if during a time of
diplomatic crisis, would seem certain to generate
unpopularity.

The immediate response at the Belvedere was

a denunciation of the "passivity" and cowardice of the
political authorities in the affected areas.173

By the

end of August 1913 Bardolff was conveying the archduke's
demands that local officials be transferred or sacked for
lack of firmness and replaced with men of more "energy" or
by the military.174 When in October 1912 an
Oberleutenant Ban of IR 53 (Zagreb) joined a group of two
dozen local civilians crossing over from the Foca region
to join the Montenegrins against the Turks, this became
not only a matter of local legend— of Serb k.-u.-k.
officers deserting still in uniform to fight at the siege
of Scutari— but a matter for enciphered telegrams between
XV.Korps command and the Belvedere, where the incident was
taken as a harbinger of large-scale desertions.175
The spring of 1914 saw the military leadership of the
Monarchy trapped inside an increasingly desperate sense of
pessimism.

Conrad and his operational staff were

convinced of the inevitability of a multifront war against

Russia, Serbia, and Italy (and possibly Romania as well),
and even with German and Bulgarian aid they did not
believe that the Monarchy had any real hope of success in
such a war.176

Should the old emperor die before war

came, Franz Ferdinand's plans were almost certain to
result in civil war against Hungary.

The failure of

military authorities in Sarajevo and Ragusa to hold on to
the loyalty of the South Slav population underlined the
cost of trying to maintain the status quo.

The army

itself was only slowly being fleshed out after the passage
of the 1912 Army Bill— after more than a decade of Magyar
obstruction.

The battalions and squadrons were still in a

skeletal state, and the costs of the long periods of alarm
and mobilization in 1912/13 during the Balkan Wars and the
crisis over Albania had cut hard into the army's budget.
The disruptions of personal and economic life had
seriously sapped the morale of many units, reserve and
regular alike.

Conrad was terrified that the army— its

combat ability, its morale, its stability— was withering
away before his eyes.177

By mid-1914 Conrad had come to

believe that even a catastrophic war was preferable to
death by a kind of spiritual and economic evaporation.
When war finally came, he wrote that it would be "a
hopeless struggle, but it nevertheless must be, for such
an ancient monarchy and its army cannot just perish
ingloriously."l7B

The ultimate question for the k.-u.-k. leadership was
one of belief.

The men of the k.-u.-k. officer corps had

devoted themselves to the dynasty and the Monarchy since
cadet school and the Theresianum.

Their devotion to the

dynasty and to the ideal of service was in Istvan Deak's
phrase, "near-religious," and was taken as given, and no
more than a handful ever wavered in that devotion.179
Two-thirds of them were children of public-service
families— sons of fathers who were themselves officers or
NCOs, or who served in the gendarmerie, the bureaucracy,
the state railways, the customs service— which might be
transferred throughout the Cisleithanian lands (the whole
of the Monarchy, in the case of k.-u.-k. families) and had
as Deak says "for all intents and purposes, no
nationality."100

They believed absolutely in the

Monarchy, and they identified the army with the Monarchy
as a whole.

Conrad, Brosch, Auffenberg, Schemua, and

Potiorek all believed in a unified, centralized Monarchy
imbued with a common will and a common vision of loyalty.
A company, a battalion, a regiment, or a division— their
success required a strong authority, clear-cut lines of
command, and an overarching sense of loyalty to and belief
in the group.

The model of the nation for the k.-u.-k.

officer corps was in the end regimental.

The required

virtues of the k.-u.-k. officer were the virtues of the
military vassal: personal bravery, loyalty to the person

361
of the liege, devotion to a cause beyond the self.

By

1912 the army leadership, as Schemua said, believed itself
alone in society in possessing or admiring those virtues.
When the army leadership looked out at the larger
world, what it saw was a Reichsrat dominated by "antipolitics," by the eagerness of political factions to
forego any positive gains in order to block the plans of
rivals, a system based on pure defensiveness and abetted
by an administration whose taste for "stability" meant an
avoidance of all conflict and change.181

In Budapest the

Magyar oligarchy sought either independence or Hungarian
dominance within the Monarchy.

Hungarian obstruction had

blocked any reconstruction of the army between 1889 and
1912, and the price of Hungarian assent was that the
Magyars were able to use the army as an instrument of
Magyarization— to force Slovak or Romanian or
Transylvanian Saxon recruits to speak Magyar, to obey the
king, represented by a Diet controlled by the Magyar
oligarchy, and not the emperor, to look to the Hungarian
flag rather than the double eagles of the dynasty.

The

army alone stood as the support of the dynasty and the
Monarchy.

In 1911 Brosch lamented that

every year in October we conscript men who have,
as often as not, undergone a preliminary training in
nationalist, anti-Austrian atmospheres and have been
educated as irredentists or anti-militarists, or who,
being illiterate, know less than nothing of the
world; and out of such material we have to fashion
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intelligent, responsible individuals and
enthusiastic, patriotic citizens.182
In the years after the Hungarian crisis, in the last
decade before the war, the k.-u.-k. leadership had come to
feel that the future offered only a choice of nightmares.
Kriegsfall R+I+B(S)— a multifront war where the depleted
k.-u.-k. forces faced overwhelming odds— seemed all too
likely to occur.

Or the vision of Kerchnawe's Unser

Letzter Kampf could materialize: predatory neighbors
taking advantage of internal conflict to dismember the
Monarchy.

Or the scenario advanced by Gustav Sieber— a

grey, whimpering end where the Monarchy would collapse
with slow agony because no one could be bothered to
believe.

The Monarchy's military leadership saw

themselves as the only force that stood for the unity and
future of the realm, and their perceived helplessness
drove them deeper into despair, desperation, and a
corrosive distrust of the society around them.

In the end

Conrad contrived to call his own nightmares into being, to
involve the Monarchy in a fatal Balkan policy and,
finally, in the multifront war he had feared for so long.
The army bill of 1912 had contained a War Services
Act that granted the military extraordinary civil and
economic authority in time of war183 and after 1914 the
army would assume control over large areas of the
Monarchy, including regions (Bohemia and Croatia) far from
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the actual fighting.

The policies of the

Kriegsiiberwachungsamt, the War Supervisory Office, were
little different from those tried by Potiorek— -a drillsguare view of instilling loyalty.

The army engaged in

bitter political conflicts with the civil administration,
which it regarded as flaccid and indulgent, and its
policies far too often deepened any existing
disaffection.184
In its panic the military wildly overreacted to any
incident that might show disaffection.

When in the most

famous incident of 1914 troops of the 9. Landwehr Infantry
and IR 28.(Prague) went off to the front drunk and
chanting that they were going to fight the Russians and
didn't know why,

the military ignored the fact that both

units came from heavily socialist working-class districts
and had a long-standing distaste for "being ordered about
by the military or any other organ of state"185 and the
more salient fact that, drunk and unhappy or not, both
regiments went off to fight.

The military chose to regard

all Czechs as suspect even when the all-Czech IR 102
(Beneschau) became one of the first wartime units to be
mentioned in despatches.188 Any incidents became proof
of widespread underlying disaffection and thus proof of
the need for stronger and more wide-ranging military
control.
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Suspicion was not confined to the Czechs.

In 1914

both the Italian 97.(Trieste) Infantry and its reserve
component, the 5. Landwehr

Infantry, went off willingly

to war; the 97. saw especially hard fighting in Galicia.
Units of LIR 5. and Italian units of the 20 .Feldj&gere as
well as some Italian units of Kaiserjagera, fought with
determination against the Italians in 1915/16.

This did

not prevent the military from evacuating much of the
Italian populations of the Tirol to internment camps and
brigading Italian troops into special "southwest" units
(Siidwestbataillone)— less tactfully known as
Italienerbataillone or PU (politiache— unzuverlassig,
"politically-unreliable")-Einheiten.197 The Serb troops
of BHIR 1. and 2. were taken from combat formations,
disarmed, and sent off to labour battalions.

The Serbs,

treated nearly as convicts and affronted in martial pride,
became ready targets for seditious propaganda and, when
combat losses required their return to their units,
carriers of disaffection.

In contrast, the commander of

BHIR 4. retained his Serbs, announced his confidence in
his men, and was rewarded with loyal and outstanding
service.108
The open unrest that appeared in the Monarchy after
1917 was predicated upon privation and exhaustion, but the
policies of the military— panicky, desperate suspicion and
heavy-handedness— drove local populations into
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disaffection.

The irony here is that the k.-u.-k.

leadership, convinced that they alone believed in the
Monarchy, by treating the administration and the populace
as suspect, ended by eroding loyalty.

All the plans drawn

up to stave off the dissolution conjured up by Kerchnawe
only helped bring on the nightmare.
The k.-u.-k. army of 1918 bore little resemblance to
the force Conrad led to war in 1914.

Norman Stone

estimated that of the 900,000 men who had been in uniform
at the beginning of August 1914, 845,000 were lost—
killed, wounded, captured or invalided home due to
disease— by the end of the year.

Of fewer than 60,000

officers— career and reserve k.-u.-k., Landwehr, Honv6d,
and those who had left the army and were now reactivated—
available at the start of the war, 22,310 would become
casualties duringthe final four months of 1914.189

One-

third of the professional officers serving at the outbreak
of the war would die— in action, in captivity, or of
wounds— during its course.190

The expansion of the army

further diluted the k.-u.-k. officer corps.

By October

1918 there were 188,000 serving officers, of whom only
35,000 were career soldiers.191

The war diluted the

ranks of professionals in all the armies— one might
consider the change from the small, long-service British
army of 1914 to the huge citizen's army that fought for
Britain in 1916— but in the Monarchy the change had a

special significance*

the officers commissioned to

replace the losses of 1914 lacked the k.-u.-k.
indoctrination and linguistic skills of the pre-war
officer coprs, and many brought "national" sentiments to
the front with them.

Since no reservist was promoted

beyond the rank of captain,192 it would be the "new"
officers who were in close daily contact with their
troops, who would have to deal with language barriers and
national tensions.

Such problems were made more complex

by losses among the enlisted ranks as well.

The losses

sustained during the war put an end to the territorial
basis of the army; conscripts were brigaded into units
without regard for territorial usage. By 1918 Vienna's
all-German 4.(Hoch-und-Deutschmeister) Infantry contained
18.5% Italians.

Vienna's other regiment, the equally all-

German IR 84, would be twenty percent Italian and five
Czech.

The all-Czech 102.(Beneschau) Infantry would be

fourteen percent German; the 55.(Brzezany) Infantry, once
ninety-five percent Ruthene, would be twenty-five percent
Polish and twelve percent German.193
Yet the wartime army held together and fought on, and
in the late summer of 1918 the army's standards flew far
beyond the Monarchy's borders.

The army of the Monarchy

outlasted its Russian opponent and very nearly outlasted
its German ally.

The k.-u.-k. army experienced no

disaffection on the scale of the mutinies experienced by
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the French army in 1917, nor was the Monarchy faced with
nationalist revolts such as the British faced in Ireland
in 1916.

The army remained loyal during the general

strike of January 1918, and seven divisions returned from
the front to maintain order in Bohemia and Upper and Lower
Austria.194

The k.-u.-k. leadership only began to employ

organized propaganda techniques among the troops during
the last six months of the war19*; the soldiers of the
Monarchy had fought for four years on previouslyunsuspected reserves of loyalty to the emperor-king and to
the idea of a fatherland,

in the end it was the high

command, with its willingness to see disaffection
everywhere, that failed to believe, that failed to see
that loyalty could exist outside the ranks of k.-u.-k.
professionals.
Conrad wrote once that in the Monarchy all other
questions were dissolved in the question of the army; by
1914 the military leadership sought to dissolve all other
questions by applying the methods of the barracks square.
Had Franz Ferdinand survived to become Franz II those
methods would have had full reign inside the Monarchy.
One can only note that such methods failed in the "model”
province of Bosnia in peacetime, and they failed
throughout the Monarchy in wartime.

Conrad's own sense of

desperation led him to advocate bellicose and increasingly
fantastic policies which finally involved the Monarchy in

a war Conrad himself believed would only lead to disaster.
The conscripts who went off to war in 1914 still possessed
strong reserves of loyalty.

It was the military

leadership and not the rank-and-file which no longer
believed in the future of the Monarchy.
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CONCLUSION

In 1848/49 it had been the imperial-royal army that
had held the Monarchy together, and throughout the seventy
years between the revolutions of 1848 and the dissolution
of the Monarchy the army had seen itself as a special
institution, one above nationality and loyal to the
dynasty and the emperor.

Since the days of Prince Eugene,

the Monarchy's generals had been well aware of the
polyglot nature of the regiments they commanded, but up to
1848 the military leadership paid remarkably little
attention to the question of nationality.

The Archduke

Charles had insisted that there could be no privileged
nationalities in the ranks of the army, and in fact the
various nationalities were looked on with neither fear nor
favor.

Regiments were garrisoned throughout the Monarchy

with little regard for national origin; the imperial-royal
army lacked both the inclination and the resources to
operate any coherent system of garrisoning troops away
from their homelands.
The events of 1848 made the army's leadership aware
of the possibility of national revolt, and throughout the
1850s and 1860s Hungarian units were deliberately kept
away from Hungary.

Yet Magyar officers continued to be

commissioned into imperial-royal service, and there were
Magyar officers commanding Magyar troops.
381

Hungarian and

382
Italian units fought in the campaigns of 1859 and 1866,
and their performance, despite later legends of mass
disaffection, was by and large loyal.

The imperial

government was unable to overcome Hungarian political and
fiscal obstruction in the 1850s and 1860s, but the
imperial-royal army was able to integrate Hungarian
recruits and Hungarian regiments into its ranks and
instill a sense of common purpose.
The army leadership— exemplified by the Archduke
Albrecht— had been unwilling to station Hungarian
regiments inside Hungary, but after 1867 both the changed
political climate of the Monarchy and its straitened
finances meant that such a policy could not be maintained.
Throughout the late 1860s and 1870s there was a slow
movement of Hungarian regiments back to Hungary.
fears

The

raised by the revolution of 1848 had largely

evaporated.

No voices were raised in warning, and the

creation of the Honvdd, of a "national" Hungarian force
provoked little opposition from the military.

By 1883,

when the army was re-organized on a territorial basis, the
loyalty of the army— of regiments of all nationalities—
was taken for granted.

Opposition to territorialization

was based on fears for the army's combat efficiency, not
for its political reliability.
Territorialization put the army in direct contact
with the nationalities on a daily basis.

Yet in the
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political unrest that began in the 1890s, the army
remained a reliable instrument for maintaining order.

It

was after all a Honvdd unit that dispersed the Hungarian
Diet in 1906.

It was not the rank-and-file, but the

officer corps itself that began to show signs of
disaffection.
The world of the k.-u.-k officer corps became
increasingly narrow as the nineteenth century ended.

Its

members still saw themselves as direct vassals of the
emperor, and many of them had no nationality outside the
concept of army and regiment.

The economic and social

position of the officer corps declined relative to both
the bureaucracy and the civilian middle classes, and its
narrowly technical education meant that the officer corps
was increasingly cut off from political and intellectual
currents in the Monarchy.

They had been trained to be

loyal and to be above nationality, and in holding fast to
those ideas they came to doubt that any other group in the
Monarchy was prepared to be self-sacrificingly loyal.
The k.-u.-k. leadership was all too aware of the
army's material weakness, and they blamed it on political
weakness, on a lack of will on the part of the imperial
government.

In the last years before the war, the army's

leadership began to gravitate to figures who offered the
promise of "decisive" action— toward Conrad's dreams of a
war with Italy or Serbia, or toward Franz Ferdinand, who
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offered no less unrealistic plans for re-making the
Monarchy by a coup in Budapest.

Xn both cases these were

the counsels of futility and despair, and Conrad for one
was intermittently aware of the lack of realism in his
designs.

The Monarchy's generals were aware that their

special sense of loyalty was not shared outside the ranks
of the military, and they could not believe that there was
any alternative source of loyalty other than military
values.

''Action" would, they hoped, force others to once

again believe in the Monarchy; the irony is that a policy
of the "firm hand"— in Bosnia or in wartime Bohemia— only
drove much of the population away from any hope of
loyalty.
Archduke Albrecht wrote in the 1880s that the army
was the single great link holding the Monarchy together,
and that the Monarchy could not survive the break-up of
the army.

The peoples of the Monarchy surprised the

military leadership with their willingness to fight in
1914, with the unexpected depth of their loyalty.

Yet the

military leadership no longer trusted them, or even
trusted its own ability to defend the Monarchy.

Albrecht,

preparing for the territorial reforms of the 1880s, had
said that the strength of the army lay in its ability to
use the special characteristics of each nationality to
make a greater whole.

The men of Conrad's generation were

no longer able to envision an army— or a Monarchy— built
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along those lines.

The demand for an enforced unity had

failed for both Ferdinand II and Joseph II; it was no less
untenable for Franz Ferdinand and Conrad.

The

nationalities still had faith in the Monarchy in 1914.

It

was the k.-u.-k. leadership and not the nationalities that
first despaired of the future.
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